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Abstract
Formal argumentation based dialogue models have attracted some research in-
terests recently. Within this line of research, we propose a formal model for
argumentation-based dialogues between agents, using assumption-based argumen-
tation (ABA). Thus, the dialogues amount to conducting an argumentation process
in ABA. The model is given in terms of ABA-specific utterances, debate trees
and forests implicitly built during and drawn from dialogues, legal-move func-
tions (amounting to protocols) and outcome functions. Moreover, we investigate
the strategic behaviour of agents in dialogues, using strategy-move functions. We
instantiate our dialogue model in a range of dialogue types studied in the litera-
ture, including information-seeking, inquiry, persuasion, conflict resolution, and
discovery. Finally, we prove (1) a formal connection between dialogues and well-
known argumentation semantics, and (2) soundness and completeness results for
our dialogue models and dialogue strategies used in different dialogue types.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Argumentation based dialogue systems have attracted some research interests in
recent years (e.g. see [Pra06]), largely due to the need for agents to commu-
nicate and agree in multi-agent systems. The modern study of formal dialogue
systems for argumentation starts from Charles Hamblin’s work [Ham71]. The
topic was initially studied within philosophical logic and argumentation theory
[Mac90, WK95]. Subsequently, researchers from the field of artificial intelligence
& law [Gor94, Pra01] and multi-agent systems [APM00, PWA03] have looked into
dialogue systems as well.
Much literature has explained the role agent systems plays in the current com-
puting research (e.g., see [Woo09] for a thorough treatment on this subject). Here,
we quote from [JMP05] that gives a nice summary of software agents.
The rise of the Internet, ambient computing, ad-hoc networks and
virtual communities have led to a paradigm shift in how we view
computer systems and computation. Instead of computer systems be-
ing viewed simply as programs which execute some pre-determined
method, a better analogy is to view systems as societies of interacting
and autonomous entities, or “agents”, who combine together as and
when necessary to achieve possibly-conflicting individual objectives.
This agent-oriented perspective has become influential within com-
puter science over the last decade, and has made connections with
prior work in biology (e.g., ecology, evolutionary theory), physics
(statistical mechanics), economics (game theory) and sociology (or-
ganisation theory).
Wooldridge and Jennings give the following list of agent properties (quoted ver-
batim from [WJ95]).
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• autonomy: agents operate without the direct intervention of humans or oth-
ers, and have some kind of control over their actions and internal state;
• social ability: agents interact with other agents (and possibly humans) via
some kind of agent communication language;
• reactivity: agents perceive their environment (which may be the physical
world, a user via a graphical user interface, a collection of other agents, the
Internet, or perhaps all of these combined), and respond in a timely fashion
to changes that occur in it;
• pro-activeness: agents do not simply act in response to their environment,
they are able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking the initiative.
We can think of multi-agent systems as a collection of agents that co-exist in a
shared environment. Though it is uncertain if all agents in the environment share
some overarching goals or not, each agent certainly has its own goals. More-
over, usually it is the case that agents need to communicate in order to cooperate,
coordinate, and negotiate with other agents so as to reach their individual goals.
Therefore, it is easy to see the need for effective communication among agents
exists.
Much research has been dedicated to low level inter-agent communication, in
terms of languages and protocols for autonomous software agents. The most influ-
ential example is the development of the FIPA’s Agent Communications Language
(FIPA-ACL) [FIP02]. FIPA-ACL relies on speech act theory [Sea70, Aus75] de-
veloped by Searle and Austin. It defines a set of performatives, including ask-
if, ask-all, tell, deny, insert, etc. It also specifies allowed agent responses upon
receiving these performatives. However, the communication framework given
by FIPA-ACL, through its performatives, is a low level framework. To capture
more sophisticated higher level agent communication behaviours, e.g., inquiry,
and information-seeking, dialogue models have been proposed.
Two major questions need to be addressed in a study of dialogue models. Firstly,
how to construct “coherent” dialogues? Secondly, how to construct dialogues with
specific goals? The first question can be addressed by introducing dialogue pro-
tocols; and the second question can be addressed by studying dialogue strategies.
This thesis is concerned with answering these two questions. Our goals are to:
• Develop a generic argumentation dialogue framework capable of supporting
various types of dialogue.
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• Study strategic behaviours of agents participating in different types of dia-
logues.
Hence, we address the high level agent communication need as follows:
In multi-agent systems, argumentation dialogues are a viable and
appropriate means for agents to exchange information and delib-
erate.
Specifically, this thesis presents a two-agent argumentation based dialogue model.
We use Assumption-based Argumentation (ABA) [DKT09] as the underlying rep-
resentation for arguments, as ABA is a general purpose, widely used argumen-
tation framework. In ABA, there are strong theoretical results to use, e.g., there
are existing work in computing acceptable arguments within an ABA framework
with respect to various argumentation semantics [DKT09]. Moreover, there is a
clear relation between ABA and Abstract Argumentation (AA) framework, i.e.,
ABA and AA are instances of each other [DMT07]. Hence all theoretical results
obtained in AA are applicable in ABA.
In ABA, we have rules, assumptions, and contraries. Informally, rules and
assumptions form deductions (arguments); contraries of assumptions provide a
means of specifying “counter-arguments” for arguments composed of rules and
assumptions. Within an ABA framework, arguments are deemed “acceptable” if
certain properties of these arguments are fulfilled, e.g., an argument does not “at-
tack” itself and attacks all arguments that attack it. In our model, a dialogue is
composed of utterances with contents either a rule, an assumption, a contrary, a
topic, a goal, or pass. A dialogue starts with an agent posing a topic/goal and
completes when both agents utter pass.
To ensure coherence of a dialogue, we introduce a set of legal-move and out-
come functions. Legal-move functions are mappings from dialogues to utterances.
Hence, given an incomplete dialogue, a legal-move function returns a set of al-
lowed utterances that extends the dialogue. Legal-move functions can then be
viewed as dialogue protocols. Outcome functions are mappings from dialogues to
true/false. Given a dialogue, an outcome function returns true if a certain property
holds within that dialogue.
Through dialogues, the participating agents construct a “joint knowledge base”
by pooling all information disclosed in the dialogue to form the ABA framework,
Fδ, drawn from a dialogue, δ. Since Fδ contains all information that the two
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agents have uttered in the dialogue, it gives the context of examining the accept-
ability of the claim of the dialogue. Conceptually, a dialogue is “successful” if its
claim is “acceptable” in Fδ. Rather than checking success retrospectively, once
the dialogue is completed, we define legal-move functions guaranteed to gener-
ate successful dialogues. This main result is obtained by mapping the debate tree
generated from a dialogue to an abstract dispute tree [DKT06].
Some of the earlier studies on dialogue systems have categorised dialogues into
six types: persuasion, negotiation, inquiry, deliberation, information-seeking and
eristics [WK95]. Each of these types of dialogues has its own goals, and agents
participating in different types of dialogue have different interests. Hence different
types of dialogues call for different dialogue strategies.
Building upon the aforementioned dialogue protocols, dialogue strategies can
be formulated via strategy-move functions. These are mappings from dialogues
and legal-move functions to utterances. Hence, given a dialogue and a legal-move
function, a strategy-move function selects a subset of the set of utterances allowed
by the legal-move function such that utterances within this subset advance the
dialogue towards the agents’ and the dialogue’s specific goals.
For instance, in an information-seeking dialogue, a questioner agent poses a
topic and an answerer agent puts forward information that is related to the topic.
The aim of the dialogue is to build proper (arguments) for this topic. The be-
haviours of the questioner and the answerer can be captured by two strategy-
move functions: the pass and the non-attack strategy-move functions, respectively.
Agents (questioners) that use a pass strategy-move function put forward the claim
and no other utterance in a dialogue; agents (answerers) that use a non-attack
strategy-move function only utter rules and assumptions, but not contraries.
To summarise, this thesis studies argumentation based dialogue models from
two angles (1) dialogue protocols, which are used to keep the integrity of dia-
logues and guarantee the acceptability of the claim of a dialogue and (2) dialogue
strategies, which identify appropriate utterances that advance a dialogue towards
its goal and the goals of the agents participating in the dialogue.
1.2 Structure of Thesis
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents background studies on
argumentation frameworks, especially ABA, and argumentation dialogues.
Chapter 3 presents basic notions of our ABA based dialogue model. Core ele-
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ments of our model, including legal-move, outcome and strategy-move functions,
are introduced.
Chapter 4 discusses our dialogue protocols in detail and links dialogues to argu-
mentation semantics. We present several legal-move functions and prove sound-
ness results of our dialogue model. Basically, we show that for a dialogue that
is compatible with certain legal-move functions, the claim of this dialogue is “ac-
ceptable” in the ABA framework drawn from the dialogue.
Chapter 5 discusses dialogue strategies that agents use through various dia-
logues. Several strategy-move functions are presented in detail in this chapter.
We prove soundness and completeness results for claims of dialogues.
Chapter 6 instantiates our dialogue framework to model information-seeking
and inquiry dialogues. We formally define these two types of dialogues and prove
completeness and soundness results with respect to information disclosed through-
out dialogues with certain legal-move and strategy-move functions.
Chapter 7 further instantiates and extends our framework to model conflict res-
olution and discovery dialogues.
We conclude in Chapter 8 with a summary of this thesis and a list of possible
future works.
1.3 Contributions
The contributions of the thesis are as follows:
• Presentation of a generic dialogue model (Chapters 3, 4). This sets the foun-
dation for all later formalisations of various types of dialogues.
• Presentation of a catalogue of dialogue strategies for agents (Chapter 5).
This gives a way of specifying agent behaviours in dialogues.
• Formalisation of information-seeking and inquiry dialogues (Chapter 6).
This illustrates our dialogue model and justifies it by showing various re-
sults.
• Formalisation of persuasion dialogue with mechanism design techniques
(Chapter 6). This gives an example on how mechanism design techniques
can be applied in argumentation based dialogues. Our results include that:
under specified conditions, neither the two agents in a persuasion will lie in
dialogues.
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• Formalisation of discovery and conflict resolution dialogue (Chapter 7). This
further justifies our dialogue model by applying it to more types of dia-
logues.
1.4 Statement of Originality
I declare that this thesis was composed by myself and that the work it presents is
my own, except where otherwise stated.
1.5 Publications
The work in this thesis brings together and builds upon work published as follows:
• (Chapter 4) Xiuyi Fan, Francesca Toni, Assumption-based Argumentation
Dialogues, Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial In-
telligence (IJCAI 2011), July 16-22, 2011, Barcelona, Spain [FT11a]
• (Chapter 5) Xiuyi Fan, Francesca Toni, Agent Strategies for ABA based
Information-seeking and Inquiry Dialogues, 20th European Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2012), August 27-31, 2012, Montpellier, France
[FT12a]
• (Chapter 6) Xiuyi Fan, Francesca Toni, Mechanism Design for Argumenta-
tion based Persuasion Dialogues, Fourth International Conference on Com-
putational Models of Argument (COMMA 2012), September 10-12, 2012,
Vienna, Austria [FT12c]
• (Chapter 7) Xiuyi Fan, Francesca Toni, Argumentation Dialogues for Two-
Agent Conflict Resolution, Fourth International Conference on Computa-
tional Models of Argument (COMMA 2012), September 10-12, 2012, Vi-
enna, Austria [FT12b]
• (Chapter 7) Xiuyi Fan, Francesca Toni, A First Step towards Argumenta-
tion Dialogues for Discovery, First International Workshop on the Theory
and Applications of Formal Argumentation (TAFA-11), July 16-17, 2011,
Barcelona, Spain [FT11c]
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• (Chapter 7) Xiuyi Fan, Francesca Toni, Two-Agent Conflict Resolution with
Argumentation Dialogues (Extended Abstract), Tenth International Confer-
ence on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent System (AAMAS 2011), May
2-6, 2011, Taipei, China [FT11b]
The work published in the following paper has also contributed to some early
ideas that lead to this thesis, even though not explicitly included.
• Xiuyi Fan, Francesca Toni, Adil Hussain, Multi-Agent Conflict Resolution
with Assumption-based Argumentation. Third International Conference on
Computational Models of Argument (COMMA 2010), 8th-10th September
2010, Desenzano del Garda, Italy [FTH10]
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2 Background
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we cover the following topics. Firstly, we look at argumentation
from a historical perspective and develop a general understanding of what argu-
mentation is about (Section 2.2). We then give some more formal discussion about
the Abstract Argumentation (AA) framework (Section 2.3). After that, we move
to the Assumption-based Argumentation (ABA) framework, which serves as the
underlying framework for the rest of this thesis (Section 2.4). With a good un-
derstanding of argumentation, and ABA in particular, we move to argumentation
based dialogues (Section 2.5). We review two existing dialogue frameworks. This
review helps us to put the research presented in this thesis into context.
2.2 Argumentation
Argumentation is usually traced back to ancient Greek philosophers [RS09]. In
particular, it is often attributed to Aristotle, for his work in formal deductive rea-
soning and rhetoric [Bil87, BH08].
It is interesting to consider some early development of argumentation. Toulmin,
while aiming at the study of “twentieth-century epistemology” (Preface to the Up-
dated Edition, 2003 edition, page vii [Tou58]), gives a description of a semi-formal
argumentation model. Toulmin has touched upon many topics that have attracted
the attention of several researchers later on.
In [Tou58], Toulmin has described that arguments are performed within a certain
“field” with respect to a given “modal”. The “field” can be roughly understood as
the scope or domain where an argument takes place. We can view this as defining
the scope of a particular argumentation framework. The “Modal” can be viewed as
an early attempt to understand argumentation semantics, whether we understand
argumentation semantics broadly as criteria of classifying arguments into “accept-
able” ones or not.
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Furthermore, Toulmin has discussed about uncertainty in arguments. Intuitively,
while an argument is constructed, the facts used to support the claim might be
uncertain; the rules used to deduct the claim from facts might also be uncertain.
While an argument is attacked, the attack relation between arguments might also
be uncertain. Recent research has attempted to incorporate these uncertainty into
their argumentation frameworks, e.g., [Zuk09] gives a few pointers to more recent
research in these directions.
Toulmin’s layout of arguments is shown in Figure 2.1. In this figure, D stands
for Data, Q stands for Qualifier, C stands for Claim, W stands for Warrant, B
stands for Backing, and R stands for Rebuttal [Tou58, Ver09]. Toulmin’s model
is well recognised and acknowledged in later works such as [Dun95]. However,
apart from mentioning “modal”, Toulmin has made little progress in formally un-
derstanding “argument acceptability” or “argumentation semantics” as we know
today.
Another line of influential work on early development of argumentation is by
Pollock [Pol94, Pol91, Pol87]. Prakken and Horty [PH12] give a nice summary
of Pollock’s contribution in computational argumentation. It is considered that
Pollock developed one of the first formal systems for argumentation based infer-
ence. Many topics in argumentation were first studied by Pollock, such as argu-
ment structure, the nature of defeasible reasons, the interplay between deductive
and defeasible reasons, rebutting versus undercutting defeat, argument strength,
argument labelings, self-defeat, and resource-bounded argumentation [PH12].
In Pollock’s view, defeasible reasoning is the following [Pol95] (Page 85):
Defeasible reasoning is, a fortiori, reasoning. Reasoning proceeds
by constructing arguments, where reasons provide the atomic links
in arguments. Conclusive reasons logically entail their conclusions.
Defeasibility arises from the fact that not all reasons are conclusive.
D // So, Q, C
Since W
On account of B Unless R
Figure 2.1: Toulmin’s layout of arguments.
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Those that are not are prima facie reasons. Prima facie reasons create
a presumption in favour of their conclusion, but it is defeasible.
Pollock considers arguments as inference trees, where the nodes are statements,
with the leaf nodes being premises, and the links are applications of “reasons”.
Formally, Pollock considers sequences of lines from an argument. Each line from
an argument is a tuple (ϕ, r, l, s), where ϕ is a proposition, r is the reason applied
to infer ϕ, l is the set of preceding lines from which ϕ is inferred, and s is the
line’s strength (a number). A sequence of such lines is a (linear) argument if each
line is such that its proposition is either inferred from earlier lines or taken from
the knowledge base [PH12].
With his definition of arguments, Pollock defines defeat as follows.
• An argument line (ϕ, r, l, s) defeats an argument line (ϕ′, r′, l′, s′) if and
only if
– r′ is a defeasible rule, and
– s ≥ s′, and
– ϕ = ¬ϕ′ or ϕ = ¬r′ (here ¬r is shorthand for saying that the an-
tecedents of rule r do not support its consequent).
• An argument A defeats an argument B if and only if a line of A defeats a line
of B.
In addition to argument construction, with argument defeat relation defined, Pol-
lock has also worked on various argumentation semantics. For him, a semantics
is an account of how the set of constructed arguments, taken together with their
defeat relations, determines what a cogniser should believe. His understanding
is the same as today’s view on argumentation semantics. Here we do not repeat
Pollock’s two semantics definitions, which can be found in [Pol87] and [Pol95],
respectively. We just point out that, as proved in [Dun95] and [JV99], under cer-
tain conditions, Pollock’s two semantics are equivalent to Dung’s grounded and
preferred semantics [Dun95] (both introduced later), respectively.
From a modern perspective, argumentation is a useful technique in comput-
ing. Argumentation theories have been in rapid development in the field of artifi-
cial intelligence, and logical computing in particular, e.g., Rahwan and McBurney
[RM07] say:
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[...] if logic is the means by which computers think, then argumenta-
tion is the means by which intelligent computers interact, both with
one another and with humans.
Hence, argumentation is a means for intelligent computer interaction.
Applications of argumentation in computing are developed in many areas. In the
area of medical application, many argumentation based expert systems and tutorial
systems have been developed [FGG+07]. Argumentation has long been used in
legal reasoning, e.g. Bench-Capon et al [BCPS09] present a detailed overview of
argumentation applications developed for legal reasoning in the past two decades.
Argumentation has also been used in recommendation systems [CnMS06]. Here,
contrary to machine learning based systems, argumentation provides a white-box
approach. Users of such systems not only receive the recommendation, but the
reasoning behind it. In the context of Semantic Grid and Semantic Web, argu-
mentation is also an emerging technology [TGK+08]. Supported by ontology
frameworks, web services, and Grid computing, argumentation is a natural way
for agents to interact with one another [RS09, TSL+07, TGC07, MS07].
A few informal definitions for argumentation are presented to set up the ground
for our discussion. These definitions are based on the argumentation framework
used throughout this thesis, though they represent similar concepts in most other
argumentation frameworks as well. Formal definitions follow later.
Argument: An argument is a set of propositions composed of three parts: a
claim, some premises, and an inference from the premises to the claim.
Contradiction: Two formulas are in contradiction, for example, if one negates
the other.
Attack: One argument, A, attacks another argument, B, if and only if the con-
clusion of A is a contradiction with a premise of B.
2.3 Abstract Argumentation
Abstract argumentation (AA) [Dun95] is developed as one of the first compu-
tational argumentation frameworks. An AA framework is simply a pair AF =
〈A,R〉, consisting of a set of arguments, A, and a binary attack relation, R. For
example,
AF = 〈{A, B, C}, {(A, B),(B, A), (B, C), (C, C)}〉
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Figure 2.2: An argumentation graph example.
is an argumentation framework.
AA is abstract as its arguments and attacks are both atomic. Moreover, there is
no other relation between arguments defined in AA, except attacks.
An abstract argumentation system captures “inconsistency” between arguments,
given by the relation of attack, hence not all arguments can co-exist with each
other. It is essential to determine which arguments are acceptable. Intuitively,
arguments that are not attacked should be accepted; arguments that are attacked
and cannot somehow withstand their attacks should not be accepted. As we show
in the next section, [Dun95, BG09] have proposed a full suite of policies, which
are called semantics, to determine the acceptability of arguments in an abstract
argumentation framework. These argumentation semantics have been adopted and
used in many other argumentation frameworks.
Abstract argumentation is usually represented as directed graphs. As introduced
in [Dun95], arguments are represented as nodes and attacks are represented as
directed links in these graphs. Figure 2.2, is the directed graph for the ealier argu-
mentation framework
AF = 〈{A, B, C}, {(A, B),(B, A), (B, C), (C, C)}〉.
From Figure 2.2, it can be noticed that in an argumentation framework, two argu-
ments can attack each other (arguments A and B) and an argument can attack itself
(argument C).
In the literature, extension is used to describe a subset of arguments. An “ac-
ceptable” extension, E, is a set of arguments which jointly withstand from attacks
according to a given semantics. Formally, given an abstract argumentation frame-
work AF = 〈A,R〉 and a semantics S, the set of extensions prescribed by S for
AF is denoted as ES(AF ) ⊆ 2A. The acceptability of an argument a ∈ A is now
defined as its membership of elements of ES(AF ).
Intuitively, an extension requires all elements in the extension not to attack each
other, hence to be conflict-free.
• Formally, given an argumentation framework AF = 〈A,R〉, a set S ⊆ A is
conflict-free if and only if @a, b ∈ S such that (a, b) ∈ R.
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A further requirement of an extension is that a set of arguments can withstand
attacks by firing back counterattacks, hence be acceptable.
• Formally, given an argumentation framework AF = 〈A,R〉, an argument
a ∈ A is acceptable with respect to a set S ⊆ A if and only if ∀b ∈ A :
(b, a) ∈ R ⇒ (∃c ∈ S : (c, b) ∈ R).
A set of arguments is acceptable if and only if all of its elements jointly defend the
set by issuing counterattacks.
• Formally, a set S ⊆ A is acceptable if and only if ∀x ∈ A,∀b ∈ S : (x, b) ∈
R ⇒ ∃c ∈ S(c, x) ∈ R.
With conflict-freeness and acceptability defined, we can define admissibility in
terms of sets that are both conflict-free and acceptable.
• Admissible: Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈A,R〉, an exten-
sion E is admissible if and only if E is conflict-free and acceptable.
The admissible semantics is the most widely used semantics, both in abstract
argumentation and other works [RS09]. Admissibility is easy to understand as
a set of arguments which do not attack themselves but attack all arguments that
attack this set. Several other semantics have been developed such that each of
them is believed to have better use in certain applications.
• Complete: Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈A,R〉, an extension
E is complete if and only if E is admissible and every argument ofA which
is acceptable with respect to E belongs to E.
• Grounded: An extension is grounded if and only if it is the smallest set, with
respect to set inclusion, of arguments which is complete.
• Preferred: An extension is preferred if and only if it is a maximal set, with
respect to set inclusion, of arguments which is admissible.
• Ideal: An extension is ideal if and only if it is a maximal set, with respect to
set inclusion, of arguments which is admissible and a subset of all preferred
extensions.
• Stable: An extension is stable if and only if it is conflict-free and attacks all
arguments that are not in it.
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A // B // C // D
Figure 2.3: Argumentation graph for Example 2.
Example 1. In the argumentation framework:
AF = 〈{A, B, C}, {(A, B), (B, A), (B, C), (C, C)}}〉,
shown in Figure 2.2, we can obtain extensions as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Argumentation semantics for Example 1
Semantics Sets
Conflict-free {}, {A}, {B}
Admissible {}, {A}, {B}
Complete {}, {A}, {B}
Grounded {}
Preferred {A}, {B}
Ideal {}
Stable {B}
Example 2. In the argumentation framework:
AF = 〈{A, B, C, D}, {(A, B), (B, C), (C, D)}}〉,
shown in Figure 2.3, we can obtain extensions as shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Argumentation semantics Example 2
Semantics Sets
Conflict-free {}, {A}, {B}, {C}, {D}, {A, C}, {B, D}
Admissible {}, {A}, {A, C}
Complete {A, C}
Grounded {A, C}
Preferred {A, C}
Ideal {A, C}
Stable {A, C}
Example 3. In the argumentation framework,
AF = 〈{A, B, C, D, E}, {(A, B), (B, C), (C, A), (D, E), (E, D), (E, E)}〉,
shown in Figure 2.4, we can obtain extensions as shown in Table 2.3.
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Figure 2.4: Argumentation graph Example 3.
Table 2.3: Argumentation semantics Example 3.
Semantics Sets
Conflict-free {}, {A}, {B}, {C}, {D}, {A, D}, {B, D}, {C, D}
Admissible {}, {D}
Complete {}, {D}
Grounded {}
Preferred {D}
Ideal {D}
Stable
In addition to the extension based approach introduced previously, the labelling
approach for computing semantics has been introduced [CG09]. As shown in
[MC09], when computing extensions in Abstract Argumentation frameworks, many
of the argumentation semantics (admissible, complete, grounded, preferred, and
stable) can be computed with the labelling approach. The process works as fol-
lows (sketch):
• Each argument in an argumentation framework can be either: IN, OUT or
UNDEC.
• Given an AA framework 〈A,R〉, for x, y ∈ A, the labelling requirements
specify the following:
– x is IN if and only if every y that attacks x is OUT.
– x is OUT if and only if there is at least one y that attacks x such that y
is IN.
– x is UNDEC if and only if there is no y that attacks x such that y is IN,
and it is not the case that: for all y, y attacks x implies y is OUT.
Given a labelling L, in(L) and undec(L) denote the sets of arguments that
is labelled IN and UNDEC, respectively. With the above labelling specification,
argument labelling can be mapped to extensions, as follows:
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• A labelling is admissible if and only if all arguments labelled IN and OUT
satisfy the labelling requirements.
• A labelling is complete if and only if all arguments labelled UNDEC satisfy
the labelling requirements.
• Let L be a complete labelling, then:
– L is grounded if and only if there does not exist a complete labelling
L′ such that in(L′) ⊂ in(L).
– L is preferred if and only if there does not exist a complete labelling
L′ such that in(L′) ⊃ in(L).
– L is stable if and only if undec(L) = {}.
With labelling defined, Modgil and Caminada have shown a result that links
labelling with extension semantics. Theorem 6.1 in [MC09] states the following:
Let AF = 〈A,R〉 be an argumentation framework, and a set of argu-
ments E ⊆ A. For S ∈ {admissible, complete, grounded, preferred,
stable}, E ∈ ES(AF ) if and only if there exists an S labelling L with
in(L) = E.
Modgil and Caminada state that the labelling approach not only is a viable way
of computing argumentation semantics, but also is a useful tool for introducing
argumentation semantics to people.
2.4 Assumption-based Argumentation
At the same time as the initial development of AA, another argumentation frame-
work, Assumption-based Argumentation (ABA) [BDKT97, BTK93, DKT09], had
been developed. Unlike attacks in abstract argumentation, which are abstract and
atomic, logic deductions supported by assumptions are used to define arguments.
The notion of contrary is introduced to facilitate attacks between arguments. The
idea of contrary goes beyond negation. For instance, “it is raining” is not only
contrary to “it is not raining” but also to “it is sunny.”
In ABA, arguments are trees, where the root of a tree is the claim of the argu-
ments; and leaves are either assumptions or facts. Using the notion of contrary, an
argument A attacks an argument B if and only if the claim of A is in contrary with
an assumption of B.
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Formally, as in [DKT09], an ABA framework is a tuple 〈L,R,A, C〉 where
• 〈L,R〉 is a deductive system, with a language L and a set of inference rules
R of the form β0 ← β1, . . . , βm(m ≥ 0) with βi ∈ L, and if m > 1, then
βi 6= βj for i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m1;
• A ⊆ L is a (non-empty) set, whose elements are referred to as assumptions,
• C is a total mapping from A into 2L \ {{}}, where each c ∈ C(α) is a
contrary of α2.
Given β0 ← β1, ..., βm, β0 is referred as the head and β1, ..., βm as the body.
We will use the following notation: Head(β0 ← β1, ..., βm) = β0; Body(β0 ←
β1, ..., βm) = β1, ..., βm. An ABA framework is flat if and only if no assumption
is the head of a rule.
Example 4. Given an ABA framework AF1 = 〈L,R1,A1, C1〉 as follows:
• L1 = {a, b, c, p, q, r},
• R1 = {p← a, q ← b, r ← c},
• A1 = {a, b, c},
• C1 is: C1(a) = {q}, C1(b) = {p}, C1(c) = {r, q}.
AF1 is flat.
Let AF2 = 〈L,R2,A2, C2〉 be:
• L2 = {a, p, q},
• R2 = {p← a},
• A2 = {p, a},
1Standard ABA [DKT09] does not require βi 6= βj , but this can be imposed with no loss of
generality. Suppose there are two otherwise identical ABA frameworks, one with rules such that
βi = βj , one with rules such that βi 6= βj (all corresponding rules are otherwise identical),
then, for any sentence β in the language of the two ABA frameworks, the acceptability of β
with respect to a given semantics (defined later) are the same in both frameworks, e.g., suppose
we have two ABA frameworks that are otherwise identical, except one has a rule p ← q, q
whereas the others has a rule p ← q, we can show that for any sentence β in the language, the
acceptability of β is the same in both frameworks.
2Here, as in [GT08], we define the contrary of an assumption as a total mapping from an assumption
to a set of sentences, instead of a mapping from an assumption to a sentence as in the original
ABA [BDKT97].
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• C2 is: C2(a) = {q}, C2(p) = {q}.
AF2 is not flat as p is both the head of a rule (p← a) and an assumption.
ABA frameworks can be defined for any logic specified by means of inference
rules. Sentences in the underlying language are assumptions. Arguments are de-
ductions of a claim supported by a set of assumptions. Attacks are directed at the
assumptions in inference rules.
Formally, given a deduction system 〈L,R〉, a set of rules R, and a set of as-
sumptions A ⊆ L, an argument for c ∈ L (the claim) supported by A ⊆ A is a
tree with nodes labelled by sentences in L or by the symbol τ 3, such that
1. the root is labelled by c
2. for every node N
• if N is a leaf then N is labelled either by an assumption or by τ ;
• if N is not a leaf and β0 is the label of N , then there is an inference
rule β0 ← β1, ..., βm(m ≥ 0) and eitherm = 0 and the child ofN is τ
or m > 0 and N has m children, labelled by β1, ..., βm (respectively)
3. A is the set of all assumptions labelling the leaves.
We use A ` c to denote an argument with assumptions A and claim c.
With the notion of arguments and contrary of assumption, we can formally de-
fine attack in an ABA framework as [DKT09]:
• an argumentA1 ` c1 attacks an argumentA2 ` c2 if and only if the claim c1
of the first argument is the contrary of one of the assumptions in the support
A2 of the second argument (∃α ∈ A2 such that c1 ∈ C(α));
• a set of arguments As attacks a set of arguments Bs if an argument in As
attacks an argument in Bs;
• a set of assumptions A1 attacks a set of assumptions A2 if and only if an
argument supported by a subset of A1 attacks an argument supported by a
subset of A2.
3τ /∈ L intuitively represents “true”.
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Example 5. (Continuation of Example 4) InAF1, we have {a} ` p attacks {b} `
q, {b} ` q attacks {a} ` p, {b} ` q attacks {c} ` r, and {c} ` r attacks {c} ` r.
We also say that {a} attacks {b}, {b} attacks {a}, {b} attacks {c}, and {c} attacks
{c}.
Figure 2.5 illustrates arguments as trees.
{a} ` p {b} ` q {c} ` r
p q r
a
OO
b
OO
c
OO
Figure 2.5: Arguments in Example 5.
With argument and attack defined, all semantics introduced in abstract argumen-
tation can be applied in ABA. These semantics can also be defined for assumptions,
as follows [BTK93, BDKT97].
Formally, given F = 〈L,R,A, C〉:
• a set of assumptions is admissible (in F) if and only if it does not attack
itself and it attacks all A ⊆ A that attack it;
• a set of assumptions is complete (in F) if and only if it is admissible and
contains all assumptions it defends, where a set of assumptions A defends
another set of assumptionsA′ if and only ifA attacks all sets of assumptions
that attack A′;
• a set of assumptions is grounded (in F) if and only if it is the least set (with
respect to ⊆) that is complete;
• a set of assumptions is preferred (in F) if and only if it is maximally admis-
sible (with respect to ⊆);
• a set of assumptions is ideal (in F) if and only if it is the largest (with
respect to ⊆) admissible set contained in all maximally (with respect to ⊆)
admissible sets;
We can also define for individual argument and sentence to be acceptable, as
follows:
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• an argument A ` β is admissible (complete, grounded, preferred, ideal)
(in F) supported by A′ ⊆ A if and only if A ⊆ A′ and A′ is admissible
(complete, grounded, preferred, ideal, respectively);
• a sentence is admissible (complete, grounded, preferred, ideal) (in F) if and
only if it is the claim of an argument that is admissible (complete, grounded,
preferred, ideal, respectively) supported by some A ⊆ A.
Furthermore, it can be seen that ABA is an instance of AA [DMT07], as illus-
trated in Example 6.
Example 6. (Continuation of Example 5) In AF1, we have arguments {a} ` p,
{b} ` q and {c} ` r. If we name these three arguments as A, B, C, respectively,
then we have the argument-attack relation presented in Example 1.
Later on, we will use the term frameworks to describe tuples of the form 〈L,R,
A, C〉 but where C is a mapping from A into 2L. Obviously, ABA frameworks are
frameworks but not vice versa.
We will use the abstract dispute trees of [DKT06] to prove some of our results
later, where an abstract dispute tree for an argument A is a (possibly infinite) tree
T a (a for abstract):
1. every node of T a is labelled by an argument and is assigned the status of
either a proponent (P) node or an opponent (O) node, but not both;
2. the root of T a is a P node labelled by A;
3. for every P node n labelled by an argument B, and for every argument C that
attacks B, there exists a child of n, which is an O node labelled by C;
4. for every O node n labelled by an argument B, there exists exactly one child
of n which is a P node labelled by an argument which attacks some assump-
tion α in the set supporting B. α is said to be the culprit in B;
5. there are no other nodes in T a except those given by 1-4 above.
The set of all assumptions in (the support of arguments of) the proponent nodes in
T a is called the defence set of T a.
An abstract dispute tree is admissible if and only if no culprit in the argument
of an opponent node belongs to the defence set of T a. The defence set of an
admissible abstract dispute tree T a for an argument A is admissible (Theorem 5.1
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in [DKT06]), and A is in an admissible extension and the sentence in the root node
of A is admissible.
An abstract dispute tree is grounded if and only if it is admissible and finite. The
defence set of a grounded abstract dispute tree T a for an argument A is grounded.
An abstract dispute tree is ideal if and only if for no opponent nodeO in the tree
there exists an admissible tree with root O. The defence set of an ideal abstract
dispute tree for an argument is ideal (Theorem 3.4 in [DMT07]).
An abstract dispute tree example is shown in Figure 2.6. We can see that this
tree is admissible, but not ideal.
P : A
O : B
OO
P : A
OO
...
OO
Figure 2.6: An abstract dispute tree for the argument A in Figure 2.2.
2.5 Dialogue
In this thesis, we consider that a dialogue is composed of a sequence of utterances
made by the participating agents. In [Car83], the author nicely summarises the use
of dialogue systems:
[in agent systems] logic is used to define the condition under which a
proposition is true and dialogue systems define the conditions under
which an utterance is appropriate.
A well recognised dialogue taxonomy is given in [WK95]. Walton and Krabbe
divide dialogues into six different types (see Table 2.4, adapted from [WK95]).
Later parts of this thesis study information-seeking, inquiry, and persuasion dia-
logues in some depth. For these three dialogue types, Walton and Krabbe state
[WK95]:
The information-seeking dialogue arises from an initial situation where
one participant has some knowledge, or is in a position to know some-
thing, and the other party both lacks and needs that information. Thus
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Table 2.4: Dialogue types (adapted from [WK95]).
Type Initial Situation Main Goal Participants’ Aims
Persuasion Conflicting Resolution of Persuade the Other(s)
Point of View Such Conflicts
by Verbal Means
Negotiation Conflict of Making a Deal Get the Best out of
Interests & Need it for Oneself
Inquiry General Ignorance Growth of Find a “Proof”
Knowledge & or Destroy One
Agreement
Deliberation Need for Action Reach a Decision Influence Outcome
Information- Personal Ignorance Spreading Gain, Pass on, Show
Seeking Knowledge & or Hide Personal
Revealing Knowledge
Positions
Eristics Conflict & Reaching a Strike the Others
Antagonism (Provisional) Party & Win in the
Accommodation in Onlookers
a Relationship
the initial situation for information-seeking dialogue is asymmetrical.
The goal is some kind of spreading of knowledge.
The inquiry is a type of dialogue that strives to establish or “prove”
propositions in order to answer a question (solve a problem) in such a
way that a stable and general agreement on the matter at issue results.
The Persuasion dialogue (critical discussion) always arises from a
conflict of opinions, and its goal is to resolve the conflict, to arrive
at a final outcome of stable agreement in the end.
Walton and Krabbe’s taxonomy gives a summary of dialogue goals and partici-
pants’ aims for different type of dialogues. Dialogue systems provide a computa-
tional means of realising these goals and aims.
From the computational perspective, dialogue systems has been studied, e.g.
in [Pra06]. In such systems, two or more participants exchange statements for a
purpose, e.g., seeking information, resolving a difference of opinion, etc. Com-
putationally, a complete dialogue system usually includes the following elements
[Lou98]:
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• Contents of utterances during the dialogue.
• Occasions of making any utterance (conditions on when an utterance can be
made).
• Consequences of receiving an utterance.
• Mechanisms of determining the outcome of a dialogue.
The list above gives the principle elements of dialogue frameworks. An impor-
tant factor is that an utterance is appropriate if it furthers the goal of the dialogue
in which it is made. Carlson [Car83] has proposed a game-theoretic approach to
dialogues, in which speech acts are viewed as moves in a game and rules for their
appropriateness are formulated as rules of the game. Such treatment has since been
the standard approach of dialogue systems [Pra06].
Prakken has further formalised dialogue systems [Pra06]. He proposes to anal-
yse dialogue systems with a number of elements as follows.
• Dialogue goal: purpose of the dialogue.
• Topic language: the language that describes the content of each utterance.
• Communication language: the language that facilitates the discussion.
• Context: the background and the scope of the dialogue.
• Protocol: the rules defining the legal moves in a dialogue.
• Effect rules: the rules that define the effect of an utterance.
• Outcome rules: the rules that define the outcome of the dialogue.
This list is general enough that many dialogue systems follow suit. Chapter 3 and
4 of this thesis are dedicate to the presentation of our ABA based dialogue system.
Though we do not explicitly follow this list while defining our terms, much of our
effort can be mapped to this list.
Black and Hunter [BH09] present a formal dialogue system for inquiry dia-
logues using Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP) [GS04] as its underlying ar-
gumentation framework. Using Prakken’s framework as a guideline, we can view
that dialogue system as shown in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5: Black and Hunter’s inquiry dialogue framework.
Dialogue Goal: To inquiry a given topic
Topic Language: Restricted set of propositional logic
Comm. Language: Specifically defined with moves: open, close and assert
Context: Generic
Protocol: See Definition 24 and 28 of [BH09]
Effect Rules: Not directly applicable
Outcome Rules: See Definition 26 and 30 of [BH09]
Black and Hunter have considered two types of inquiry dialogues in [BH09],
argument inquiry and warrant inquiry. In both dialogues, the two participat-
ing agents jointly inquire about topics. Argument inquiry dialogues allow two
agents to share knowledge to jointly construct arguments (roughly speaking, in
their frameworks, arguments are deductions of topics); whereas warrant dialogues
allow two agents to share knowledge to jointly construct dialectical trees. The di-
alectical tree defined by Black and Hunter resemble the abstract dispute trees we
have presented earlier in that “the dialectical tree can be considered a tree with an
argument at each node in which a child node is a counter argument to its parent”.
Black and Hunter have defined their framework in steps. Firstly, they define
that their framework contains three moves (type of utterances): open, close and
assert. Then, they define their dialogues as sequences of moves satisfying three
requirements: (1) starting with an open move, (2) every move must be made to a
participant of the dialogue, and (3) maintaining a strict interleaving between the
two agents. A dialogue terminates when both agents make the close move. A
dialogue proceeds by agents contributing sentences as the content of their moves.
In argument inquiry dialogues, only sentences that “expand” the deduction of the
topic are allowed in the dialogue; whereas in warrant dialogues sentences that are
both expanding and in conflict with the topic can be uttered. In both cases, there
is a “relevance” requirement such that all utterances are “related” to the claim in
both dialogues.
Black and Hunter have used the “union” of the two agents’ knowledge as the
benchmark for evaluation. They have proved that their framework is both sound
and complete, i.e., for their argument inquiry dialogues, if there is an argument
in the union of the two agents’ knowledge base, then such argument can be con-
structed in their dialogues, and if their dialogue finds an argument, then this argu-
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ment exists in the union of the two agents’ knowledge base. Similar results have
been shown for their warrant inquiry dialogue as well. These results hold mostly
because of the exhaustive strategy they enforce, which defines that during a dia-
logue, if the protocol allows making an utterance, then the agent has to make such
utterance, i.e., agents cannot hide any information that is “relevant” to the topic in
discussion.
Compare with their work, the work presented in this thesis have a few advan-
tages. Namely,
1. by using a structured argumentation framework, i.e., ABA, we allow dia-
logues to be computed with different argumentation semantics, e.g., admis-
sibility and grounded, whereas their system uses DeLP and does not support
this computation;
2. our framework is generic and supports many types of dialogues whereas
their system is only used for inquiry.
Prakken [Pra05] defines a formal dialogue system for persuasion dialogues.
Properties of that system are summarised in Table 2.6. Similarly to Table 2.5,
much of the detail of Prakken’s system could not be captured in a compact ta-
ble. However, it can be seen that these two systems serve as examples of dialogue
systems and they share the common framework described in [Pra06].
Prakken has introduced two notions of dialogues in [Pra05], liberal and relevant.
Both liberal and relevant dialogues are supported with moves: claim, why, argue,
concede and retract. Prakken’s liberal dialogues are somewhat similar to Black
and Hunter’s dialogues, in that the dialogue starts with a topic, and all moves need
to be related to some earlier moves. In Prakken’s framework, an argument is a
deduction with a conclusion (conc) and premises (prem). Prakken defines extends
as “An argument B extends an argument A if conc(B) = ϕ and ϕ ∈ prem(A)
(for example, r since s extends p since q, r).” Unlike Black and Hunter, Prakken
requires no explicit interleaving between the two agents and he has specifically
defined a turn-taking function to decide which agent makes the next move. Another
difference between the two frameworks is that Prakken’s system does not exploit
internal structures of arguments. Therefore moves are operated at the level of
arguments rather than at the level of logic sentences. This is less of a concern for
Prakken as he has focused on persuasion dialogues and there is little need for the
two agents to jointly construct arguments in persuasion.
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Dialogue Goal: To persuade the other participant about a given topic
Topic Language: None specific logic language L
Comm. Language: Specifically defined with moves: why, concede, etc.
Context: Generic
Protocol: See Definition 7 of [Pra05]
Effect Rules: See Definition 10, 11, 12 of [Pra05]
Outcome Rules: See Definition 14, 22 of [Pra05]
Table 2.6: Prakken’s persuasion dialogue framework.
Also similarly to Black and Hunter, Prakken represents his dialogues as trees.
Nodes in trees are labelled proponent and opponent meaning they support and
attack the topic, respectively. To determining the outcome of a dialogue, Prakken
has used an in/out labelling. Conceptually, a node is in if it withstands its attacks;
otherwise, it is out. Since the root of a dialogue tree is the topic, the proponent
wins the dialogue if the root node is in.
Prakken’s relevant dialogue is his liberal dialogue with certain moves disallowed
under specific conditions. Namely, moves that do not change the acceptability
status of the topic (root) node is disallowed in relevant dialogues. This refinement
ensures more compact and efficient dialogues.
Compare with Prakken’s work, the work presented in this thesis differs such
that,
1. our framework is generic and supports many types of dialogues whereas his
system is used for persuasion;
2. our dialogue protocol does not pre-assign the proponent or opponent roles to
agents and allows agents to construct arguments jointly whereas his system
assigns the roles to agents and does not allow joint construction of argu-
ments.
Parsons et al. [PWA03] have presented a study on two-agent information seek-
ing, inquiry, and persuasion dialogues. This research is performed in an agent-
centric view. Though it defines a few utterances, e.g., question, assert, challenge,
etc., their definition of dialogue protocol specifies agent behaviours in a global
view, not unlike a two-agent interaction algorithms, as shown in Example 7.
Example 7. This example presents the information-seeking dialogue protocol shown
in [PWA03].
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1. a1 asks question(p).
2. a2 replies with either assert(p) or assert(¬p) if it can, and assert(U) if
it cannot. Which response is given will depend upon the contents of its
knowledge base and its assertion attitude. U indicates that, for whatever
reason, a2 cannot give an answer.
3. a1 either accepts a2’s response, if its acceptance attitude allows, or challe-
nges. U cannot be challenged and as soon as it is asserted, the dialogue
terminates without the question being resolved.
4. a2 replies to a challenge with an assert(S), where S is the support of an
argument for the last proposition challenged by a1.
5. Go to 3 for each proposition in S in turn.
6. a1 accepts p if its acceptance attitude allows.
Compare to our work, Parsons’s results are not linked to any argumentation se-
mantics and honesty of agents has been unconditionally assumed, whereas ours
supports semantics and does not assume honesty in the level of dialogue proto-
col. Since their protocols are given as algorithms, it is feasible to compute the
complexity of their algorithms, which they have studied. Hence, though [PWA03]
have touched upon some aspects of agent dialogues, their research differs from
that of Prakken or Black and Hunter and is orthogonal to ours.
Applications of dialogue systems are abundant. Some of the early work in dia-
logue systems include [Mac90, WW78, WK95]. Using dialogue systems in sup-
porting resource-bounded reasoning is seen in [Lou98, Ger00]. In artificial intel-
ligence and law, persuasion dialogue systems that promote fairness and effective
procedure in legal reasoning have been studied [Gor94, HLL94, BC98, Pra01]. In
the field of multi-agent systems, dialogue systems have been introduced to support
agent interaction [KSE98, PSJ98, APM00, PWA03].
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we briefly introduce the origin of argumentation, applications of
computer based argumentation and basic argumentation concepts. A large por-
tion of this chapter is devoted to introducing two well-developed argumentation
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frameworks: abstract argumentation and ABA. We have also presented some back-
ground on argumentation dialogues and introduced two dialogue frameworks.
In the next chapter, we will start to introduce our dialogue model, key ingredi-
ents such as legal-move functions, strategy-move functions, and outcome functions
will be presented. We will also compare our model with the two main dialogue
frameworks presented in this chapter.
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3 Argumentation Dialogues
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the basis of our model of argumentation based dialogues
between (two) agents, using ABA. In our dialogue model, agents can utter claims
(to be debated), rules, assumptions and contraries or pass. Thus, dialogues “build”
an ABA framework shared between the agents.
The model is given in terms of (various kinds of) legal-move functions, to de-
termine which moves agents can make during dialogues, and outcome functions,
to determine whether dialogues have been successful. While participating in di-
alogues, agents use strategy-move functions to select utterances that fulfil their
goals and / or the goal of the dialogue, amongst utterances allowed by legal-move
functions.
We illustrate our dialogue framework with an example dialogue using elements
from the classic movie Twelve Angry Men throughout this chapter (and use this
example till Chapter 6).
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the dialogue model, in-
cluding legal-move functions and outcome functions. Section 3.3 presents a refined
type of dialogue where utterances are related. Section 3.4 introduces strategy-
move functions. Section 3.5 discusses a few related work. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Generic Dialogues
We define dialogues as sequences of utterances between two agents a1 and a2
sharing a common language L. We also assume there is a (non-empty, possibly
infinite) set ID that:
• is totally ordered, with the ordering described by the symbol “<”;
• contains a special element ID0 which is the least element with respect to <.
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Example 8. For instance, we can define ID as the set of nonnegative integers,
namely, N. The total order relation < is defined in the classic sense that for a, b ∈
N, a < b if and only if there exists some c ∈ N such that a+ c = b. ID0 is 0.
Utterances are defined as follows:
Definition 1. An utterance from agent ai to agent aj (i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j) is a tuple
〈ai, aj , T, C, ID〉 where:
• C (the content) is of one of the following forms:
– claim(χ) for some χ ∈ L (a claim),
– rl(s0 ← s1, . . . , sm) for some s0, . . . , sm ∈ L with m ≥ 0 (a rule),
– asm(α) for some α ∈ L (an assumption),
– ctr(α, β) for some α, β ∈ L (a contrary),
– a pass sentence pi, such that pi /∈ L.
• ID ∈ ID \ {ID0} (the identifier)
• T ∈ ID (the target); we impose that T < ID.
We refer to an utterance with content pi as a pass-utterance. We also use PASS
to denote the set of all utterances of the form 〈 , , , pi, 〉1. We refer to an utterance
with content other than pi or claim(χ) as a regular-utterance. In the remainder U
will stand for the set of all possible utterances as in Definition 1. We will also
adopt the following notation: U i stands for all utterances from ai in U , namely of
the form 〈ai, , , , 〉, and, for any utterance 〈ai, , , , 〉 = u, we also say that u
is made by ai.
Intuitively, when the content of an utterance is pi, the utterance indicates that the
agent making it does not have or want to contribute any information (i.e. claim,
rule, assumption, contrary) that can be added to the dialogue, either because no
such information is in the agent’s possession or because the agent chooses not
to disclose such information. The target of an utterance is the identifier of some
earlier utterance in the dialogue, as we will see below.
Note that until Chapter 7, we will assume that the identifier of an utterance in
all of our dialogues, for simplicity, is a non-negative integer, with ID = N and
ID0 = 0, as seen in Example 8.
1Throughout, stands for an anonymous variable as in Prolog.
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Definition 2. A dialogue Daiaj (χ) (between agents ai and aj , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j
for χ ∈ L), is a finite sequence 〈u1, . . . , un〉, n ≥ 0, where each ul, l = 1, . . . , n,
is an utterance from ai or aj , u1 is an utterance from ai, and:
1. u1 = 〈ai, aj , ID0, claim(χ), id〉, for some id ∈ ID;
2. the content of ul is claim(χ) if and only if l = 1;
3. the target of pass- and claim utterances is ID0; the target of regular-utterance
is not ID0;
4. for every utterance ui = 〈 , , T, , 〉, such that i > 1 and T 6= ID0, there
exists a uk = 〈 , , , C, T 〉, such that C 6= pi and k < i;
5. no two consecutive utterances are pass-utterances, other than possibly the
last two utterances, un−1 and un;
6. for 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n, if i < j, then the identifier of ui is less than the identifier
of uj .
If the last two utterances are pass-utterances, then Daiaj (χ) is referred to as
completed. If n = 0, Daiaj (χ) is referred to as empty. Given a dialogue δ =
〈u1, . . . , un〉 and an utterance u, we define δ ◦ u = 〈u1, . . . , un, u〉.
Given δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉, we say that each ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is in δ.
In the remainder D will stands for the set of all dialogues as in Definition 2.
Note that condition 4 in Definition 2 enforces a basic notion of “relevance”,
expressed by the following.
Definition 3. For any two utterances ui, uj ∈ U , ui 6= uj , uj is related to ui if and
only if ui = 〈 , , , , ID〉, uj = 〈 , , ID, , 〉.
The following example illustrates our notion of dialogue.
Example 9. Given L = {s, a, b, c, d, g, q, r}, and ID = N with ID0 = 0, a
possible (completed) dialogue Da1a2 (s) is as follows:
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a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 2〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← a), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, asm(a), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(a, q), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, rl(q ← b), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, asm(b), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 7, ctr(b, c), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 8, asm(c), 9〉 〈a2, a1, 9, ctr(c, r), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 11〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 12〉
Note that in this example (and in general) a1, a2 may or may not be equipped with
an ABA framework. ABA is used as a lingua franca in the spirit of the Argument
Interchange Format (AIF) [RR09], in the sense that internally, agents can represent
their knowledge in representations other than ABA; while communicating, agents
convert their internal representation into ABA. Even if a1, a2 are equipped with
ABA frameworks, the agents may or may not be truthful, in that, for example, an
agent may utter “made-up” rules which do not exist in its ABA framework.
We will illustrate the dialogue notions in the context of the following example,
adapted from the movie Twelve Angry Men, an example of argumentation based
collaborative reasoning [AB11]. Here, we focus on the reasoning of two of the
jurors: juror 8, played by Henry Fonda (a1), and juror 9, played by Joseph Sweeney
(a2). These agents need to decide whether to condemn a boy, accused of murder,
or acquit him, after a trial where two witnesses have provided evidence against the
boy. According to the law, the jurors should acquit the boy if they do not believe
that the trial has proven him guilty convincingly.
Example 10. In this example, two agents perform a dialogue δ to decide whether
to condemn the boy. The example dialogue, δ = Da1a2 (boy innocent), is shown in
Table 3.1. Utterances in this dialogue should be self-explanatory. For example,
boy innocent← boy not proven guilty
says that the boy should be deemed to be innocent if he cannot be proven guilty.
In this example, it can be seen that a1 starts the dialogue by putting forward the
claim: claim(boy innocent). Then both agents contribute rules, assumptions and
contraries for and against the claim (directly or indirectly). A natural language
reading of this dialogue is in Table 3.2. Utterances in this dialogue are (top-down)
related and the dialogue completes with two consecutive passes.
Our dialogue model allows pass-utterances being uttered at any moment through-
out a dialogue, but we are able to extract a “sub-dialogue” which contains no pass-
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Table 3.1: Dialogue δ for Example 10.
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(boy innocent), 1〉
〈a2, a1, 1, rl(boy innocent← boy not proven guilty), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, asm(boy not proven guilty), 3〉
〈a2, a1, 3, ctr(boy not proven guilty, boy proven guilty), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, rl(boy proven guilty ← w1 is believable), 5〉
〈a2, a1, 5, asm(w1 is believable), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, ctr(w1 is believable, w1 not believable), 7〉
〈a1, a2, 7, rl(w1 not believable← w1 contradicted by w2), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 8, rl(w1 contradicted by w2←), 9〉
〈a2, a1, 4, rl(boy proven guilty ← w2 is believable), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 10, asm(w2 is believable), 11〉
〈a2, a1, 11, ctr(w2 is believable, w2 not believable), 12〉
〈a1, a2, 12, rl(w2 not believable← w2 has poor eyesight), 13〉
〈a2, a1, 13, rl(w2 has poor eyesight←), 14〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 15〉
〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 16〉
Table 3.2: A natural language reading of the dialogue in Table 3.1.
a1: The boy is innocent.
a2: The boy is innocent if he is not proven guilty.
a1: We assume the boy is not proven guilty.
a2: The boy cannot be proven not guilty if he is guilty.
a1: The boy is guilty if witness 1 is believable.
a2: We assume the witness 1 is believable.
a1: Witness 1 is not believable if it cannot be believed.
a1: Witness 1 cannot be believed if it is contradicted by witness 2.
a1: Witness 1 is indeed contradicted by witness 2.
a2: The boy is guilty if witness 2 is believable.
a1: We assume the witness 2 is believable.
a2: Witness 2 is not believable if it cannot be believed.
a1: Witness 2 cannot be believed as it has a poor eyesight.
a2: Witness 2 indeed has a poor eyesight.
a1: OK.
a2: OK.
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utterance. This is defined using the notion of pi-pruned sequence obtained from
a dialogue, consisting of all regular-utterances in a dialogue. Note that, since no
regular-utterance has a pass-utterance as its target (by condition 3 in Definition 2),
the target of every utterance in a pi-pruned sequence is guaranteed to be in this
sequence. Also, since the first utterance in a dialogue can never be a pass utter-
ance (by condition 2 of Definition 2), the first utterance in a pi-pruned sequence
is always the same as the first utterance in the original dialogue. Moreover, it is
trivially true that for any utterance u that if u is not in a dialogue δ, u is not in the
pi-pruned sequence of δ.
Example 11. The pi-pruned sequence obtained from the dialogue δ in Example 9
is the following δ′:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← a), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, asm(a), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(a, q), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, rl(q ← b), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, asm(b), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 7, ctr(b, c), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 8, asm(c), 9〉 〈a2, a1, 9, ctr(c, r), 10〉
Note that δ′ = 〈u′1, . . . , u′9〉 where u′1 = u1, u′2 = u3, u′3 = u4, u′4 = u5, u′5 =
u6, u
′
6 = u7, u
′
7 = u8, u
′
9 = u10, for ui = 〈 , , , , i〉 in the original δ.
In Example 9, we see the two agents taking turns in making utterances. A strict
interleaving is enforced between these two agents. In general, such requirement is
unnecessary, i.e., an agent is allowed to make a few consecutive utterances before
the other agent makes any. We define a (generic) turn-making function to specify
the agents that makes the next utterance.
Definition 4. A turn-making function is a mapping γ : D 7→ {a1, a2} such that,
given δ = Daiaj (χ) = 〈u1, . . . , un〉, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j:
γ(δ) =
ai if n = 0,ax ∈ {ai, aj} otherwise.
A dialogue 〈u1, . . . , un〉 ( n > 0 ) is compatible with a turn-making function γ
if and only if for each l = 1, . . . , n, if ul = 〈ax, , , , 〉 then γ(〈u1, . . . , ul−1〉) =
ax.
Our definition of turn-making function is very liberal, in that it states that ai
starts Daiaj (χ) and all subsequent utterances are made by any of the agents as dic-
tated by γ. As observed earlier, γ(δ) for δ = Da1a2 (χ) in Example 9 forces a strict
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interleaving between a1 and a2. The following example shows a different kind of
γ.
Example 12. Given L, ID, ID0 as in Example 9, a possible (completed) dialogue
Da1a2 (s) is as follows:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← a, b), 2〉 〈a2, a1, 2, asm(a), 3〉
〈a2, a1, 2, rl(b←), 4〉
〈a2, a1, 3, ctr(a, c), 5〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 6〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 7〉
By means of dialogues agents jointly construct a shared framework, as follows:
Definition 5. The framework drawn from a dialogue δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉 is Fδ =
〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 where:
• Rδ = {ρ|rl(ρ) is the content of some ui in δ};
• Aδ = {α|asm(α) is the content of some ui in δ};
• Cδ is a mapping such that, for any α ∈ Aδ, Cδ(α) = {β|ctr(α, β) is the
content of some ui in δ}.
Clearly, the ABA framework drawn from a dialogue represents all information
that has been disclosed by the two agents in the dialogue.
Example 13. The framework drawn from the dialogue δ in Example 9 is Fδ =
〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉, in which
• Aδ = {a, b, c};
• Rδ = {s← a, q ← b};
• Cδ is such that Cδ(a) = {q}, Cδ(b) = {c}, Cδ(c) = {r}.
Note that Fδ in Example 13 is a flat ABA framework, but, in general, the frame-
work drawn from a dialogue may not be an ABA framework, since C may be empty
as in the following example.
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Example 14. Given L = {s, a}, let δ be:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, asm(a), 3〉
The framework drawn from the dialogue, Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 has:
• Aδ = {a};
• Rδ = {s← a};
• Cδ is such that Cδ(a) = {}.
Fδ, is not an ABA framework as the contrary of assumption a in this framework
is the empty set.
Even when the framework drawn from a dialogue is an ABA framework, it may
not be flat, as the agents may disagree on the assumptions, as in the following
example.
Example 15. Given L = {s, a, q, r}, let δ be:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, asm(a), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 2, rl(a← q), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 3, ctr(a, r), 5〉
The framework Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 has:
• Aδ = {a};
• Rδ = {s← a, a← q};
• Cδ is such that Cδ(a) = {r}.
In this example a is both an assumption and the head of a rule, hence the ABA
framework, Fδ, is not flat.
We refine our dialogues so that the frameworks drawn from them are guaranteed
to be flat ABA frameworks. This refinement builds upon the notions of legal-
move function (with respect to a turn-making function) and outcome function to
(with respect to a legal-move function) restrict the kind of utterances allowed in
“successful” dialogues.
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Definition 6. A legal-move function (with respect to γ) is a mapping λ : D 7→ 2U
such that, given δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉 ∈ D, for all u ∈ λ(δ):
1. δ ◦ u is a dialogue;
2. δ ◦ u is compatible with γ if δ is;
3. if u = 〈 , , T, C, 〉, then there exists no i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that ui =
〈 , , T, C, 〉.
Given δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉, if um+1 ∈ λ(〈u1, . . . , um〉) for all m such that 0 ≤
m < n, we say that δ is compatible with λ.
We use Λ to denote the set of all legal-move functions. Also, we often omit to
mention the turn-making function when describing a legal-move function.
Given λ1, λ2 ∈ Λ, λ = λ1 · λ2 is defined as follows: for all u ∈ U , u ∈ λ(δ) if
and only if u ∈ λ1(δ) ∩ λ2(δ).
Given λ1, . . . , λn ∈ Λ, λ1 · . . . · λn = λ1 · (λ2 · (. . . (λn−1 · λn) . . .)).
Condition 3 in this definition regulates that there is no repeated utterance to the
same target in a dialogue. However, the definition of legal-move function does
not impose any “mentalistic” requirement on agents, such as that they utter infor-
mation they hold true, similar to communication protocols in multi-agent systems
[Woo09].
The operator “·” defines the composition of legal-move functions such that the
resulting legal-move function allows utterances that are in the intersection of all ut-
terances allowed by the legal-move functions in the composition. Naturally, given
λ = λ1 · λ2, if δ is compatible with λ, then δ is also compatible with λ1 and λ2,
respectively. Also, trivially, if λ1, λ2 ∈ Λ, λ1 · λ2 ∈ Λ.
From now on we will assume a generic true-making function γ and we will
omit to mention it in an definitions, assuming implicitly that all our dialogues are
compatible with a given γ.
We then ensure the flatness of the framework drawn from a dialogue using a flat
legal-move function, as follows.
Definition 7. A flat legal-move function is a legal-move function λ ∈ Λ such that,
given a dialogue δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉 ∈ D, for all u = 〈 , , , C, 〉 ∈ λ(δ), then
• C = asm(α) only if there exists no ui for 1 ≤ i ≤ n with content rl(ρ) and
Head(ρ) = α;
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• C = rl(ρ) only if there exists no ui for 1 ≤ i ≤ n with content asm(α) and
Head(ρ) = α.
We use λfl to denote a generic flat legal-move function. A flat dialogue is a
dialogue compatible with a flat legal-move function λfl.
The dialogue δ in Example 15 is not compatible with a flat legal-move function
λfl.
It is easy to see that the framework drawn from a dialogue compatible with a flat
legal-move function is flat.
Lemma 1. Given a dialogue δ, if δ is compatible with a flat legal-move function
λfl, and the framework drawn from δ, Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 is an ABA frame-
work, then it is a flat ABA framework.
Proof. By Definition 7, for any β ∈ L, if β ∈ Aδ then β ← . . . /∈ Rδ and if
β ← . . . ∈ Rδ then β /∈ Aδ. Therefore, Fδ is flat.
In order to guarantee that the framework drawn from a dialogue is an ABA
framework, we will use a specific kind of outcome function imposing each as-
sumption has a non-empty set as its contrary:
Definition 8. An outcome function is a mapping ω : D × Λ 7→ {true, false}.
We use Ω to denote the set of all outcome functions.
Definition 9. The ABA outcome function, ωABA ∈ Ω, is such that given a dialogue
δ and a legal-move function λ, ωABA(δ, λ) = true if and only if δ is compatible
with λ and the framework 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 drawn from δ is such that for all α ∈
Aδ, Cδ(α) 6= {}.
An ABA dialogue is a dialogue δ ∈ D compatible with a flat λfl ∈ Λ such that
ωABA(δ, λfl) = true.
Example 16. We revisit the Twelve Angry Men example in Example 10. The ABA
framework drawn from the dialogue δ shown in Table 3.1 is Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉,
as follows.
• Aδ = {boy not proven guilty, w1 is believable, w2 is believable};
• Rδ = {boy innocent← boy not proven guilty
boy proven guilty ← w1 is believable
boy proven guilty ← w2 is believable
49
w1 not believable← w1 contradicted by w2
w1 contradicted by w2←
w2 not believable← w2 has poor eyesight
w2 has poor eyesight←}
• Cδ is such that
C(boy not proven guilty) = {boy proven guilty},
C(w1 is believable) = {w1 is not believable},
C(w2 is believable) = {w2 is not believable}.
We can see that the ABA framework drawn the dialogue is flat hence this dia-
logue is ABA and flat.
From now on, unless otherwise specified, all dialogues are ABA dialogues and
thus the frameworks Fδ drawn from dialogues δ are flat ABA frameworks.
We aim at using dialogues to successfully determine the acceptability of their
claims (with respect to several argumentation semantics). We define (several kinds
of) successful dialogues as follows.
Definition 10. Given an ABA dialogueDaiaj (χ)= δ, let Fδ be the ABA framework
drawn from δ, then δ is:
• a-successful if and only if χ is admissible in Fδ.
• g-successful if and only if χ is grounded in Fδ.
• i-successful if and only if χ is ideal in Fδ.
For simplicity, we use admissibility, grounded and ideal as our semantics through-
out this thesis. These semantics have been studied in ABA.
Proposition 1. Given a dialogue δ ∈ D, if δ is g-successful, then δ is also a-
successful and i-successful.
Proof. Since δ is g-successful, χ is grounded. By the definition of the grounded
semantics (see Chapter 2 and definition 2.2 of [DMT07]), χ is also complete and
admissible. Hence g-successful implies a-successful.
By theorem 2.1 (iii) of [DMT07], which states that an ideal set of arguments
is a superset of the grounded set of arguments, we have g-successful implies i-
successful.
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The following examples illustrate the notions of a-/g-/i-successful dialogues.
Example 17. Let the dialogue δ be:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(a), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(a, c), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, asm(c), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(c, a), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, asm(a), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 7〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 8〉
The ABA framework drawn from this dialogue, Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 has:
• Aδ = {a, c};
• Rδ = {};
• Cδ is such that Cδ(a) = {c}, Cδ(c) = {a}.
In this example, we have two arguments {a} ` a and {c} ` c. Since {a} ` a
attacks {c} ` c that attacks {a} ` a, {a} ` a defends itself hence is admissible.
Therefore a is admissible. Since {c} ` c is also admissible, {a} ` a is not
grounded nor ideal.
Since a is admissible, but not grounded, nor ideal, in Fδ, δ is a-successful, but
not g-/i-successful.
Example 18. Let the dialogue, δ be:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(a), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(a, c), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, asm(c), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(c, b), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, rl(b←), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 7〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 8〉
The ABA framework drawn from this dialogue, Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 has:
• Aδ = {a, c};
• Rδ = {b←};
• Cδ is such that Cδ(a) = {c}, Cδ(c) = {b}.
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In this example, we have three arguments: {a} ` a, {c} ` c and {} ` b. {c} ` c
attacks {a} ` a and {} ` b defends {a} ` a by attacking {c} ` c. There is no
argument attacks {} ` b. Hence, {a} ` a is admissible, grounded and ideal. So is
a.
Since a is admissible, grounded, and ideal in Fδ, δ is a-/g-/i-successful.
Example 19. Let the dialogue, δ be:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(a), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(a, b), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, rl(b← c, d), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, asm(c), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 4, asm(d), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 5, ctr(c, a), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 6, ctr(d, c), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 8, asm(c), 9〉 〈a2, a1, 7, asm(a), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 10, ctr(a, b), 11〉 〈a2, a1, 9, ctr(c, a), 12〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 13〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 14〉
The ABA framework drawn from this dialogue, Fδ = 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉, has:
• Aδ = {a, c, d};
• Rδ = {b← c, d};
• Cδ is such that Cδ(a) = {b}, Cδ(c) = {a}, Cδ(d) = {c}.
The admissible set of assumptions is {a}, so is the preferred set of assumptions.
Thus, a is ideal (and admissible), but not grounded, in Fδ. Hence, the dialogue δ
is i-successful (and a-successful but not g-successful).
In the context of the Twelve Angry Men example, the claim of the dialogue in
Table 3.1, boy innocent, is admissible, grounded, and ideal in Fδ. Hence, δ in
Table 3.1 is a-,g-,i-successful.
The definitions in this section jointly establish the foundations of a generic di-
alogue framework for determining acceptability of claims (in the flat ABA frame-
work drawn from the dialogue). In subsequent sections we build on these foun-
dation notions and show how (a-/g-) successful dialogues can be constructed. But
first, we need to ensure that some basic properties of our dialogues are met. Specif-
ically, we specialise our definition of legal-move function (Definition 6) to con-
struct “related” dialogues, as shown in the next section.
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3.3 Related Dialogues
Definition 2 defines a class of generic dialogues. Little control is enforced on con-
structing such dialogues, for example, dialogues such as the following are allowed.
Example 20. This example illustrates a dialogue in that utterances have no seman-
tic relation.
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(p← q), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 1, asm(a), 3〉
Here, the second and third utterances are related to their target in the sense of
Definition 3. However, there is no “conceptual” relation between these utterances
and their targets, e.g., there is no relation between the sentence s and the rule
p ← q. To have more purposeful dialogues, where utterances are “semantically”
related, we define a form of relevance between utterances within a dialogue.
Definition 11. For any two utterances ui, uj ∈ U , ui = 〈 , , , Ci, 〉, uj =〈 , , ,
Cj , 〉, uj is top-down related to ui if and only if uj is related to ui (as in Defini-
tion 3) and one of the following cases holds:
1. Cj = rl(ρj), Head(ρj) = β and either Ci = rl(ρi) with β ∈ Body(ρi), or
Ci = ctr( , β), or Ci = claim(β);
2. Cj = asm(α) and either Ci = rl(ρ) with α ∈ Body(ρ), or Ci = ctr( , α), or
Ci = claim(α);
3. Cj = ctr(α, ) and Ci = asm(α).
Intuitively, an utterance is top-down related to another if it contributes to ex-
panding an argument (case 1), identifies an assumption in the support of an argu-
ment (case 2) or starts the construction of a counter-argument (case 3). Note that
an utterance may be top-down related to an utterance from the same agent or not.
Also, no pass-utterance can be top-down related to an utterance and no utterance
can be top-down related to a pass-utterance.
We use the notion of top-down related-ness to define a new class of legal-move
functions:
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Definition 12. A top-down related legal-move function λ ∈ Λ is such that for
δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉, δ ∈ D and for all u ∈ λ(δ) such that u is a regular-utterance,
then u is top-down related to some um in δ, 1 ≤ m ≤ n.
We use λrt to denote a generic top-down related legal-move function. A top-
down related dialogue is a dialogue compatible with a top-down related legal-
move function λrt.
For simplicity, we use “related” to mean “top-down related” for the rest of this
thesis, when there is no ambiguitiy. We will introduce a notion of bottom-up re-
lated in Chapter 7 as another form of semantic relevance.
The dialogue in Example 9 is related (and also flat); the dialogue in Example 20
is not. Until Chapter 7, we only consider top-down related dialogues.
To ease the presentation, we will also define coherent dialogues, as follows.
Definition 13. Given a dialogue δ ∈ D, a flat legal-move function λfl, a related
legal-move function λrt, we say δ is coherent if and only if δ is compatible with
λfl · λrt, for some flat legal-move function λfl and some related legal-move func-
tion λrt.
Since both flatness and related-ness are fundamental to any dialogues, in the rest
of this thesis, unless otherwise specified, all dialogues are coherent.
3.4 Strategy-move Functions
In ABA dialogues, agents make utterances that contain rules, assumptions, con-
traries and passes. The selection of utterances must satisfy the integrity of the
dialogue and the aims of the agents. Legal-move functions are used to keep the
integrity of dialogues. As presented in Chapter 2, there are several types of dia-
logues, where each type has its own goals and agents have different aims in dif-
ferent types of dialogues. Here, we introduce strategy-move functions to specify
agents’ behaviours that are suitable for their aims and for the goals of the dialogues
they are engaged in.
Definition 14. A strategy-move function for agent ai (i = 1, 2) is a mapping
φ : D × Λ 7→ 2Ui , such that, given λ ∈ Λ and δ ∈ D: φ(δ, λ) ⊆ λ(δ).
Given a dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉 compatible with a legal-move
function λ and a strategy-move function φ for ak (k = i, j), if, for all um =
〈ak, , , , 〉, 1 < m ≤ n, um ∈ φ(〈u1, . . . , um−1〉, λ), then we say that δ is
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constructed with φ with respect to ak and ak uses φ in δ. Furthermore, if ai and aj
both use φ in some δ, then we say that δ is constructed with φ.
Given strategy-move functions φ1, φ2, φ = φ1 · φ2 is defined as follows: for all
u ∈ U , u ∈ φ(δ, λ) if and only if u ∈ φ1(δ, λ) ∩ φ2(δ, λ).
We use Φ to denote the set of all strategy-move functions.
We will study strategy-move functions in more detail in Chapter 5. There, we
will also discuss the strategy-move functions used by a1 and a2 in the dialogue
shown in Table 3.1.
3.5 Related Work
McBurney and Parsons [MP09] give an overview of dialogue games for argumen-
tation. In that work, the authors explain the syntax and semantics of dialogue pro-
tocols. Our work can be seen as providing a novel dialogue game for ABA, hence
the syntax of our dialogue is based on ABA and the semantics of our dialogues are
standard ABA semantics.
Prakken in [Pra06] reviews dialogue systems for persuasion. Our dialogue
model is generic hence it is not restricted to persuasion. As we will illustrate
in Chapters 6 and 7, our dialogue model can be applied in information-seeking,
inquiry, persuasion, conflict-resolution, and discovery dialogues.
Parsons et al [PMSW07] examine three notions of relevance in dialogues where
utterances are arguments and attacks:
• R1 (every new utterance has a direct impact on the claim),
• R2 (every new utterance directly or indirectly impacts the claim), and
• R3 (every new utterance has a direct impact on the previous one).
Our utterances are at a finer granularity level, as they correspond to rules, as-
sumptions, and contraries, whereas in [PMSW07] utterances are at the argument
level, i.e., each utterance contains an argument. Thus, there is no direct mapping
between our work and their relevance.
On the other hand, we are going to introduce several other legal-move functions
in Chapter 4, and some of these legal-move functions will resemble Parsons’ R1
and R2 relevances.
Black and Hunter [BH09] present a formal system for inquiry dialogues based
on DeLP [GS04] as the underlying argumentation framework. Our work differs
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from theirs as (1) it defines a mechanism for any type of dialogue whereas they
focus on inquiry dialogues; (2) it uses ABA whereas they use DeLP; (3) it does
not force an agent to disclose all knowledge whereas they force complete full dis-
closure of all relevant knowledge for the purpose of inquiry; (4) it does not force a
strict interleaving whereas they do.
Prakken [Pra05] defines a formal system for persuasion. The main differences
with our work are: (1) since that work focuses on persuasion dialogues, proponent
and opponent roles are pre-assigned to agents before the dialogue whereas in our
work agents can play both roles within the same dialogue; (2) Prakken focuses
the grounded semantics, whereas we allow admissibility, grounded, and ideal se-
mantics; (3) his set of utterances refers to arguments and attacks, as in the case
of [PMSW07]; (4) he forces the support of arguments to be minimal, whereas we
do not, in the spirit of [DTM10]; (5) he does not allow agents to jointly construct
arguments whereas we do.
An early version of this Chapter has been published in [FT11a]. Several im-
provements have been implemented here. Firstly, unlike [FT11a], we render ex-
plicit the turn making function in Definition 4. Whereas the dialogue model in
[FT11a] implicitly forces a strict interleaving between agents, construction given
here does not. Secondly, though the legal-move function definition (Definition 6)
is similar to Definition 5 in [FT11a], we define λ : D 7→ 2U instead of λ : D 7→ U
there. This new definition is more precise as it indicates that there might be more
than one utterance that satisfies a legal-move function.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the basis of our dialogue system. We have
defined legal-move, outcome, and strategy-move functions, playing a specific role
in the generation of dialogues. Basically, legal-move functions work like dialogue
protocols and underpin construction of dialogues. Outcome functions are used to
ensure that certain dialogue properties are fulfilled, so some conclusions about the
claim of the dialogue can be drawn. Strategy-move functions are used to model
agent behaviours such that certain agent goals will be reached if a dialogue is
constructed with some strategy-move functions (as we will further explore later).
A summary of the main concepts introduced in this chapter is given in Table 3.3.
A summary of the types of dialogues introduced in this chapter can be seen in
Table 4.5 from Page 92.
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Table 3.3: Summary of concepts introduced in Chapter 3.
Turn-making (γ): Returns the agent who makes the next utterance
Legal-move (λ): Returns utterances that satisfy dialogue protocols
Outcome (ω): Tests if certain dialogue property holds
Strategy-move (φ): Returns utterances that fulfill agents’ goals
In the next Chapter, we will study our dialogue protocol (legal-move functions
and outcome functions) in detail. We will show how dialogues with various level
of “generality” can be constructed with different legal-move functions and how
to construct dialogues which have their claims being acceptable with respect to
information disclosed through the dialogue. We will formally link argumentation
semantics with dialogues.
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4 Dialogues and Argumentation
Semantics
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, we have introduced some basic concepts, e.g., legal-move functions,
outcome functions, and strategy-move functions, that are used to define our dia-
logue model. In this chapter, we study specific classes of legal-move functions
and outcome functions in detail. We show how legal-move functions can be used
to construct dialogues.
Since our aim is to construct dialogues with “acceptable” claims, we link di-
alogues with argumentation semantics. Generally speaking, by ensuring that a
dialogue being compatible with some specifically defined legal-move functions,
we can guarantee that the claim of dialogues is acceptable with respect to given
argumentation semantics, notably the admissibility and grounded semantics. This
result is obtained using debate trees and debate forests.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents our notion of de-
bate tree. Section 4.3 presents focused dialogues that are constructed using debate
trees. Section 4.4 presents debate forests and dialogues constructed using them.
Section 4.5 illustrates the concepts we introduced in this chapter. Section 4.6 com-
pares our refined dialogue model, as defined in this chapter, with a few other mod-
els. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Debate Trees
We will see below how utterances can be decided in terms of debate trees drawn
from a dialogue. Informally, each node of debate trees
1. contains one sentence,
2. is tagged as either unmarked (um), marked-rule (mr) or marked-assumption
(ma),
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3. is labelled either proponent or opponent as in the abstract dispute trees of
[DKT06] (see Chapter 2), and
4. has an ID taken from an utterance in the dialogue.
The sentence of each node in a debate tree represents an argument’s claim or (el-
ement of a) support. A node is tagged unmarked if its sentence is only mentioned
in the claim or the body of a rule or contrary of an assumption, but without any
further examination, marked-rule if its sentence is the head of an uttered rule, and
marked-assumption if its sentence has been explicitly uttered as an assumption. A
node is labelled proponent (opponent) if it is (directly or indirectly) for (against)
the claim of the dialogue. The ID is used to identify the node’s corresponding
utterance in the dialogue.
As an illustration, possible nodes from utterances in Example 9 are:
(s, um : P[1]),
(s,mr : P[1]),
(a, um : P[3]),
(a,ma : P[4]),
(q, um : O[5]).
Note that since debate trees are constructed in steps as dialogues proceed, not all
nodes in the above list are in a debate tree at every step, namely, certain nodes
tagged as um, such as (s, um : P[1]) and (q, um : O[5]) are replaced by nodes
with “updated” information about the same sentences, i.e., (s,mr : P[1]) and
(q,mr : O[5]), respectively, after new utterances are inserted into the dialogue.
For instance, the content of utterance 5 in the dialogue in Example 9 is ctr(a, q),
so by this utterance, q is only mentioned as a contrary of a, it is uncertain whether
q is an assumption or the head of a rule, hence the tag in (q, um : O[5]) is um.
However, after utterance 6, which has the content rl(q ← b), it is known that q is
the head of the rule q ← b, hence (q, um : O[5]) is replaced by (q,mr : O[5]).
Thus nodes tagged um may be replaced by other nodes during the construction of
a debate tree.
In a debate tree, nodes are connected in two cases:
1. they belong to the same ABA argument, and
2. they form attacks between two ABA arguments.
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(s,mr : P[1]) s (a,ma : P[4])
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
a
OO
(q, um : O[5])
OO
Figure 4.1: Nodes in a debate tree connected as in ABA arguments (left) or attacks
between ABA arguments (right).
Figure 4.1 (left) gives an example of case (1), again, the dialogue in Example 9.
Here, the left column contains connected nodes in a debate tree; the right column
shows the corresponding ABA argument. In case (2), two nodes n1 = (α,ma :
L[id]) and n2 = (β, : L′[ ]), L,L′ ∈ {P, O}L′ 6= L, are connected if there is
an utterance u = 〈 , , id, ctr(α, β), 〉 in the dialogue. (e.g., see Figure 4.1 right).
Hence, the two nodes are connected if the parent node contains an assumption and
the child node contains a contrary of that assumption.
We give the formal definition of a debate tree as follows.
Definition 15. Given Daiaj (χ) = δ, the debate tree drawn from δ is a tree T (δ),
where:
1. nodes of T (δ) can be characterised as follows:
a) nodes are tuples (S, F : L[U ]) where
• S is a sentence in L,
• F (the tag) is either um (unmarked), mr (marked-rule) or ma
(marked-assumption),
• L (the label) is either P (proponent) or O (opponent),
• U ∈ ID (the ID);
b) (β, : [ ]) is a node in T (δ) if and only if there is an utterance
〈 , , , C, 〉 in δ such that C is either:
i. claim(β), or
ii. s0 ← s1, . . . , sm where β = si for some i with 0 < i ≤ m, or
iii. asm(β), or
iv. ctr( , β);
c) (β, um : [t]) is a node in T (δ) if and only if there is no utterance
〈 , , t, rl(β ← . . .), 〉 or 〈 , , t, asm(β), 〉 in δ;
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2. links of T (δ) are of 6 types (below L,L′ ∈ {P,O}, L 6= L′):
a) for n = (s0,mr : L[t]) and n′ = (si, um : L[id]), n is the parent of n′
if and only if there is one utterance in δ of the form
〈 , , t, rl(s0 ← . . . , si, . . .), id〉 and there is no utterance in δ of the
forms 〈 , , id, rl(si ← . . .), 〉 or 〈 , , id, asm(si), 〉;
b) for n = (s0,mr : L[t]) and n′ = (si,mr : L[id]), n is the parent of n′
if and only if there are two utterances in δ of the forms
〈 , , t, rl(s0 ← . . . , si, . . .), id〉 and 〈 , , id, rl(si ← . . .), 〉, respec-
tively;
c) for n = (s0,mr : L[t]) and n′ = (si,ma : L[id]), n is the parent of n′
if and only if there are two utterances in δ of the forms
〈 , , t, rl(s0 ← . . . , si, . . .), t′〉 and 〈 , , t′, asm(si), id〉, respectively;
d) for n = (s0,ma : L[t]) and n′ = (si, um : L′[id]), n is the parent of n′
if and only if there is one utterance in δ of the form 〈 , , t, ctr(s0, si), id〉,
and there is no utterance in δ of the forms 〈 , , id, rl(si ← . . .), 〉 or
〈 , , id, asm(si), 〉;
e) for n = (s0,ma : L[t]) and n′ = (si,mr : L′[id]), n is the par-
ent of n′ if and only if there are two utterances in δ of the forms
〈 , , t, ctr(s0, si), id〉 and 〈 , , id, rl(si ← . . .), 〉, respectively;
f) for n = (s0,ma : L[t]) and n′ = (si,ma : L′[id]), n is the par-
ent of n′ if and only if there are two utterances in δ of the forms
〈 , , t, ctr(s0, si), t′〉 and 〈 , , t′, asm(si), id〉, respectively.
For convenience, we call ( ,mr : [ ]), ( ,ma : [ ]), and ( , um : [ ]), a rule,
assumption, and unmarked node, respectively.
Definition 15 gives the characteristics of debate trees. Debate trees are con-
structed as dialogues progress. The construction of debate trees is given below.
Lemma 2. Given a dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ, the debate tree T (δ) is T m(δ) in the
sequence T 0(δ), T 1(δ), . . . , T m(δ) constructed inductively from the pi-pruned se-
quence δ′ = 〈u′1 . . . , u′m〉 obtained from δ, as follows (L,L′ ∈ {P, O}, L 6= L′):
1. T 0(δ) is empty;
2. T 1(δ) contains a single node:
(χ, um : P[id1]),
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where id1 is the identifier of u′1 = u1;
3. let T i(δ) be the i-th tree, for 0 < i < m, let u′i+1 = 〈 , , t, C, id〉, and
let 〈 , , , Ct, t〉 be the target utterance of u′i+1; then T i+1(δ) is obtained as
follows:
a) if C = rl(β0 ← β1, . . . , βl) then T i+1(δ) is T i(δ) with additional l
nodes:
(β1, um : L[id]), . . . , (βl, um : L[id])
as children of the node (β0, : L[t]), and the node (β0, : L[t]) is
replaced by (β0,mr : L[t]);
b) if C = asm(α) then T i+1(δ) is T i(δ) with the node (α, um : L[t])
replaced by (α,ma : L[id]).
c) ifC = ctr(α, β) then T i+1(δ) is T i(δ) with an additional node: (β, um :
L[id]) child of (α,ma : L′[t]).
Proof. We show, given a dialogue δ, that this inductive process constructs a debate
tree T (δ) as in Definition 15.
Condition 1(a) and 1(b) in Definition 15 are trivially true since nodes in T 0(δ),
. . . , T m(δ) are nodes inserted in accordance with utterances in δ hence if a sen-
tence β is in a node, β must be in some utterance in the dialogue. Condition 1(c) in
definition 15 is true as 3(a) and 3(b) in the lemma specify how nodes tagged um are
replaced by nodes tagged ma and mr. Condition 2(a) through 2(f) in Definition 15
are jointly met by 3(a) through 3(c) in the lemma.
Hence, this inductive process yields a debate tree as per Definition 15.
The debate tree T (δ) for δ in Example 9 is shown in Figure 4.2. The construc-
tion of this tree is shown in Figure 4.3.
It is easy to see that debate trees for related dialogues are always guaranteed to
be well-formed, in that each non-root node in them has exactly one parent1.
Given the construction of debate trees, arguments can be drawn from a debate
tree, as follows:
Definition 16. An argument drawn from a debate tree T (δ) is a sub-tree T of
T (δ) such that:
1Note that, as stated in Chapter 3, we assume all dialogues in discussion are coherent, hence flat
and related.
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(s,mr : P[1])
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(q,mr : O[5])
OO
(b,ma : O[7])
OO
(c,ma : P[9])
OO
(r, um : O[10])
OO
Figure 4.2: The debate tree drawn from the dialogue in Example 9.
1. all nodes in T have the same label (either P or O);
2. if there is an utterance 〈 , , , rl(β0 ← β1, . . . , βm), t〉 in δ and (β0,mr :
L[t]) is in T , then (β1, : L[ ]), . . . , (βm, : L[ ]) are in T ;
3. there does not exist a node n′ in T (δ) such that n′ is parent or child of some
node ni in T and ni, n′ have the same label.
An argument T drawn from a debate tree is actual if for all nodes ( , F : [ ]) in
T , F is either mr or ma; if there is at least one node of the form ( , um : [ ]) in
T , then T is potential.
An argument is a proponent argument if its nodes are labelled P; and an oppo-
nent argument if its nodes are labelled O.
Given a debate tree T (δ), we say that a node is in an argument (in T (δ)) if and
only if it is a node in some argument drawn from T (δ).
The sentence χ in the root of an argument T drawn from a debate tree is the
claim of T . If T is actual, and χ is its claim, T is written as S `t χ, where
S = {α|(α,ma : [ ]) is a node in T }.
Example 21. In the debate tree shown in Figure 4.2, two (actual) proponent argu-
ments and one (actual) opponent argument can be drawn from this tree, as shown
in Figure 4.4.
Definition 16 is very useful in that it gives a means of talking about arguments
in the context of a debate tree. This notion will be repeatedly used later on, as
supported by the following lemma: actual arguments can be mapped to equivalent
ABA arguments.
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T 1(δ) T 2(δ) T 3(δ) T 4(δ) T 5(δ)
(s, um : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(a, um : P[3])
OO
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(q, um : O[5])
OO
(q,mr : O[5])
OO
(b, um : O[6])
OO
T 6(δ) T 7(δ) T 8(δ) T 9(δ)
(s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(q,mr : O[5])
OO
(q,mr : O[5])
OO
(q,mr : O[5])
OO
(q,mr : O[5])
OO
(b,ma : O[7])
OO
(b,ma : O[7])
OO
(b,ma : O[7])
OO
(b,ma : O[7])
OO
(c, um : P[8])
OO
(c,ma : P[9])
OO
(c,ma : P[9])
OO
(r, um : O[10])
OO
Figure 4.3: The construction of the debate tree in Figure 4.2. Here the tree is con-
structed using utterances u′1, . . . , u′9 as given in Example 11.
Lemma 3. For each actual argument S `t β drawn from a debate tree T (δ), there
exists an ABA argument S ` β in the ABA framework drawn from δ.
This lemma is trivially true as a node in an actual argument can be mapped to a
node in an ABA argument by 1) dropping the tag and the ID, and 2) adding nodes τ
as children of leaf nodes of the form ( ,mr : [ ]) (as each of these node represents
a rule with an empty body).
The ABA arguments corresponding to the arguments drawn from the debate tree
drawn from the dialogue in Example 9 (see Figure 4.2) are: {a} ` s, {b} ` q, and
{c} ` c.
We consider now restricted forms of debate trees, that we then use below to
refine our notion of legal-move function.
Definition 17. A debate tree T (δ) is patient if and only if for all nodes n =
( ,ma : [ ]) in T (δ) such that n has a child, then n is in an actual argument
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(s,mr : P[1]) (c,ma : P[9]) (q,mr : O[5])
(a,ma : P[4])
OO
(b,ma : O[7])
OO
Figure 4.4: Two proponent arguments (left) and one opponent argument (right)
drawn from the debate tree shown in Figure 4.2.
drawn from T (δ).
Arguments in a patient tree are fully expanded (cf. actual) before being attacked.
The tree in Figure 4.2 is patient. The debate tree in the following example is not.
Example 22. Let a dialogue δ be follows:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← a, b), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, asm(a), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, ctr(a, c), 4〉
The debate tree drawn from this dialogue is in Figure 4.5. This debate tree is not
patient as the argument {a} ` s is not actual, since the node (b, um : P[2]) has the
flag um, yet the assumption node (a,ma : P[3]) already has a child (c, um : O[4]).
(s,mr : P[1])
(a,ma : P[3])
44
(b, um : P[2])
jj
(c, um : O[4])
OO
Figure 4.5: The non-patient debate tree drawn from the dialogue in Example 22.
The restricted form of legal-move function we consider is guaranteed to generate
patient trees, as follows.
Definition 18. A legal-move function λ ∈ Λ is patient if and only if for every
δ ∈ D such that T (δ) is patient, for every u ∈ λ(δ), T (δ ◦ u) is still patient.
We use λp to denote a generic patient legal-move function. A patient dialogue
is a dialogue compatible with a patient legal-move function λp.
In the rest of this chapter, all dialogues are patient.
65
(a,ma : P[2]) (a,ma : P[2])
(b,ma : O[4])
OO
(b,ma : O[4])
OO
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(b, um : O[7])
OO
(b,ma : O[8])
OO
Figure 4.6: Filtered (left) and not filtered (right) debate trees.
This definition requires agents to consult the debate tree before making utter-
ances. Thus, when an agent decides what to utter, it needs to take the current
debate tree into account and make sure that its new utterance will keep the tree
patient. Thus, the debate tree drawn from a dialogue can be seen as a commit-
ment store [WK95] holding information that agents disclose and share using the
dialogue.
Another legal-move function that relies on the debate tree as a commitment store
is the filtered legal-move function, defined as follows.
Definition 19. A debate tree T (δ) is filtered if and only if for any two nodes
n1 = (β,ma : L[id1]), n2 = (β,ma : L[id2]), L ∈ {P,O}, n1 6= n2, if n1 has a
child n′1 in an actual argument T1 and n2 has a child n′2 in an actual argument T2,
then T1 6= T2.
Figure 4.6 shows two debate trees. The one on the left is a filtered debate tree
whereas the one on the right is not. In the filtered debate tree (left), since the node
(a,ma : P[2]) has a child (b,ma : O[4]), so the node (a,ma : P[6]) cannot be
attacked by the same argument {b} `t b, hence (b, um : O[7]) is an unmarked
node, rather than a marked assumption node.
Note, when comparing two arguments for equality, we only consider the sen-
tence and the tag in each argument, while ignoring the label and the ID.
Definition 20. A legal-move function λ ∈ Λ is filtered if and only if for every
δ ∈ D such that T (δ) is filtered, for every u ∈ λ(δ), T (δ ◦ u) is still filtered.
We use λfi to denote a generic filtered legal-move function. A filtered dialogue
is a dialogue compatible with a filtered legal-move function λfi.
Filtered legal-move functions bring efficiency to dialogues. For dialogues that
are compatible with a filtered legal-move function, any assumption is attacked
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at most once by the same argument. The following two examples show the two
dialogues that draw the two debate trees in Figure 4.6.
Example 23. A dialogue δ that is compatible with a filtered legal-move function
is shown in the following table. We can see that the argument {a} ` a is attacked
by {b} ` b once and only once. The debate tree drawn from this dialogue is shown
in Figure 4.6 (left).
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(a), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(a, b), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, asm(b), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(b, a), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, asm(a), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, ctr(a, b), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 8〉
〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 9〉
Example 24. A dialogue δ that is not compatible with a filtered legal-move func-
tion is shown in the following table. In this dialogue, the argument {a} ` a is
attacked by {b} ` b twice, repeatedly. The debate tree drawn from this dialogue is
shown in Figure 4.6 (right).
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(a), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(a, b), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, asm(b), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, ctr(b, a), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 5, asm(a), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, ctr(a, b), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 7, asm(b), 8〉
The next notion we introduce is the exhaustiveness, which gives sense of a dia-
logue “completeness”.
Definition 21. The exhaustive outcome function ωex is such that, given δ ∈ D,
λ ∈ Λ and 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 the framework drawn from δ, ωex(δ, λ) = true if and
only if ωABA(δ, λ) = true and @u′ ∈ λ(δ) with content either:
• asm(α), for α ∈ Aδ, or
• rl(ρ), for ρ ∈ Rδ, or
• ctr(α, β), for β = Cδ(α),
such that ωABA(δ ◦ u′, λ) = true.
We refer to dialogues for which ωex is true as exhaustive.
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Note that exhaustiveness does not force agents to contribute to dialogues with all
relevant information they hold. Rather, it enforces that if an utterance u with a rule
or an assumption as its content has been made in accordance to a certain λ, then
the pass utterance is not allowed to be uttered where it is possible to make another
utterance with the same content as u, if such u is allowed by λ. The following
example illustrates this notion of exhaustiveness.
Example 25. Given a patient legal-move function λp, the following dialogue δ
compatible with λp is not exhaustive as
〈a2, a1, 5, rl(c←), 6〉
can be uttered in place for
〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 6〉,
since rl(c←) has been uttered in:
〈a2, a1, 3, rl(c←), 4〉.
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← a, b), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, rl(a← c), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, rl(c←), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 2, rl(b← c), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 6〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 7〉
Similarly to [DKT06], we introduce the defence set and the culprits of a debate
tree. We use these two concepts to prove our soundness result in the next section.
Definition 22. Given a debate tree T (δ),
• the defence set DEF(T (δ)) is the union of all assumptions α in proponent
nodes of the form n = (α,ma : P[ ]), such that n is in an actual argument;
• the culprits CUL(T (δ)) are given by the set of all assumptions α in op-
ponent nodes n = (α,ma : O[ ]) such that the child of n in T (δ) is
n′ = ( , : P[ ]) and both n and n′ are in actual arguments.
In this section, we have introduced some basic notions used in dialogue con-
struction. In the next two sections, we are going to formally link dialogues with
argumentation semantics and show how a-/g-successful dialogues can be con-
structed.
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4.3 Focused Dialogues
With debate tree defined, in this section we link dialogues and argumentation se-
mantics. We first define the notion of a node being properly attacked in a debate
tree, as follows.
Definition 23. Given a debate tree T (δ), a node n in T (δ) is properly attacked if
and only if n is of the form ( ,ma : [ ]) and n has a child n′, such that n′ is in an
actual argument.
Thus, an assumption node is properly attacked if and only if there is an actual
argument attacking the assumption in the node.
Then we introduce the notion of focused, as follows.
Definition 24. A debate tree T (δ) is focused if and only if
1. for all arguments A drawn from T (δ), if A contains a node ( ,ma : O[ ]),
then there is at most one node n of the form ( ,ma : O[ ]) in A such that n
has any child, and such node n has a single child;
2. for all nodes of the form (β0,mr : P[t]) with children (β1, : P[ ]), . . .,
(βn, : P[ ]) there must be an utterance in δ of the form
〈 , , t, rl(β0 ← β1, . . . , βn), 〉.
In focused trees, no alternative ways to defend claims are considered simultane-
ously, i.e., an opponent argument is only attacked by a single proponent argument
whereas a proponent argument can be attacked in as many ways as the number of
its assumptions. Moreover, the claim is supported by a single set of proponents.
The tree in Figure 4.2 is focused. (We call trees and dialogues that are not focused
as non-focused trees and dialogues, respectively.) Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show two
non-focused debate trees drawn from dialogues in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, respectively,
violating condition 1 and 2 in Definition 24, respectively.
Definition 25. A legal-move function λ ∈ Λ is focused if and only if for every
δ ∈ D such that T (δ) is focused, for every u ∈ λ(δ), T (δ ◦ u) is still focused.
We use λf to denote a generic focused legal-move function. A focused dialogue
is a dialogue compatible with a focused legal-move function λf .
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Table 4.1: A dialogue that draws a non-focused debate tree.
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(χ), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(χ), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(χ, s), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, rl(s← a, b), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, asm(a), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 4, asm(b), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 5, ctr(a, c), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 6, ctr(b, c), 8〉
Table 4.2: Another dialogue that draws a non-focused debate tree.
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← b), 3〉
(χ,ma : P[2])
(s,mr : O[3])
OO
(a,ma : O[5])
44
(b,ma : O[6])
jj
(c, um : P[7])
OO
(c, um : P[8])
OO
Figure 4.7: A non-focused tree. Note, in this tree, the opponent argument {a, b} `t
s has two proponent nodes as its children: (c, um : P[7]) and (c, um :
P[8]).
(s,mr : P[1])
(a, um : P[2])
44
(b, um : P[3])
jj
Figure 4.8: A non-focused tree. Note, in this tree, a proponent node (the root) has
two “sets” of proponent children from two different utterances.
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With all needed ingredients, we are ready to show how a-/g-successful dialogues
can be constructed. We first define two specific legal-move functions by compos-
ing several legal-move functions that we have defined so far.
Definition 26. Given a flat legal-move function λfl, a related legal-move function
λrt, a patient legal-move function λp, a focused legal-move function λf , and a
filtered legal-move λfi,
• a (focused) admissible legal-move function is defined as:
λ = λfl · λrt · λp · λf · λfi;
• a (focused) grounded legal-move function is defined as:
λ = λfl · λrt · λp · λf .
We use λADM and λGND to denote generic (focused) admissible and grounded
legal-move functions, respectively.
Example 26. A sample dialogue compatible with a grounded legal-move function
λGND is:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 2〉
〈a1, a2, 1, asm(s), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, ctr(s, a), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 4, rl(a← q), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 4, rl(a← p), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 5, asm(q), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 6, asm(p), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 7, ctr(q, b), 9〉 〈a2, a1, 8, ctr(p, c), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 9, rl(b←), 11〉 〈a2, a1, 10, rl(c←), 12〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 13〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 14〉
The debate tree drawn from this dialogue is in Figure 4.9.
Example 27. The dialogue δ in Example 19 is compatible with an admissible
legal-move function λADM , but not a grounded legal-move function λGND. The
debate tree T (δ) drawn from δ is shown in Figure 4.10. As illustrated in this
example, the filtering has been applied to both:
(b, um : O[11]) and (a, um : O[12]).
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(s,ma : P[3])
(a,mr : O[4])
OO
(q,ma : O[7])
44
(p,ma : O[8])
jj
(b,mr : P[10])
OO
(c,mr : P[12])
OO
Figure 4.9: The debate tree drawn from the dialogue in Example 26.
(a,ma : P[2])
(b,mr : O[3])
OO
(c,ma : O[5])
44
(d,ma : O[6])
jj
(a,ma : P[10])
OO
(c,ma : P[9])
OO
(b, um : O[11])
OO
(a, um : O[12])
OO
Figure 4.10: The debate tree drawn from the dialogue in Example 19.
Hence, there is no repeated attacks to these two assumptions.
Actual arguments drawn from the dialogue in Example 26 are: {s} `t s, {q} `t
a, {p} `t a, {b} `t b, and {} `t c. Notice that there are two arguments {q} `t a
and {p} `t a for the same claim a, as both rl(a← q) and rl(a← p) are in δ. Even
though the debate tree drawn from this dialogue (shown in Figure 4.9) is similar to
the one in Figure 4.7, this dialogue is still focused as these two rules represent two
different ways of attacking the claim, rather than supporting / proving the claim.
We refine the outcome function guaranteeing that the “proponent” has the last
word in the dialogue, namely all leaves in the debate tree are proponent nodes
or “dead-end” opponent nodes (not corresponding to any unattacked actual argu-
ments).
Definition 27. The last word outcome function ωlw is such that, given δ ∈ D
such that δ is compatible with a grounded or admissible legal-move function λ,
and the debate tree, T (δ), drawn from δ, then ωlw(δ, λ) = true if and only if
ωex(δ, λ) = true and one of the following two cases holds:
1. for all leaf nodes n in T (δ), n is either ( ,mr : P[ ]) or ( ,ma : P[ ]);
72
2. if a leaf node n is of the form ( , : O[ ]), then either
a) n is in a potential argument, or
b) n is in an actual argument that contains one node n′ of the form (α,ma :
O[ ]) such that there is another node n′′ in T (δ) of the form (α,ma :
O[ ]), n′′ 6= n, and n′′ is properly attacked.
We refer to exhaustive dialogues for which ωlw is true as positive.
The last word outcome function specifies a winning condition for the (fictitious)
proponent such that: either the proponent finishes the dialogue with rules and un-
attacked assumptions (condition 1), or the (fictitious) opponent does not pose any
valid attacks via actual argument (condition 2a), or any valid attacks posed by the
opponent has been answered with valid counter attacks (condition 2b).
Example 28. This example illustrates a non-positive dialogue δ.
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← a, b), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 3〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 4〉
The debate tree T (δ) drawn from this example is in Figure 4.11. We can see this
dialogue is not positive as there are two unmarked leaf nodes:
(a, um : P[2]) and (b, um : P[2]),
in T (δ).
(s,mr : P[1])
(a, um : P[2])
44
(b, um : P[2])
jj
Figure 4.11: A non-positive dialogue in Example 28.
The dialogues in Examples 9 and 26 are positive. The dialogue in Example 28
is not. Positive dialogues give debate trees corresponding to abstract dispute trees
[DKT06] (see Chapter 2) with the same defence set and culprits. Formally:
Lemma 4. Given a positive dialogue δ compatible with some grounded legal-
move function λGND, let T (δ) be the debate tree drawn from δ and χ be the
sentence in the root node of T (δ). Then there is an abstract dispute tree T a for S `
χ for some S, such that DEF(T (δ)) = DEF(T a) and CUL(T (δ)) = CUL(T a).
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Proof. We can transform debate trees into abstract dispute trees. Given a debate
tree T (δ), its equivalent abstract dispute tree T a is constructed as follows.
1. Delete all nodes n from T (δ) where n is in a potential argument. Let T ′(δ)
be the result.
2. Modify T ′(δ) by appending a new flag field Z = {0, 1} to each remaining
node in T (δ) and initialise Z to 0 for all nodes, i.e., a node now looks like
( , : [ ])[0]. Let T ′′(δ) be the result.
3. T a is T am in the sequence T a1 , . . . , T am constructed inductively as follows:
• T a0 is empty;
• let A be the argument in T ′′(δ) that contains the root of T (δ). Set the
flags of all nodes in T ′′(δ) that are also in A to 1. Let T ′′1 (δ) be the
result; then T a1 contains a single node that is labelled by A and is a P
node;
• let T ai be the i-th tree, for 0 < i < m, then T ai+1 is T ai with an
additional node (B, L), where B is an argument drawn from T ′′i (δ),
child of B′, another argument drawn from T ′′i (δ), such that:
– the flag of at least one node in B is 0;
– the root node of B has a parent node p in T ′′i (δ) with flag equal to
1 and such that p is in B′;
– L is P if the root node of B is a proponent node, otherwise L is O;
– set the flags of all nodes in T ′′i (δ) that are also in B to 1, let T ′′i+1(δ)
be the result.
4. m is the smallest index such that there is no node in T ′′m(δ) with its flag equal
to 0.
T a constructed above is an abstract dispute tree as follows.
1. Every node of T a = T am contains a single argument as there is no potential
argument in T ′(δ) and T ′′(δ). For each argument, there is a unique node
in T a. Each node in T a is labelled either P or O as arguments drawn from
T (δ) are labelled either P or O.
2. The root node of T a contains the argument that has the claim of the dialogue.
The root is labelled P by construction of T (δ).
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3. By definition of exhaustive outcome function, since δ is exhaustive, every
assumption is attacked in as many ways as possible. Hence a P node in T a
has as many children as its attacks by actual arguments.
4. By the definition of patient and focused legal-move function, since δ is pa-
tient and focused, there is only one way of attacking an argument labelled
by a O node. By the last word outcome function, since δ is positive, there is
no un-attacked argument labelled by a O node. Therefore, every O node in
T a with an assumption has one and only one P node as its child.
Since T a contains the same actual arguments as T (δ) and arguments have the
same P/O labelling in both T a and T (δ), we have DEF(T (δ)) = DEF(T a) and
CUL(T (δ)) = CUL(T a).
Lemma 4 shows the connection between the debate trees drawn from dialogues
compatible with λGND with abstract dispute trees. Similar result can be obtained
for dialogues compatible with some admissible legal-move function λADM . Since
λfi performs the “filtering”, this filtering can be retracted by inserting nodes that
have been filtered back to a debate tree. We introduce the expanded debate tree as
follows.
Definition 28. Given a debate tree T (δ) where δ is positive and compatible with
some λADM , we can construct a (possibly infinite) sequence T E0 , . . . , T En , . . . of
trees such that:
• Delete all nodes n from T (δ) where n is in a potential argument. Let T ′(δ)
be the result.
• T E0 = T ′(δ).
• Suppose T Ei , for i ≥ 0, has been constructed; then T Ei+1 is obtained by
adding arguments T1, . . . , Tk simultaneously to leaf nodes n1, . . . , nk of
T Ei , as children, respectively, where Tj and nj , 1 ≤ j ≤ k are such that:
1. nj is of the form (α,ma : L0[ ]) (L0 ∈ {P,O}),
2. there is n0j of the form (α,ma : [ ]) in T ′(δ), n0j 6= nj ,
3. n0j has a child n
′
j in T ′(δ), and n′j is in an actual argument T ′′j in T ′(δ).
4. modify all nodes (β, F : [id]) in T ′′j to (β, F : P[id]) if L0 = O, or
(β, F : O[id]) if L0 = P; let the result be Tj .
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The expanded debate tree T E(δ) of T (δ) is the limit2 of this sequence. Note
that, T E(δ) of T (δ) is the last element of this sequence, if the sequence is finite
(when no leaf node is an assumption node).
Example 29. We illustrate the notion of the expanded debate tree with the debate
tree given in Figure 4.10. The expanded debate tree is shown in Figure 4.12.
(a,ma : P[2])
(b,mr : O[3])
OO
(c,ma : O[5])
44
(d,ma : O[6])
jj
(a,ma : P[10])
OO
(c,ma : P[9])
OO
(b,mr : O[3])
OO
(a,ma : O[10])
OO
(c,ma : O[5])
44
(d,ma : O[6])
OO
(b,mr : P[3])
OO
...
OO
...
OO
(c,ma : P[5])
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(d,ma : P[6])
OO
...
OO
...
OO
Figure 4.12: The expanded debate tree of the debate tree shown in Figure 4.10.
With the notion of the expanded debate tree defined, we have results for dia-
logues that are compatible with λADM as well.
Lemma 5. Given a positive dialogue δ compatible with some admissible legal-
move function λADM , let T (δ) be the debate tree drawn from δ and χ be the
sentence in the root node of T (δ). Then there is an abstract dispute tree T a for S `
χ for some S, such that DEF(T (δ)) = DEF(T a) and CUL(T (δ)) = CUL(T a).
Proof. We can transform debate trees into abstract dispute trees using the proce-
dure as shown in the proof of Lemma 4 with a modification. After deleting all
nodes n from T (δ) where n is in a potential argument (step 1), we replace T (δ)
with T E(δ), the expanded debate tree of T (δ). The rest of the construction of T a
remain unchanged.
2The limit of a sequence of debate trees is a (possibly infinite) tree T such that every tree in the
sequence is a top-portion of T , and every finite top-portion of T is a sub-tree of some tree in the
sequence.
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It is easy to see that T a constructed with the modified T E(δ) is an abstract dis-
pute tree and DEF(T (δ)) = DEF(T a) and CUL(T (δ)) = CUL(T a), as shown
in the proof of Lemma 4.
As in the case of abstract dispute trees, the defence set of a debate tree may not
be admissible, as it may attack itself. We refine the notion of outcome function by
enforcing that this set does not attack itself, as follows:
Definition 29. The successful outcome function ωscc is such that, given δ ∈ D,
compatible with some admissible legal-move function λADM or grounded legal-
move function λGND, ωscc(δ, λ) = true if and only if ωlw(δ, λ) = true and
DEF(T (δ)) ∩ CUL(T (δ)) = {}.
Theorem 1. Given a dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ ∈ D compatible with some admissible
legal-move function λADM , if ωscc(δ, λADM )= true, then δ is a-successful and χ
is supported by DEF(T (δ)).
Proof. If ωscc(δ, λ) = true, by Lemma 5 there exists an abstract dispute tree T a
such that DEF(T (δ)) = DEF(T a) and CUL(T (δ)) = CUL(T a). By Theorem
5.1 of [DKT06] (see Chapter 2), the theorem holds.
Theorem 2. Given a dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ ∈ D compatible with some λGND, if
ωscc(δ, λGND)= true, then δ is g-successful and χ is supported by DEF(T (δ)).
Proof. Similar to the previous proof, if ωscc(δ, λ) = true, then there exists an
abstract dispute tree T a such that DEF(T (δ)) = DEF(T a) and CUL(T (δ)) =
CUL(T a). As shown in [DKT09], as a direct consequence of Theorem 3.7 in
[KT99], we have the defence set of a grounded abstract dispute tree is a subset
of the grounded set of arguments. Hence δ is g-successful and χ is supported by
DEF(T (δ)).
4.3.1 One-way Expansion Dialogue
We also introduce a special class of focused dialogues compatible with one-way
expansion legal-move functions. Dialogues compatible with one-way expansion
legal-move functions are simpler than focused dialogues. We show how such dia-
logues can be used to model a simplified instance of discovery dialogues in Sec-
tion 7.4.
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Definition 30. A one-way expansion legal-move function, λ ∈ Λ, is such that, for
δ ∈ D, for all u = 〈 , , , C, 〉 ∈ λ(δ), then:
1. C = rl(ρ) only if @ u′ = 〈 , , , rl(ρ′), 〉, u′ 6= u in δ such that Head(ρ) =
Head(ρ′);
2. C = ctr(α, β) only if @ u′ = 〈 , , , ctr(α, β′), 〉, u′ 6= u in δ such that
β = β′.
We use λowe to denote a generic one-way expansion legal-move function.
A one-way expansion dialogue is a dialogue compatible with some λowe.
This definition implies that, in a single dialogue (1) there is only one unique
way of expanding a rule; and (2) every assumption has one and only one contrary.
Although condition (2) is not very restrictive (indeed it is imposed in the original
ABA), condition (1) imposes a restrictive limitation on ABA framework drawn
from dialogues, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 30. The following dialogue is a one-way expansion dialogue.
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(s), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(s, a), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, rl(a← b), 4〉
The following dialogue is not a one-way expansion dialogue, as there are two
rules rl(a← b) and rl(a← c) in this dialogue, though it is focused.
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, asm(s), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, ctr(s, a), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, rl(a← b), 4〉
〈a2, a1, 3, rl(a← c), 5〉
As we can see from Definition 30, one-way expansion legal-move functions are
(special cases of) focused legal-move functions. Hence we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 6. Given a dialogue δ, for any one-way expansion legal-move function
λowe, if λowe(δ) = U , then there is a focused legal-move function λf such that
U ⊆ λf (δ).
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Definition 31. Given a flat legal-move function λfl, a related legal-move function
λrt, a patient legal-move function λp, a focused legal-move function λf , and a
filtered legal-move λfi,
• a (one-way) admissible legal-move function is defined as:
λ = λfl · λrt · λp · λowe · λfi;
• a (one-way) grounded legal-move function is defined as:
λ = λfl · λrt · λp · λowe.
We use λ−ADM and λ
−
GND to denote generic (one-way) admissible and grounded
legal-move functions, respectively.
Since one-way expansion functions are special cases of focused legal-move
functions, given Lemma 6, we obtain results for one-way expansion dialogues
similar to Theorems 1 and 2 as follows.
Corollary 1. Given a dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ ∈ D compatible with an (one-way)
admissible legal-move function λ−ADM , if ωscc(δ, λ
−
ADM )= true, then δ is a-
successful and the χ is supported by DEF(T (δ)).
Corollary 2. Given a dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ ∈ D compatible with an (one-
way) grounded legal-move function λ−GND, if ωscc(δ, λ
−
GND)= true, then δ is
g-successful and the χ is supported by DEF(T (δ)).
4.4 Dialogues and Debate Forests
In this section we lift dialogue constraints and consider dialogues that may not
be compatible with a focused legal-move function. Hence, we consider dialogues
that allow multiple ways of (directly or indirectly) supporting the claim. In this
unconstrained case, we again show that Theorems 1 and 2 hold for such dialogues.
We first define two more legal-move functions.
Definition 32. Given a flat legal-move function λfl, a related legal-move function
λrt, a patient legal-move function λp, and a filtered legal-move λfi,
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• an (unconstrained) admissible legal-move function is defined as:
λ = λfl · λrt · λp · λfi;
• an (unconstrained) grounded legal-move function is defined as:
λ = λfl · λrt · λp.
We use λ∗ADM and λ
∗
GND to denote generic (unconstrained) admissible and grounded
legal-move functions, respectively.
Unconstrained admissible and grounded legal-move functions are used to con-
struct non-focused dialogues that are admissible and grounded, respectively. We
show results of using these legal-move functions in later part of this section.
We first show an example of a dialogue compatible with some grounded legal-
move function λ∗GND (and some admissible legal-move function λ
∗
ADM as well).
Example 31. A sample dialogue compatible with λ∗GND (but not λGND) is:
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← p), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← q), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, rl(q ← a), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 2, rl(p← b, c), 5〉 〈a2, a1, 4, asm(a), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, ctr(a, r), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 7, rl(r ←), 8〉
〈a1, a2, 5, asm(b), 9〉 〈a2, a1, 5, rl(c←), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 9, ctr(b, k), 11〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 12〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 13〉
This dialogue is not compatible with a focused legal-move function (hence not
compatible with λGND) as both utterance
〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← p), 2〉 and 〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← q), 3〉
expand s. The debate tree drawn from this dialogue is shown in Figure 4.13. We
can see that this tree is not focused.
We first introduce the notion of arguments (in the form of nodes in a debate tree)
being attacked as follows.
80
(s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,ma : P[3])
jj
(b,ma : P[9])
44
(c,mr : P[10])
OO
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(k, um : O[10])
OO
(r,mr : O[7])
OO
Figure 4.13: The (non-focused) debate tree drawn from the (non-focused) dialogue
in Example 31.
Definition 33. Given a debate tree T that contains an argument A, which is a sub-
tree of T , we say that A is attacked in T if and only if there is a node n = ( ,ma :
[ ]) in A such that n has a child node m in T .
We say that the sub-tree rooted at m in T is an attacker of A in T .
For instance, the argument {s} `t s in Figure 4.9 is attacked; and the attacker
of {s} `t s is the tree shown in Figure 4.14 (right). The notion of attacked differs
from the one given in Definition 23 in two ways:
• Definition 33 defines the attacked notion with respect to an argument, or a
sub-tree of a debate tree, whereas Definition 23 defines the properly attacked
with respect to a single (assumption) node in a debate tree;
• Definition 33 states an argument is attacked as long as there is some node
in the debate tree such that the node is a child of the argument, whereas
Definition 23 defines an assumption node being properly attacked if and
only if there is an actual argument that hangs from that assumption node.
(a,mr : O[4])
(s,ma : P[3]) (q,ma : O[7])
44
(p,ma : O[8])
jj
(b,ma : P[11])
OO
(c,mr : P[12])
OO
Figure 4.14: The argument {s} `t s (left) and its attacker (right).
Debate trees are insufficient to represent information disclosed in non-focused
dialogues. To compute the acceptability of the claim of non-focused dialogues, we
introduce the notion of debate forest, composed of (debate) trees.
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Definition 34. Given a dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉, the debate forest
F(δ) drawn from δ is a set of trees. F(δ) is Fm(δ) in the sequence F0(δ), F1(δ),
. . . ,Fm(δ) constructed inductively from the pi-pruned sequence δ′ = 〈u′1 . . . , u′m〉
obtained from δ, as follows (below, L,L′ ∈ {P,O}, L 6= L′):
1. F0(δ) is empty.
2. F1(δ) contains a single debate tree T 11 (δ), which contains a single node
(s, um : P[1]).
3. Let F i(δ) be the i-th forest containing trees T i1 (δ), . . . ,T il (δ), let u′i+1 =
〈 , , t, C, id〉, and let u′t = 〈 , , , Ct, t〉 be the target utterance of u′i+1; then
F i+1(δ) is obtained as follows.
a) if C = rl(β0 ← β1, . . . , βl) then F i+1(δ) is obtained in one of the
following two cases:
i. if there is no debate tree in F i(δ) that contains (β0,mr : P[t]),
then F i+1(δ) is F i(δ) updated as follows:
for all T ij (δ), 0 < j ≤ l, in F i(δ) such that T ij (δ) contains (β0, :
L[t]), then, for each T ij (δ),
(β1, um : L[i+ 1]), . . . , (βl, um : L[i+ 1])
are added to T ij (δ) as children of (β0, : L[t]); and if (β0, : L[t])
is (β0, um : L[t]), then it is replaced by (β0,mr : L[t]) in each
T ij (δ) that contains (β0, um : L[t]);
ii. otherwise, F i+1(δ) is F i(δ) with k additional debate trees, where
k is the number of debate trees in F i(δ) that contains (β0,mr :
P[t]). For each T ij (δ) that contains (β0,mr : P[t]), a new debate
tree is created by copying T ij (δ) and replacing all children and
sub-trees rooted at these children of (β0,mr : P[t]) with new
children
(β1, um : P[i+ 1]), . . . , (βl, um : P[i+ 1]);
b) if C = asm(α) then F i+1(δ) is F i(δ) with all T ij (δ) that contain
(α, um : L[t]) with (α, um : L[t]) replaced by (α,ma : L[i+ 1]).
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c) if C = ctr(α, β) then F i+1(δ) is obtained in one of the following two
cases:
i. if there exists no T ij (δ) in F i(δ) such that T ij (δ) contain a node
n = (α,ma : O[t]) where n is in an argument A such that A is
attacked, then F i+1(δ) is F i(δ) with all T ij (δ), 0 < j ≤ l, that
contain (α,ma : L[t]) each having a new node (β, um : L′[i+1])
as a child of (α,ma : L[t]);
ii. otherwise, F i+1(δ) is F i(δ) with additional k debate trees, where
k is the number of debate trees in F i(δ) that contain (α,ma :
O[t]). For each T ij (δ) that contains (α,ma : O[t]), a new debate
tree is created by (1) copying T ij (δ), (2) removing the attacker
of the argument that contains (α,ma : O[t]), and (3) adding
(β, um : P[i+ 1]) as a child of (α,ma : O[t]).
The construction of the debate forest drawn from the dialogue in Example 31
is in Figures 4.15 and 4.16. Conceptually, we construct debate forests using the
same procedure as constructing debate trees, i.e., inserting new nodes and locating
parents, etc. However, if we see a new utterance u such that adding u will yield
a non-focused dialogue, we will (1) duplicate all existing trees in the forest that
contain the target of u and (2) removing all sub-trees that are connected to the
target of u from the duplications, and (3) add u to the duplicated trees. It is possible
that more trees are duplicated in this process than needed but the forest is a set, so
only a single version of the identical trees is kept. Hence, at the end, we obtain a
set of unique debate trees in a debate forest.
To study properties of debate forests, we introduce the concept of sub-dialogues.
Definition 35. Given a dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ, Daiaj (χ)′ = δ′ is a sub-dialogue of δ
if and only if for all utterances u in δ′, u is in δ. We say that δ is the full-dialogue
of δ′.
Concepturally, given a dialogue δ, a sub-dialogue of δ contains a subset of utter-
ances that are in δ. As shown later, given a dialogue δ, we want to identify some
sub-dialogues δ′s of δ, such that each δ′ is focused and share the same claim as δ.
Hence, the computation on δ can be divided to separate computation on each δ′.
Example 32. Two sub-dialogues of the dialogue in Example 31 are in tables 4.3
and 4.4.
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T 11 (δ)
F1(δ) (s, um : P[1])
T 21 (δ)
F2(δ) (s,mr : P[1])
(p, um : P[2])
OO
T 31 (δ) T 32 (δ)
F3(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p, um : P[2])
OO
(q, um : P[3])
OO
T 41 (δ) T 42 (δ)
F4(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p, um : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(a, um : P[4])
OO
T 51 (δ) T 52 (δ)
F5(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b, um : P[5])
OO
(c, um : P[5])
jj
(a, um : P[4])
OO
T 61 (δ) T 62 (δ)
F6(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b, um : P[5])
OO
(c, um : P[5])
jj
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
Figure 4.15: The construction of the debate forest in Example 31 (Part 1).
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T 71 (δ) T 72 (δ)
F7(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b, um : P[5])
OO
(c, um : P[5])
jj
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(r, um : O[7])
OO
T 81 (δ) T 82 (δ)
F8(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b, um : P[5])
OO
(c, um : P[5])
jj
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(r,mr : O[7])
OO
T 91 (δ) T 92 (δ)
F9(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b,ma : P[9])
OO
(c, um : P[5])
jj
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(r,mr : O[7])
OO
T 101 (δ) T 102 (δ)
F10(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b,ma : P[9])
OO
(c,mr : P[5])
jj
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(r,mr : O[7])
OO
T 111 (δ) T 112 (δ)
F11(δ) (s,mr : P[1]) (s,mr : P[1])
(p,mr : P[2])
OO
(q,mr : P[3])
OO
(b,ma : P[9])
OO
(c,mr : P[5])
jj
(a,ma : P[6])
OO
(k, um : O[11])
OO
(r,mr : O[7])
OO
Figure 4.16: The construction of the debate forest in Example 31 (Part 2).
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Table 4.3: A sub-dialogue of the dialogue in Example 31 (part 1).
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(s← q), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, rl(q ← a), 4〉
〈a2, a1, 4, asm(a), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 6, ctr(a, r), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 7, rl(r ←), 8〉
Table 4.4: A sub-dialogue of the dialogue in Example 31 (part 2).
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(s← p), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, rl(p← b, c), 5〉
〈a1, a2, 5, asm(b), 9〉 〈a2, a1, 5, rl(c←), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 9, ctr(b, k), 11〉
The first sub-dialogue (in Table 4.3) is neither a-successful nor g-successful as
the proponent fails to defend a, an assumption in the argument {a} ` s.
The second sub-dialogue (in Table 4.4) is both a-successful and g-successful as
the proponent is able to construct the argument {b} ` s and defend it.
Note that Definition 35 gives a very liberal definition of sub-dialogues. We will
show how such definition can be used to prove our results. Conceptually, what
happens there is that we show each non-focused dialogue can be understood as a
“union” of several independent focused sub-dialogues. Hence, each sub-dialogue
draws a tree in the debate forest drawn from the full non-focused dialogue. Thus,
as soon as one debate tree is found to be “good”, then the particular sub-dialogue
draws the debate tree becomes “successful”, then the full non-focused dialogue is
“successful”. Essentially, we reduce the computation on a non-focused dialogue
to many separate independent computation on sub-dialogues.
The following results (Lemmas 7, 8 and 9) connect debate forest with debate
trees.
Lemma 7. Given a debate forest F(δ) drawn from δ compatible with λ is some
grounded legal-move function λ∗GND, or some admissible legal-move function
λ∗ADM , each tree in F(δ) is a debate tree.
Proof. We show that given a dialogue δ, the inductive process in Definition 34
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constructs a set of debate trees.
For each tree T ij (δ) in F i(δ), condition 1(a) and 1(b) in Definition 15 are triv-
ially true as all nodes in each tree are inserted in accordance with utterances in δ
hence if a sentence β is in a node, β must be in some utterance in the dialogue.
Condition 2(a)-2(f) in Definition 15 are met by condition 3(a)-3(c) in Defini-
tion 34.
Hence, each tree in a debate forest is a debate tree per Definition 15.
We redefine patient and filtered legal-move functions with respect to debate
forests, as follows.
Definition 36. A debate forest F(δ) is patient if and only if all debate trees in
F(δ) are patient debate trees.
Definition 37. A debate forest F(δ) is filtered if and only if all debate trees in
F(δ) are filtered debate trees.
Definition 38. A legal-move function λp ∈ Λ is patient if and only if for every
δ ∈ D such that F(δ) is patient, for every u ∈ λ(δ), F(δ ◦ u) is still patient.
Definition 39. A legal-move function λfi ∈ Λ is filtered if and only if for every
δ ∈ D such that F(δ) is filtered for every u ∈ λ(δ), F(δ ◦ u) is still filtered.
The latter two definitions are generalised versions of Definition 18 and 20 re-
spectively as a debate tree is a special case of a debate forest that contains a single
tree.
Lemma 8. Given a debate forest F(δ) drawn from a dialogue δ, if δ is compatible
with some grounded legal-move function λ∗GND or some admissible legal-move
function λ∗ADM , then each debate tree in F(δ) is patient and focused.
Proof. Since dialogues constructed with λ∗GND or λ
∗
ADM are patient, and by Defi-
nition 38, we know that each debate tree in a debate forest is patient, we only need
to show that each debate tree is also focused.
Definition 24 defines two conditions for debate trees to be focused. Condition
(a) in Definition 24 is met by 3(c) in Definition 34 as which ensures that in a
single tree, a proponent argument is only attacked by a single opponent argument.
Condition (b) in Definition 24 is met by 3(a) in Definition 34 as which ensures that
when a proponent node is expanded such that it has a set of proponent children,
then these children must be from a single utterance.
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Lemma 9. Given a debate forest F(δ) drawn from δ, if δ is compatible with
some grounded legal-move function λ∗GND or some admissible legal-move func-
tion λ∗ADM , then each tree in F(δ) is a debate tree drawn from a sub-dialogue
of δ, such that each of these sub-dialogue is compatible with λGND or λADM ,
respectively.
Proof. We prove this lemma by constructing sub-dialogues and showing each of
the tree in a debate forest is a debate tree drawn from a sub-dialogue compatible
with λGND or λADM .
Given F(δ) contains l debate trees T1(δ), . . . , Tl(δ), the sub-dialogue δi, 0 <
i ≤ l that draws the debate tree Ti(δ) is constructed as follows.
1. δi is initialised to empty.
2. For each node (β, F : [id]) = n in T (δi),
• if uid = 〈 , , t, , id〉 is in δ but not in δi, then add uid to δi;
• let ut be the utterance in δ such that uid is related to ut, if ut is not in
δi, then add ut to δi.
3. Sort δi in the order of utterance IDs.
It is easy to see δi constructed above are sub-dialogues of δ and Ti(δ) is drawn
from δi. It is also trivially true that δi is flat, given δ is. We now show δi is related.
By Definition 15, we know in a debate tree, there are 6 cases that two nodes n
and n′ can be connected (n is the parent of n′):
1. n = ( ,mr : L[id]) and n′ = ( ,mr : L[id′]), or
2. n = ( ,mr : L[id]) and n′ = ( ,ma : L[id′]), or
3. n = ( ,mr : L[id]) and n′ = ( , um : L[id′]), or
4. n = ( ,ma : L[id]) and n′ = ( ,mr : L′[id′]), or
5. n = ( ,ma : L[id]) and n′ = ( ,ma : L′[id′]), or
6. n = ( ,ma : L[id]) and n′ = ( , um : L′[id′]),
in which L,L′ ∈ {P,O}, L 6= L′, id, id′ ∈ ID \ {ID0}. By Definition 11, the
utterance uid′ = 〈 , , , , id′〉 is related to the utterance uid = 〈 , , , , id〉 in
cases 1, 3, 4 and 6. In cases 2 and 5, there is an utterance ut = 〈 , , id, asm( ), t〉,
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such that ut is related to uid and uid′ is related to ut. It can be seen that the
previous construction of δi includes all utterances uid, uid′ and ut but no other
utterance. Hence δi is related.
With the above results and Lemma 8, this lemma holds.
We prove results for dialogues compatible with some λ∗GND and λ
∗
ADM , which
generalise results using λ−GND and λ
−
ADM given earlier.
Theorem 3. Given a dialogue Daiaj (β) = δ compatible with some λ∗GND, δ is g-
successful if there is a debate tree T (δi) drawn from a sub-dialogue δi of δ such
that δ is compatible with λGND and ωscc(δi, λGND) = true.
Proof. Let F(δ) be the debate forest drawn from δ and F(δ) contains debate trees
T (δ1), . . . , T (δn). Given Lemma 9, we know all trees in F(δ) are debate tree
drawn from some sub-dialogue of δ and each sub-dialogue is compatible with
λGND.
Suppose δi is compatible with λGND and ωscc(δi, λGND) = true, then δi is
g-successful and β is grounded in AF i, the ABA framework drawn from δi. We
need to show β is also grounded in AF , the ABA framework drawn from δ.
Since δi is compatible with λGND and ωscc(δi, λGND) = true, then it is not the
case that there is an argument that attacksDEF(T (δi)) that has not been countered
attacked in the ABA framework drawn from δ. By Definition 34 each debate
tree in F(δ) represents a set of arguments that support the claim of δ. Hence
each tree contains its own set of defence set, i.e., DEF(T (δi)) is different from
DEF(T (δj)), where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j. Therefore, if a defence set of a tree is
grounded in the ABA framework drawn from the sub-dialogue, it is also grounded
in the ABA framework drawn from the full-dialogue. Hence δ is g-successful if δi
is g-successful.
Similarly, the result holds for dialogues compatible with some λ∗ADM , as shown
in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Given a dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ compatible with some λ∗ADM , δ is
a-successful if there is a debate tree T (δi) drawn from a sub-dialogue δi of δ such
that δ is compatible with λADM and ωscc(δi, λADM ) = true.
Theorems 3 and 4 do not refer to debate forests drawn from dialogues directly,
rather, they specify conditions of sub-dialogues of the dialogue in consideration.
This is partly because the successful outcome function ωscc is defined for some
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(boy innocent,mr : P[1])
(boy not proven guilty,ma : P[3])
OO
(guilty, um : O[4])
OO
(W1,ma : O[6])
OO
(W2,ma : O[11])
mm
(not W1,mr : P[7])
OO
(not W2,mr : P[12])
OO
(contradicted,mr : P[8])
OO
(W2 has poor eyesight,mr : P[13])
OO
Figure 4.17: The debate tree drawn from the dialogue in Example 10.
admissible or grounded legal-move function λADM or λGND, but not for λ∗ADM
or λ∗GND (see Definition 29 on Page 77). Though we could overwrite Definition 29
and redefine it for λ∗ADM and λ
∗
GND, we choose not to as the current version of
Theorems 3 and 4 clearly indicates that testing the acceptability of the claim of a
non-focused dialogue can be reduced to testing the acceptability of the claim of
sub-dialogues of the original dialogue, whereas these sub-dialogues draw debate
trees and show properties we presented in the earlier section.
4.5 Illustration
We revisit Example 10 here. As we show in Chapter 3, the dialogue δ =Da1a2 (boy innocent)
is (top-down) related and flat.
The debate tree drawn from this dialogue, T (δ), is shown in Figure 4.17. T (δ)
is patient, focused and filtered. Hence, δ is compatible with a flat, related, patient,
focused and filtered legal-move function, λ. Hence δ is also flat, related, patient,
focused and filtered.
Since ωex(δ, λ) = ωscc(δ, λ) = true, δ is exhaustive and positive as well. Then,
by Theorems 1, 2 and Proposition 1, δ is a-/g-/i-successful.
4.6 Related Work
In the previous chapter, we have mentioned that Parsons et al. [PMSW07] study
utterance relevance in dialogues. We have stated that some legal-move functions
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presented in this chapter bring similar effect to our dialogue model. Indeed, we can
see that our patient legal-move function (λp) and focused legal-move function (λf )
jointly resemble their R1 related-ness (every new utterance has a direct impact on
the claim). Our related legal-move function (λrt) has some of the features of their
R2 related-ness (every new utterance directly or indirectly impacts the claim) in
that all related utterances have impact on the claim.
We have also mentioned Prakken’s work on persuasion dialogue [Pra05] in ear-
lier chapters. In that work, Prakken maps his dialogue framework to the grounded
semantics. Roughly speaking, in terms of obtaining the soundness result, i.e., a
“successful” dialogue means that the claim of the dialogue is “acceptable”, there
are two main differences between his approach and ours. Firstly, we rely on map-
ping our dialogues to abstract dispute trees whereas he uses a form of labelling.
Hence, in our case, “successful” dialogues can be mapped to “good” abstract dis-
pute trees; and in his case, “successful” dialogues have winning arguments that are
labelled in. Secondly, to support non-focused dialogues, we use the debate for-
est, and show individual trees in a forest can be mapped to abstract dispute trees,
whereas he put all arguments into a single tree and then identifies a “winning strat-
egy” that represents a sub part of the single tree.
Compared with [FT11a], the work presented in this chapter is a substantial ex-
tension. Firstly, this chapter shows soundness results with respect to grounded se-
mantics, rather than just admissibility. Secondly, [FT11a] uses “dialectical trees”,
which are mapped to concrete dispute trees [DKT06] whereas this work uses de-
bate trees (Definition 15), which are mapped to abstract dispute trees [DKT06].
Moreover, [FT11a] define dialectical trees constructively, and this work defines de-
bate trees (Definition 15) declaratively. The declarative definition makes some of
the later results, e.g., that debate forests are composed of debate trees (Lemma 7),
possible, as it would be difficult to claim two constructive definitions being equiv-
alent. Thirdly, in this chapter, we have studied non-focused dialogues and intro-
duced the notion of debate forest, and no such results were presented in [FT11a].
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have completed the presentation of our dialogue model by defin-
ing several legal-move functions and outcome functions. Table 4.5 summarises
various types of dialogues we have defined with these legal-move and outcome
functions. The system is generic and can be adapted in various applications. If we
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Table 4.5: Summary of types of dialogues defined with legal-move and outcome
functions from Chapters 3 and 4.
Dialogue Λ / Ω Brief Description
Flat λfl Assumptions cannot be rule heads.
ABA λfl, ωABA The framework drawn is a flat ABA framework.
Related λrt Utterances in a dialogue are (top-down) related.
Coherent λfl, λrt Dialogues that are flat and related.
Patient λp Only actual arguments are attacked.
Filtered λfi No duplicated attacks.
Focused λf Only a single way to support the claim.
Exhaustive ωex All utterances allowed by a legal-move are made.
Positive ωlw Proponent answers all attacks.
One-way λowe Only a single way to support / attack the claim.
Table 4.6: Summary of our dialogue framework.
Dialogue Goal: Generic
Topic Language: Assumption-based Argumentation
Comm. Language: Utterances (Definition 1)
Context: Generic
Protocol: Legal-move functions (λ)
Effect Rules: Not directly applicable
Outcome Rules: Outcome functions (ω)
revisit Prakken’s list on dialogue elements in Chapter 2 (Page 34), we can see our
dialogue framework can be summarised as in Table 4.6. We prove soundness of
our model by connecting it with an argumentation framework. Our results amount
to show a correspondence between justifying the claim of a dialogue by proving
its acceptability with respect to a given semantics in the argumentation framework
drawn from the dialogue.
Note that our soundness result is solely with respect to the shared information
that has been put forward in a dialogue, i.e., the acceptability of the dialogue claim
with respect to a certain argumentation semantics is tested in the ABA framework
drawn from a dialogue; it has little implication on the acceptability of the dialogue
in the “union” of the two agents. Hence, it is possible that a sentence, β, is accept-
able with respect to a certain argumentation semantics, S , in the union of the two
agents’ ABA frameworks, but a dialogue with β as its claim is not successful with
92
respect to S. (The inverse is also true: it is possible for the claim of a successful
dialogue being not acceptable in the union of the two agents’ knowledge-bases.)
Hence, there is no completeness result for our dialogue model as it is. However,
this issue will be addressed in the next chapter, when certain agent behaviours can
be enforced through strategy-move functions.
In particular, in the next chapter, we present how agents can develop strategies
which are compliant to the protocol given by legal-move functions yet fulfil agents’
aims in various dialogue types using strategy-move functions.
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5 Dialogue Strategies
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have focused on studying various properties of a class
of dialogue protocols and showing some soundness results by proving that if a di-
alogue is compatible with certain legal-move functions, and certain outcome func-
tions return true for such dialogue, then the claim of the dialogue is acceptable
with respect to some argumentation semantics in the ABA framework drawn from
the dialogue.
In this chapter, we shift our focus to agents’ behaviours in dialogues. Since
agents participating in dialogues may have different aims and dialogues of different
types have different goals, agents need to determine the appropriate information to
disclose. We give strategies to help agents identify “suitable” utterances (and their
content) in order to advance dialogues towards their goal while achieving their
individual objectives.
In Chapter 3 we have introduced strategy-move functions to characterise agents’
behaviours in dialogues. Unlike legal-move functions that define public dialogue
protocols, strategy-move functions decide, amongst all utterances allowed by the
legal-move function, which of these are appropriate for the agent. In this chap-
ter, we define a set of strategy-move functions suitable to characterise agents’ be-
haviours.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 gives preliminary definitions
used throughout this chapter. Section 5.3 introduces some specific classes of
strategies-move functions. Section 5.4 shows formal results for dialogues con-
structed using these strategy-move functions. Section 5.5 revisits the Twelve An-
gry Men example and illustrates notions presented in this chapter. Section 5.6
discusses a few relate works. Section 5.7 concludes.
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5.2 Preliminaries
As in Chapter 3 and 4, we consider two agents, a1 and a2 sharing a language L.
In addition, in this chapter, we think of these agents as being equipped with ABA
frameworks1. We will often use the ABA framework an agent is equipped with to
denote the agent itself, hence a1 = 〈L,R1,A1, C1〉 and a2 = 〈L,R2,A2, C2〉.
We will often need to refer to the “union” of the (ABA frameworks of the) two
agents, which amounts to the joint beliefs of the agents. This union represents all
beliefs that the two agents have collectively, formalised by the following notion:
Definition 40. Given frameworksF1 = 〈L,R1,A1, C1〉 andF2 = 〈L,R2,A2, C2〉,
the joint framework (ofF1 andF2) isFJ = F1unionmultiF2 = 〈L,R1∪R2,A1∪A2, CJ〉,
where CJ(α) = C1(α) ∪ C2(α), for all α in A1 ∪ A2.2
Given frameworks FJ and F1, F1 is a sub-framework of FJ , written F1 v FJ ,
if and only if there existsF2 such thatF1unionmultiF2 = FJ . We useFJ to denote a1unionmultia2.
Note that the joint framework of any two ABA frameworks trivially is an ABA
framework.
Example 33. We again revisit Example 10. Table 5.1 gives in one go the ABA
frameworks of a1 and a2 (as indicated in the rightmost column) as well as their
joint framework FJ (given by the entire table). Note that there are more rules in
FJ than in Fδ, e.g., w2 is blonde ← and w1 is poor ← are in FJ but not Fδ,
see Table 5.1 and Example 10 (Page 43).
Throughout this chapter, we will assume that a1, a2 and FJ are flat. This is the
case in Example 33. Also, we will use the notation A `R β for an argument where
β is the claim, A is the supporting set of assumptions, and R is the set of rules
used to construct this argument, e.g., in Example 33, given:
ρ = boy innocent← boy not proven guilty
then
{boy not proven guilty} `{ρ} boy innocent
is an argument.
1Note that we do not force agents to use ABA as their internal knowledge representation. The idea
is that both agents are capable of re-representing their internal beliefs in ABA and communicate
with ABA.
2We assume that C(α) = {} if α 6∈ A.
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Table 5.1: ABA frameworks for Example 33.
Rules: (RJ )
boy innocent← boy not proven guilty a1, a2
boy proven guilty ← w1 is believable a1, a2
boy proven guilty ← w2 is believable a1, a2
w1 not believable← w1 contradicted by w2 a1
w1 contradicted by w2← a1
w2 not believable← w2 has poor eyesight a1
w2 has poor eyesight← a2
w2 is blonde← a2
w1 is poor ← a2
Assumptions: (AJ )
boy not proven guilty a1, a2
w1 is believable a1, a2
w2 is believable a1, a2
Contraries: (CJ )
C(boy not proven guilty) = {boy proven guilty} a1, a2
C(w1 is believable) = {w1 is not believable} a1, a2
C(w2 is believable) = {w2 is not believable} a1, a2
When studying dialogue strategies, we will restrict attention to the agents’ be-
liefs that are (directly and indirectly) rule-related and related (respectively) to that
topic, as defined below.
Definition 41. Y is directly rule-related toX with respect to a framework 〈L,R,A, C〉
if and only if:
• X is an assumption α ∈ A and Y is α;
• X is a sentence β ∈ L \ A and Y is a rule β ← ∈ R;
• X is a rule β0 ← β1, . . . , βn ∈ R with n ≥ 1 and Y is
– either a rule βi ← ∈ R, if βi 6∈ A,
– or an assumption βi ∈ A.
Let Orr be (the monotonic operator) defined, for any W ⊆ L ∪R, as
Orr(W ) = {Y |Y is directly rule-related to X ∈W}.
Then, Y is (directly or indirectly) rule-related to X with respect to a framework
〈L,R,A, C〉 if and only if Y belongs to the least fix-point of Orr({X}).
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Intuitively, rules and assumptions used to construct an argument are rule-related
to the argument’s claim.
Definition 42. Y is directly related toX with respect to a framework 〈L,R,A, C〉
if and only if:
• X is an assumption α ∈ A and Y is C(α) = ;
• X is a sentence β ∈ L \ A and Y is a rule β ← ∈ R;
• X is a rule, and Y is directly rule-related to X;
• X is C( ) = B and Y is
– a rule β ← ∈ R, for some β ∈ B,
– or an assumption α ∈ B ∩ A.
Let Or be (the monotonic operator) defined, for any W ⊆ L ∪ R ∪ {C(α) =
B|α ∈ A, B ⊆ L}, as
Or(W ) = {Y |Y is directly related to X ∈W}.
Then, Y is (directly or indirectly) related toX with respect to a framework 〈L,R,A, C〉
if and only if Y belongs to the least fix-point of Or({X}).
The following lemma is trivially true by Definitions 41 and 42.
Lemma 10. For all arguments A `R χ, if X ∈ A ∪R, then X is related to χ.
The notions of rule-related and related can be used to identify suitable sub-
frameworks of frameworks, as follows:
Definition 43. Given a framework F = 〈L,R,A, C〉 and a sentence χ ∈ L, let
Y = {X|X is rule-related to χ with respect to 〈L,R,A, C〉}. The χ-rule-related
framework of F is Fχr = 〈L,Rχr,Aχr, Cχr〉, with
• Rχr = Y ∩R,
• Aχr = Y ∩ A,
• Cχr(α) = {} for each α ∈ Aχr.
Namely, the χ−rule-related framework is a sub-framework with all rules and
assumptions used in arguments for χ, as illustrated next:
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Example 34. (Continuation of Example 33) Let χ = boy proven guilty, then
Fχr is 〈L,Rχr,Aχr, Cχr〉 with Cχr(α) = {} for each α and
• Rχr = {boy proven guilty ← w1 is believable;
boy proven guilty ← w2 is believable}
• Aχr = {w1 is believable, w2 is believable}
Note that χ-rule-related frameworks are not ABA frameworks since they define
the contrary of every assumption as empty.
Similarly, we can define the topic-related framework as follows.
Definition 44. Given a framework F = 〈L,R,A, C〉 and a sentence χ ∈ L, let
Y = {X|X is related to χ with respect to 〈L,R,A, C〉}. Then, the χ-related
framework of F is Fχ = 〈L,Rχ,Aχ, Cχ〉 with
• Rχ = Y ∩R;
• Aχ = Y ∩ A;
• Cχ is such that, for every α ∈ Aχ, Cχ(α) = B if and only if (C(α) = B) ∈
Y .
Namely, the χ-related framework is a sub-framework that contains all informa-
tion (directly or indirectly) related to χ, as illustrated next:
Example 35. (Continuation of Example 33) Let χ = boy innocent. Then
• w2 is blonde←
• w1 is poor ←
are not related to χ. Therefore, the χ-related framework, Fχ, of FJ is FJ with
these rules omitted.
Unlike χ-rule-related frameworks, assumptions in χ-related frameworks admit
non-empty contraries. Thus, for any ABA framework F , Fχ is an ABA frame-
work.
Notation 1. We will say that an argument A `R β is in 〈L,R,A, C〉 if and only if
β ∈ L, A ⊆ A, and R ⊆ R. Moreover, given a dialogue δ ∈ D, we will say that
an argument A is in δ and δ contains A if and only if A is in Fδ.
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The following two lemmas trivially hold by Definitions 43 and 44.
Lemma 11. Given an ABA framework F , an argument A = A `R χ is in F if
and only if A is in Fχr.
Lemma 12. Given an ABA framework F = 〈L,R,A, C〉, χ ∈ L, and the χ-
related framework Fχ, then χ is S-acceptable in F if and only if χ is S-acceptable
in Fχ, S ∈ {admissible, grounded, ideal}.
5.3 Classes of Strategy-move Functions
We have introduced the concept of strategy-move function in Chapter 3. In the
remainder of this section we define a number of classes of strategy-move func-
tions, each describing a certain behaviour. The first strategy-move function char-
acterises the “truthfulness” of agents. If a dialogue is constructed with a truthful
strategy-move function with respect to ak, then ak only utter rules, assumptions,
and contraries it believes (namely, from its ABA framework).
Definition 45. A truthful strategy-move function φ ∈ Φ for agent ak (k ∈ {1, 2})
is such that, given a dialogue δ ∈ D and a legal-move function λ ∈ Λ, for all
u ∈ φ(δ, λ) made by ak, the content C of u is such that:
1. if C = rl(ρ), then ρ ∈ Rk,
2. if C = asm(α), then α ∈ Ak,
3. if C = ctr(β, β′), then β′ ∈ Ck(β).
We refer to a generic truthful strategy-move function as φtf .
The second strategy-move function we define characterises the “completeness”
of an agent’s utterances: the thorough strategy-move function specifies that agents
must not utter pi if there is any other “truthful” utterance allowed by the given
legal-move function.
Definition 46. A thorough strategy-move function φ ∈ Φ for agent ak (k ∈ {1, 2})
is such that, given δ ∈ D such that δ is constructed with a truthful strategy-move
function with respect to ak, given λ ∈ Λ, then for all u ∈ φ(δ, λ) made by ak, if u
is a pass-utterance then there exists no regular utterance u ∈ λ(δ) ∩ Uk such that
δ ◦ u is constructed with a truthful strategy-move function.
We refer to a generic thorough strategy-move function as φh.
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We further define the notion of non-attack strategy-move function, specifying
that agents do not utter contraries. Hence, agents that use the non-attack strategy
can only construct arguments.
Definition 47. A non-attack strategy-move function φ ∈ Φ for agent ak (k ∈
{1, 2}) is such that given δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉 constructed with ak using φ, then there
is no utterance ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n of the form 〈ak, , , ctr( , ), 〉 in δ.
We refer to a generic non-attack strategy-move function as φna.
For convenience, we also define the class of non-attack-thorough strategy-move
functions, as follows.
Definition 48. A non-attack-thorough strategy-move function φ ∈ Φ for agent ak
(k ∈ {1, 2}) is such that, given δ ∈ D such that δ is constructed with a truthful
strategy-move function with respect to ak, given λ ∈ Λ, then for all u ∈ φ(δ, λ)
made by ak, u is not of the form 〈 , , , ctr( , ), 〉 and if u is a pass-utterance
then there exists no utterance of the form 〈 , , , rl( ), 〉 or 〈 , , , asm( ), 〉, u ∈
λ(δ) ∩ Uk such that δ ◦ u is constructed with a truthful strategy-move function.
We use φnh to denote a generic non-attack-thorough strategy-move function.
Intuitively, an agent that uses φnh in a dialogue attempts to utter all rules and
assumptions from its ABA framework.
Agents that use the pass strategy-move may initiate dialogues but do not utter
any other information throughout the dialogue.
Definition 49. A pass strategy-move function φ ∈ Φ for agent ak (k ∈ {1, 2}) is
such that given Daiaj (χ) = δ ∈ D and λ ∈ Λ, if γ(δ) = ak, then for l 6= k, l = i, j,
φ(δ, λ) =
{〈ak, al, 0, claim(χ), 1〉} if δ = 〈〉 and k = i;{〈ak, al, 0, pi, ID〉|ID ∈ ID} otherwise.
We refer to a generic pass strategy-move function as φps.
5.4 Results
We give a number of properties for strategy-move functions. The non-attack and
thorough strategy-move functions jointly give an agent disclosing all rules and
assumptions in arguments for the topic.
Proposition 2. Given a coherent dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ for ai, aj ∈ {a1, a2} con-
structed using a non-attack thorough strategy-move function φnh with respect to
ak, k ∈ {i, j}, then for all arguments A = A `R χ in ak, A is in Fδ.
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Proof. It follows from Definition 48. For any argument A `R χ, for all α ∈ A
and ρ ∈ R, α and ρ are related to χ (Lemma 10). Given that δ is coherent and
constructed with φnh with respect to ak, all such α and ρ in ak must be disclosed
in δ, i.e., there are utterances of the forms 〈 , , , rl(ρ), 〉 or 〈 , , , asm(α), 〉
in δ. (It is uncertain which agent makes these utterances though, as both agents
can make them. However, it is certain that if the other agent does not make such
utterances, ak will.) Therefore if A `R χ is in ak, it is also in Fδ.
Note that Proposition 2 does not specify a strategy-move function for the other
agent a′k ∈ {ai, aj}, a′k 6= ak. Hence Proposition 2 describes a situation where,
regardless of the strategy a′k uses, as long as ak uses φnh, then all arguments for
the claim of the dialogue in ak are disclosed in δ.
Proposition 3. Given a coherent dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ, constructed with a thor-
ough strategy-move function φtf , for ai, aj ∈ {a1, a2}, it holds that Fδ v FJ .
Proof. From Definition 45 as if both agents only utter information from their ABA
frameworks, then obviously Fδ is a sub-framework of the joint ABA framework
of the two agents.
Proposition 4. If FJ is flat and Daiaj (χ) = δ is a coherent dialogue constructed
with φh, then Fδ is flat.
Proof. This proposition is true as (1) Fδ must be an ABA framework as both
ai and aj are and (2) every rule, assumption and contrary in Fδ is also in FJ
(Proposition 3), so the flatness of FJ implies the flatness of Fδ (since trivially any
sub-framework of a flat ABA framework is flat).
Since a thorough strategy-move function φh represents truthfulness and thor-
oughness, coherent dialogues constructed with φh contain all information about
the dialogue topic from the two agents. In this case, the ABA framework drawn
from a dialogue and the topic-related framework obtained from the joint frame-
work of the two agents are the same. Formally:
Lemma 13. Given a coherent dialogue δ = Daiaj (χ) constructed with a thorough
strategy-move function φh, if the χ-related framework ofFJ isFχ, thenFχ = Fδ.
Proof. It follows from Definitions 45 and 46 and the condition that δ is coherent.
In order to prove it, we need to show that @W , such thatW is either a rule, assump-
tion, or contrary in FJ and W is (directly and indirectly) related to χ but W is not
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the content of any utterance in δ. Such a W cannot exist because δ is constructed
with φh, hence both agents are bound to utter all rules, assumptions, and contraries
that are (directly and indirectly) related to χ from their ABA frameworks.
We link the acceptability result between a dialogue constructed with a thorough
strategy-move function φh with the union of the two agents’ ABA frameworks.
Theorem 5. Given a coherent dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ, for ai, aj ∈ {a1, a2}, con-
structed with a thorough strategy-move function φh, χ is S-acceptable in FJ , for
S ∈ {admissible, grounded, ideal}, if and only if χ is S-acceptable in Fδ.
Proof. By Lemma 12, the acceptability of χ is the same in FJ and Fχ, the χ-
related framework of FJ . By Lemma 13, given a coherent δ ∈ D constructed with
φh, we have Fδ = Fχ. Hence this theorem holds.
However, the acceptability of the topic in the joint framework can sometimes be
assessed with a sub-framework of FJ , as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Given a focused dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ constructed with a thorough
strategy-move function φh, for ai, aj ∈ {a1, a2}, if δ is a-/g-successful, then χ is
S-acceptable in FJ , for S being admissible, and grounded respectively.
Proof. Let Fδ be 〈L,Rδ,Aδ, Cδ〉 and let FJ be 〈L,RJ ,AJ , CJ〉.
(1) Since δ is focused and a-/g-successful, χ is S-acceptable in Fδ. Then there
is A ` χ and a set of S-acceptable assumptions A ⊆ Aδ (in Fδ), such that A ⊆ A
(Theorem 1 and Theorem 2). Hence there does not exist A′ ⊆ Aδ such that A′
attacks A and A′ is not attacked by A.
(2) Since δ is a focused and constructed with φh, then for all assumptions A∗ ⊆
AJ , if A∗ attacks A in FJ , then A∗ ⊆ Aδ.
By (1) and (2), there is no A∗ ⊆ AJ , such that A∗ attacks A and A∗ is not
attacked by A. Hence A and χ are S-acceptable in FJ .
Theorem 6 is useful as if the agents want to justify the acceptability (under
admissible and grounded semantics) of a topic in the joint framework, then it is
sufficient to justify the topic using a focused dialogue, thus requiring less disclo-
sure of agents’ beliefs. Note that Theorem 6 does not hold for the ideal semantics
as focused dialogues do not compute it. Also, the converse of Theorem 6 is not
true. Indeed, given that δ is a focused dialogue constructed with φh, if δ is not
a-/g-successful, and hence χ is not S-acceptable with respect to Fδ, then χ may or
may not be S-acceptable in FJ , as illustrated next in Example 36:
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Table 5.2: A dialogue that is constructed with a truthful strategy-move function in
Example 33.
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(boy innocent), 1〉
〈a2, a1, 1, rl(boy innocent← boy not proven guilty), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 3〉
〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 4〉
Table 5.3: A dialogue that is constructed with a non-attack thorough strategy-move
function in Example 33.
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(boy innocent), 1〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(boy innocent← boy not proven guilty), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, asm(boy not proven guilty), 3〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 4〉
〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 5〉
Example 36. LetFJ=〈L,R,A, C〉, withR = {χ← a;χ← b; b←} andA = {}.
Then the dialogue shown in the following table is focused but not (a-/g-)successful,
even if χ is S-acceptable in FJ , for S ∈ {grounded, admissible}.
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(χ), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 1, rl(χ← a), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 3〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 4〉
5.5 Illustration
In this section, we reuse the Twelve Angry Men setting given in Examples 10 and
33. We first show a dialogue that is constructed with a truthful strategy-move
function in Table 5.2. Given the two agents use a truthful strategy-move func-
tion, this dialogue could terminate at any point. The two agents only utter rules,
assumptions, and contraries from their knowledge base in this dialogue. We then
show a dialogue that is constructed with a non-attack thorough strategy-move func-
tion in Table 5.3. This dialogue “constructs” an (actual) argument for the claim
boy innocent and then terminates. There is no information (rules, assumptions,
or contraries) that attacks the claim is uttered. We also point out that the dialogue
shown in Table 3.1 is constructed with a thorough strategy-move function, as all
information for and against the claim has been uttered in this dialogue.
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5.6 Related Work
As introduced in Chapter 2, Black and Hunter [BH09] present a formal system for
inquiry dialogues based on DeLP [GS04] as the underlying argumentation frame-
work. In that work, they also studied agent strategies for argument inquiry and
warrant inquiry (see Chapter 2). Though some of our strategy-move functions
(e.g., thorough and non-attack-thorough strategy-move functions) share similar
spirits with the ones given in [BH09], we have taken the approach of defining agent
strategies as compositions of strategy-move functions, rather than give a specific
strategy-move function per dialogue type. As we demonstrate in Chapter 6 and 7,
our approach brings us flexibility in the types of dialogue that we can model.
Boella et al [BGH07] use the MacKenzie dialogue system introduced in [Mac79]
to map some dialogue protocols into strategies. Our work is orthogonal as we fix
the dialogue framework and study strategies that apply in it.
This Chapter is based on [FT12a], we have included more examples to illustrate
our results.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have studied some dialogue strategies agents can use in var-
ious dialogues. In particular, we have defined a set of classes of strategy-move
functions, summarised in Table 5.4. With these strategy-move functions, we have
shown that:
1. if an agent uses a non-attack-thorough strategy-move function to construct a
dialogue, then the resulting dialogue contains all arguments for the dialogue
claim that exist in this agent’s knowledge base (Proposition 2);
2. if both agents use truthful strategy-move functions to construct a dialogue,
then information contained in the resulting dialogue is a subset of the union
of the two agents knowledge-base (Proposition 3);
3. if the joint framework of the two agents’ ABA framework is flat, and the two
agents use thorough strategy-move functions to construct dialogues, then the
ABA framework drawn from the resulting dialogue is flat (Proposition 4);
4. if both agents use thorough strategy-move functions to construct a dialogue,
then ABA framework drawn from the resulting dialogue contains all infor-
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Table 5.4: Summary of strategy-move functions defined in Chapter 5.
Strategy-move Functions Brief Description
Truthful (φtf ) An agent only utters truthful information.
Thorough (φh) An agent utters pi when there is nothing else.
Non-attack (φna) An agent doesn’t attacks the claim.
Non-attack thorough (φnh) An agent utters all supports to the claim.
Pass (φps) An agent makes the claim and pass.
mation that is related to the dialogue claim that exists in the joint framework
of the two agents (Lemma 13);
5. if both agents use thorough strategy-move functions to construct a dialogue,
then the acceptability of the dialogue claim in the ABA framework drawn
from the dialogue can be linked to the joint framework of the two agents
(Theorems 5 and 6).
Note that Theorems 5 and 6 show a form of completeness result for our dialogue
model, such that if a sentence β is acceptable with respect to a given argumentation
semantics S in the union of the two agents’ knowledge base, then there is some
dialogue δ with β as its claim such that β is acceptable with respect to S in Fδ.
In the next chapter, we will show how these strategies can be extended and used
in information-seeking and persuasion dialogues.
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6 Dialogue Instantiations (I)
6.1 Introduction
In previous chapters, we have introduced our argumentation based dialogue frame-
work. In this chapter and the next, we show how the framework can be instantiated
to several types of dialogues. Each of the presented instantiations serves as an ex-
ample in applying our dialogue model. In this chapter, we focus on information-
seeking, inquiry and persuasion dialogues.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents our formalisations of
information-seeking and inquiry dialogues, and proves soundness and complete-
ness of strategies resulting from strategy-move functions with respect to these for-
malisations, using the results from Chapter 5. Section 6.3 presents our formali-
sation of persuasion dialogues. Therein, we connect our results with mechanism
design. Section 6.4 concludes.
6.2 Information-seeking and Inquiry
We start our discussion with information-seeking and inquiry dialogues. As seen in
Chapter 2, the main characteristics of information-seeking and inquiry dialogues
are summarised in Table 6.1.
Thus, in both information-seeking and inquiry, agents need to determine the
appropriate information to disclose. We use strategy-move functions defined in
Chapter 5 to help agents identify “suitable” utterances that advance information-
seeking and inquiry dialogues towards their goals while fulfilling the participants’
aims.
We prove that dialogues where agents adopt specific classes of strategy-move
functions are (i) sound and (ii) complete for information-seeking and inquiry, in
that (i) the dialogues constructed with these strategy-move functions achieve the
main goals of these dialogue types, starting from the initial situation, and (ii) the
existence of (information-seeking and inquiry) dialogues achieving the goals guar-
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Table 6.1: Information-seeking and inquiry dialogues (from [WK95]).
Information-seeking Dialogue
Initial Situation - Personal ignorance;
Main Goal - Spreading knowledge & revealing positions;
Participant’s Aims - Gain, pass on, show or hide personal knowledge.
Inquiry Dialogue
Initial Situation - General ignorance;
Main Goal - Growth of knowledge & agreement;
Participant’s Aims - Find a “proof” or destroy one.
Table 6.2: Two formulations of information-seeking dialogues.
Information-seeking Dialogue:
IS-Type I: Initial Situation: some A ` χ in a2 which is not in a1.
Main Goal: find δ such that all A ` χ in a2 are in Fδ.
IS-Type II: Initial Situation: some A ` χ in a2 but none in a1.
Main Goal: find δ such that one A ` χ in a2 is in Fδ.
antee the existence of dialogues, constructed with these strategy-move functions,
also achieving these goals. We prove these results for two novel formulations of
each of information-seeking and inquiry dialogues, formalising the definitions of
Table 6.1, and given in Tables 6.2 and 6.4, discussed later.
6.2.1 Information-seeking Dialogues
In Table 6.2, we model information-seeking dialogues as involving a questioner
agent a1 posing a topic, χ, and an answerer agent a2 uttering information of rele-
vance to χ. The purpose is to spread knowledge about arguments for χ. We assume
that the questioner contributes no information, apart from initiating the dialogue;
and the answerer is interested in conveying information for χ, but not against it.
Thus, there is an asymmetric distribution of information, in line with the original
description.
The two formulations differ in that IS-Type I dialogues convey all arguments
whereas IS-Type II dialogues convey only one argument. Both types can be seen
as concrete formalisations of the informal notion in Table 6.1.
The following result sanctions the soundness, for IS-Type I information-seeking,
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of the questioner using a pass strategy-move function φps and the answerer using
a non-attack strategy-move function φnh to construct coherent dialogues.
Proposition 5. Let A ` χ be in a2 but not in a1. Then, if a coherent dialogue
δ = Da1a2 (χ) is constructed by a1 using some φps and a2 using some φnh, then Fδ
contains all A ` χ in a2.
Proof. Directly from Proposition 2, where a1 uses φps, rather than an unspecified
strategy-move function.
The next result sanctions the completeness, for IS-Type I information-seeking,
of coherent dialogues with the answerer using some φnh. Informally, the following
proposition states that if there is a dialogue that captures all arguments for a topic in
the answerer agent, then there is a coherent dialogue constructed by the questioner
agent using a pass strategy and the answerer agent using a non-attack-thorough
strategy which captures all arguments for the topic in the answer agent as well.
Proposition 6. Let A ` χ be in a2 but not in a1. Then, if there is δ = Da1a2 (χ)
such that Fδ contains allA ` χ that are in a2, then there exists a coherent dialogue
δ′ constructed by a1 using some φps and a2 using some φnh such that Fδ′ contains
all A ` χ that are in a2.
Proof. δ′ can be constructed as follows. Given that a1 uses φps, a1 will utter the
claim, but not contribute any rule, assumption, or contrary to δ′. Given that there
exists A1 `R1 χ, . . . , An `Rn χ in a2, δ′ can be constructed in a way such that
for every α ∈ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ An and ρ ∈ R1 ∪ . . . ∪ Rn, there is an utterance of the
form 〈a2, a1, , asm(α), 〉 or 〈a2, a1, , rl(ρ), 〉, respectively, in δ′; and there is
no other regular utterance made by a2. The resulting δ′ is coherent, as rules and
assumptions in an argument are related. Moreover, a2 uses φnh, as a2 utters no
contraries.
The following result sanctions the completeness, for IS-Type II information-
seeking, of the questioner using some φps and the answerer using some φnh to
construct focused dialogues.
Proposition 7. Let A ` χ be in a2, and a1 be such that there is no argument
A′ ` χ in a1. Then, if there is a dialogue Da1a2 (χ) = δ such that A = A ` χ is in
Fδ, then there exists a focused dialogue δ′ constructed by a1 using some φps and
a2 using some φnh such that A is in Fδ′ .
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Table 6.3: Information-seeking dialogue in Example 33.
〈a2, a1, 0, claim(w1 not believable), 1〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(w1 not believable← w1 contradicted by w2), 2〉
〈a1, a2, 2, rl(w1 contradicted by w2←), 3〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 4〉
〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 5〉
The proof of this proposition is similar to the one in Proposition 6, except that
there is only one argument constructed in the dialogue.
Proof. Let a1 use φps. Given that A `R χ is in a2, δ′ can be constructed such that
for every ρ ∈ R and α ∈ A, there is an utterance of the form 〈a2, a1, , rl(ρ), 〉
or 〈a2, a1, , asm(α), 〉, respectively, in δ′; and there is no other regular utterance
made by a2. Such δ′ is focused, as it contains a single argument. Moreover,
a2 uses φnh, as a2 utters no contraries but rules and assumptions from its ABA
framework.
Note that for the reasons illustrated in Example 36, given that there is an A =
A ` χ in a2, it is not the case that all focused dialogues Da1a2 (χ) constructed with
a1 using φps and a2 using φnh contain A.
An information-seeking dialogue constructed with φnh and φps for the two
agents in Example 33 is shown next.
Example 37. Table 6.3 shows an information-seeking dialogue, in which the ques-
tioner queries about arguments for the claim w1 not believable to the answerer.
Note that all rules used in this example are known by the answerer only. Since
there is a single argument for the topic, the dialogue is focused. It is easy to see
that this dialogue is also coherent. There is no difference between IS-Type I and
IS-Type II in this example. Note that, unlike everywhere else in this section, in this
example a2 is the questioner and a1 is the answerer.
6.2.2 Inquiry Dialogues
We formulate inquiry dialogue in two ways, shown in Table 6.4, where S ∈
{admissible, grounded, ideal}. For I-Type I, dialogues start with a topic, contain
topic-related rules, assumptions, and contraries uttered by both agents, and even-
tually reach the “proof” or “disproof” of the topic. For I-Type II, dialogues start
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Table 6.4: Two formulations of inquiry dialogues.
Inquiry Dialogue
I-Type I: Initial Situation: it is uncertain if χ is S-acceptable in FJ
Main Goal: testing the S-acceptability of χ in FJ
I-Type II: There is no argument A ` χ in either a1 or a2.
Main Goal: testing whether there exists A ` χ is in FJ
with a topic, contain rules and assumptions in arguments for this topic. We give
no specific name to agents in inquiry dialogues. Note that here agents contribute
to dialogues symmetrically.
The next proposition sanctions soundness and completeness, for I-Type I in-
quiry, of using thorough strategy-move functions φh to construct coherent dia-
logues.
Proposition 8. To test the S-acceptability of χ in FJ is to test the S-acceptability
of χ in Fδ for a coherent δ ∈ D constructed using a thorough strategy-move
function φh.
Proof. Directly from Theorem 5.
The following result sanctions the soundness and completeness for I-Type II
inquiry of using a non-attack thorough strategy-move function φnh to construct
coherent dialogues.
Proposition 9. If there is noA ` χ in either a1 or a2, to test whether A = A ` χ is
in FJ is to test whether A is in a coherent dialogue constructed using a non-attack
thorough strategy-move function φnh.
Proof. We show that A = A `R χ is in FJ if and only if A is in Fδ, where δ is
coherent and constructed using φnh.
(1) Since δ is constructed using φnh, a1 and a2 are truthful, therefore all argu-
ments A1 ` χ, . . . , An ` χ in Fδ are in FJ .
(2) We show that all arguments A1 ` χ, . . . , An ` χ in FJ are in Fδ. Suppose
A′ = A′ `R′ χ is in FJ but not in Fδ, then ∃X ∈ A′ ∪ R′, such that X is not the
content of any regular utterance in δ. But this cannot be, by Lemma 10, as X is
related to χ; and, for all such X , there is an utterance u = 〈 , , , CT (X), 〉 in δ,
where CT ( ) is rl( ) or asm( ), as δ is coherent and constructed with φnh. Hence
we have a contradiction.
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An I-Type I inquiry, coherent dialogue constructed with a thorough strategy-
move function φh is shown below.
Example 38. Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 shows a I-Type I inquiry dialogue for the
two agents in Example 33. This dialogue is coherent. From this dialogue, we
can draw an ABA framework Fδ, that is composed of all rules, assumptions, and
contraries shown in the dialogue. Clearly, Fδ is topic-related framework of FJ ,
and the S-acceptability of the topic can be examined in Fδ.
6.2.3 Related Work
As we discuss in Chapter 2, Black and Hunter [BH09] present a formal system
for inquiry dialogues. Our work differs in several ways. Firstly, we give for-
mal definitions of the goals of information-seeking and inquiry dialogues in terms
of argumentation semantics. Secondly, we have studied information-seeking dia-
logues whereas they focused solely on inquiry. Thirdly, the underlying dialogue
framework we use is generic rather than tailored to inquiry.
Parsons et al [PWA03] present a study on information-seeking, inquiry and per-
suasion dialogues, focusing on complexity results. They use classical logic as the
base for argumentation and specify dialogue protocols for each dialogue type, in
an algorithmic manner. Finally, they do not compare dialogue outcomes with the
joint knowledge held by the two agents.
6.2.4 Summary
In this section, we have shown how to use some dialogue strategies we defined ear-
lier in information-seeking and inquiry dialogues, some formal interpretations of
these dialogues. We have shown that the specified dialogue strategies are suitable
for these interpretations.
We have shown that in information-seeking dialogues, the answerer should be
truthful and disclose directly related information about the topic; whereas in in-
quiry dialogues, both agents should be truthful and disclose directly or indirectly
related information about the topic.
6.3 Persuasion Dialogues with Mechanism Design
After studying information-seeking and inquiry dialogues, we shift our focus to
persuasion dialogues in this section. We have briefly introduced the concept of
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persuasion dialogue in Chapter 2, here, we approach dialogues from a mechanism
design [Jac03] perspective to develop strategies for agents and study properties
thereof. Similarly to the previous section, we build upon our dialogue model pre-
sented in previous chapters.
We model persuasion as dialogues starting with the persuader agent posing a
topic, and then subsequently the persuader and the persuadee agent putting for-
ward information for and against the topic (respectively). A persuasion is success-
ful if the topic is “proved” through this dialogue. One difficult part in persuasion
is to prevent the persuader putting forward misleading information that does not
hold in its knowledge base. We specify conditions under which the persuader will
not utter such information.
In mechanism design terms, we consider dialogues as strategies and informa-
tion disclosed in dialogues as actions. Using the notion of strategy-move function
introduced in Chapter 5, we define two additional strategy-move functions to char-
acterise information uttered by agents in persuasion dialogues.
6.3.1 Mechanism Design Background
Mechanism design (e.g. see [Jac03]) provides an abstraction of distributed prob-
lem solving amongst interacting, self-interested agents. In the language of mecha-
nism design, agents are characterised by types, which are abstractions of their in-
ternal, private beliefs. Given I ≥ 2 agents, the space of possible types for agent i
(1 ≤ i ≤ I) is denoted by Θi and its type is θi ∈ Θi. Moreover, Θ = Θ1×. . .×ΘI .
Inter-agent interactions have a number of potential outcomes O. A given social
choice function/rule f : Θ→ O characterises what can be deemed to be an optimal
outcome of the interaction for every vector of agent types.
Agents’ self-interest is dictated by their preferences over the outcomes, given
their type, expressed in terms of (private) utility functions ui : O × Θi → R.
The public face of agents is given by their actions, where Σi is the set of possible
actions of agent i and Σ = Σ1× . . .×ΣI . The decision for agent i of which action
to perform is given by a strategy. Let Si denote the space of possible strategies for
agent i, S = S1× . . .×SI and S−i denote S1× . . . Si−1×Si+1× . . .×SI . Then a
strategy si ∈ Si is a function si : Θi×Σ→ Σi. A strategy s = (s1, . . . , si, . . . , sI)
is often represented as (si, s−i) where s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sI).
Finally, a mechanismM = (Σ, g) consists of the action space Σ and an outcome
function/rule g : S → O, where g(s) is the outcome implemented by M for
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strategy s.
Since g(s) ∈ O, utility functions can be equivalently thought of as ui : S ×
Θi → R (where ui(s, θi) stands for ui(g(s), θi)). Also, as strategies determine
actions, the outcome function can be equivalently thought of as g : Σ→ O, where
g(σ) is the outcome implemented by the mechanism for action σ.
A social choice function specifies the desired goal of an interaction amongst
agents, whereas a mechanism is a means of characterising the agents’ behaviour
in the interaction. Several characterisations of strategies have been provided as
ways to predict how (rational) agents will behave in a mechanism. In particular,
a strategy si is dominant (for agent i) if it maximises the agent’s utility irrespec-
tively of the other agents’ strategies: ∀s−i ∈ S−i, ∀s′i ∈ Si [ui((si, s−i), θi) ≥
ui((s
′
i, s−i), θi)]. For a mechanism M = (Σ, g) and a social choice function f ,
M implements f if and only if g(s) = f(θ), where s is a dominant strategy.
6.3.2 Preliminaries
In this section, upon computing the S-acceptability of a sentence s (for S ∈
{admissible, grounded, ideal}) in a framework F = 〈L,R,A, C〉, if ∃α ∈ A,
C(α) = {} (hence F is not an ABA framework), then for all such α, we let
C(α) = {new}, where new /∈ L and then replace L with L ∪ {new}. Conceptu-
ally, this treatment states that an assumption with no known contrary is considered
as an assumption with an unsupported contrary.
We also implement persuasion dialogues as a specialisation of the dialogue
model described in Chapter 3 by specialising the ID field of utterances in a di-
alogue. Given a dialogue 〈u1, . . . , un〉 = δ, for each ui = 〈 , , , , idi〉 in
δ, we let idi ∈ N such that id1 (the claim) is odd; and the parity of idi, for
ui = 〈 , , t, C, id〉 is the same as the parity of t, if C is rl( ) or asm( ); or
the opposite of the parity of t, if C is ctr( , ).
Loosely speaking, this specialisation enforces that if an utterance u supports or
defends the claim, then its ID is odd (we say that u is odd); otherwise, its ID is
even (and we say that u is even). For any u and u′, if u is odd and u′ is even, we
say that u and u′ are of the opposite type. We assume all dialogues in the rest of
this section are persuasion dialogues and follow this specialisation.
We will adopt the following notation: given δ ∈ D, we use U iδ to denote the
set of regular utterances made by ai in δ. With an abuse of notation, we say that
a content C (a rule, an assumption, or a contrary) is in U iδ if and only if C is the
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content of some u ∈ U iδ.
Given F = 〈L,R,A, C〉, and C either a rule, an assumption, or a contrary, we
say that C is in F if and only if C ∈ R (if C is a rule), or C ∈ A (if C is an
assumption), or C(α) ∈ C(α) (if C is a contrary).
6.3.3 Strategy-move Functions used in Persuasion
We define more strategy-move functions that represent the “proponent” and “op-
ponent” roles in a persuasion dialogue. The proponent strategy-move function
defines agents that only utter utterances that support or defend the claim (odd ut-
terances); whereas the opponent strategy-move function defines agents that only
utter utterances that attack the claim or some of its defences (even utterances).
Pass utterances are allowed in both strategy move functions.
Definition 50. A proponent strategy-move function φ ∈ Φ for agent ak (k ∈
{1, 2}) is such that, given δ ∈ D such that δ is constructed with a thorough
strategy-move function with respect to ak, given λ ∈ Λ,
• if φh(δ, λ) ⊆ PASS, then φ(δ, λ) ⊆ PASS;
• otherwise, let S = {X|X ∈ φh(δ, λ), X is odd},
if S = {}, then φ(δ, λ) ⊆ PASS, otherwise, φ(δ, λ) = S.
We refer to a generic proponent strategy-move function as φp.
Definition 51. An opponent strategy-move function φ ∈ Φ for agent ak (k ∈
{1, 2}) is such that, given δ ∈ D such that δ is constructed with a thorough
strategy-move function with respect to ak, given λ ∈ Λ,
• if φh(δ, λ) ⊆ PASS, then φ(δ, λ) ⊆ PASS;
• otherwise, let S = {X|X ∈ φh(δ, λ), X is even},
if S = {}, then φ(δ, λ) ⊆ PASS, otherwise, φ(δ, λ) = S.
We refer to a generic opponent strategy-move function as φo.
Trivially, the proponent (opponent) strategy-move functions describe utterances
that are truthful, thorough, and support (attack) the claim of the dialogue, respec-
tively, as we shown in the next example.
Example 39. Let a1 = a2 = 〈L,R,A, C〉, where:
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Table 6.5: An example dialogue constructed with a φp and a φo.
a1 a2
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(s), 1〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 2〉
〈a1, a2, 1, asm(s), 3〉 〈a2, a1, 3, ctr(s, a), 4〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 5〉 〈a2, a1, 4, rl(a←), 6〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 7〉 〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 8〉
• R = {a←},
• A = {s},
• C is such that C(s) = {a}.
We let a1 uses a proponent strategy-move function φp and a2 uses an opponent
strategy-move function φo, a possible dialogue Da1a2 (s) is shown in Table 6.5. As
we can see in this example that a1 only makes utterances that support s whereas
a2 only makes utterances that attack s.
6.3.4 Persuasion Dialogue Results
We model persuasion as follows: the persuader/proponent (a1) utters arguments
that support the topic (χ) whereas the persuadee/opponent (a2) attacks the per-
suader by uttering counter arguments. We equate persuasion to S-acceptability of
the topic in the ABA framework drawn from a dialogue as follows:
Definition 52. Given a dialogue δ = Da1a2 (χ), a2 is persuaded (by a1) if and
only if χ is S-acceptable in Fδ, for S ∈ {admissible, grounded, ideal}. We use
PERSUADED and NOT PERSUADED to denote that a2 is persuaded or not, respec-
tively, given a dialogue.
We link persuasion and mechanism design as follows. We define the types of
agents as their ABA frameworks:
Definition 53. The types for agents a1, a2 are θ1 = a1 and θ2 = a2.
In ABA-dialogues, agents interact by putting forward rules, assumptions and
contraries about a topic, conveyed as contents of utterances. We hence view frame-
works as actions and dialogues as strategies, in mechanism design terms, as fol-
lows:
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Definition 54. The action spaces for agents a1, a2 are Σ1 = Σ2 = AF(L) (re-
spectively).
Definition 55. Given a dialogue Daiaj (χ) = δ, the dialogue strategy sδk for ak
(i, j, k = 1, 2, i 6= j) with respect to δ is such that, given the framework Fδ drawn
from δ, sδk(θk,Fδ) = σk where σk = 〈L,Rσk ,Aσk , Cσk〉 and:
• Rσk = {ρ|〈ak, , , rl(ρ), 〉 is in δ},
• Aσk = {α|〈ak, , , asm(α), 〉 is in δ},
• Cσk is such that, for every α ∈ Aσk , Cσk(α) = {β|〈ak, , , ctr(α, β), 〉 is in
δ}.
We say that δ is the dialogue of sδ = (sδ1, s
δ
2).
Note that the framework drawn from a dialogue is equal to the joint framework
of σ1, σ2 given by the strategies of the two agents, i.e. Fδ = σ1 unionmulti σ2.
Since a framework can be drawn from a dialogue, we define the outcomes of a
persuasion dialogue as the ABA framework drawn from the dialogue, as follows:
Definition 56. The outcomes are O = {F|F ∈ AF(L) and F= Fδ for some
δ ∈ D}.
To define the utility functions, we first define the payment of utterances and
dialogues. We then carry the payment of a dialogue to the ABA framework drawn
from the dialogue. Hence the payment of agent actions are linked to the outcome.
We consider the payment of an utterance as the “cost” to the agent that makes
the utterance. The payment is 0 if the utterance is considered honest by the other
agent; and positive if it is considered as a lie. We treat the payment probabilistically
such that the payment is computed as the product of the probability of the other
agent believing the utterance is a lie and the “damage” of such a lie.
Definition 57. Let i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Given an utterance u ∈ U i, the payment of u with respect to ai is T ui = dui · pui
where dui ≤ 0 is the damage to agent ai if u is considered a lie by aj ; and 0 ≤
pui ≤ 1 is the probability of aj considering u a lie. Given an utterance u ∈ U j , the
payment of u with respect to ai is T ui = 0.
Given a dialogue δ = 〈u1, . . . , un〉 between ai and aj , let T = {T uki |uk is in
δ and T uki > 0}. Then the payment of δ for ai is: Ti = max(T ) if T 6= {}, and
Ti = 0 otherwise1. Moreover, the payment of Fδ for ai is Ti.
1For S = {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆ R, if l = max(S), then l ∈ S and @k 6= l, k ∈ S such that k > l.
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We do not address here the problem of determining the damage and probability
values and assume that these are given. As it will become clear below, we use
max(T ) = Ti to ensure that the payment is higher than the reward, should an
agent lie (even the slightest lie would result in a negative utility).
With payments defined, we define the utility functions for agents in persuasion:
Definition 58. Let Wχi ≥ 0 be the reward of topic χ for agent ai, for i = 1, 2. Let
Fδ be the ABA framework drawn from a dialogue δ. Then, the utility functions
u1, u2 for a1, a2 respectively are defined as:
• if PERSUADED: ∗ u1(Fδ, θ1) = Wχ1 + T1, ∗ u2(Fδ, θ2) = 0,
• if NOT PERSUADED: ∗ u1(Fδ, θ1) = 0, ∗ u2(Fδ, θ2) = Wχ2 + T2.
Since we always associate topics with dialogues, we will also say that the reward
of dialogue δ for ai is W
χ
i if W
χ
i is the reward for the topic of δ.
The outcome function maps agent actions to outcomes as follows.
Definition 59. The outcome function for σ1 ∈ Σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ2 is: gp(σ1, σ2) =
σ1 unionmulti σ2.
We show that the dialogue strategy sδ is a dominant strategy for agents in per-
suasion under the following two conditions: (1) introducing rules, assumptions,
and contraries that are not in an agent’s ABA framework in the dialogue makes the
payment higher than the reward of the dialogue; and uttering rules, assumptions
and contraries in an agent’s ABA framework ensures that the payment is lower than
the reward of the dialogue; (2) there is no overlap in content between utterances
from ai and aj .
Theorem 7. Given Da1a2 (χ) = δ, if δ is constructed with φp for a1 and with φo for
a2, then the dialogue strategy sδ is dominant under the conditions that:
1. • for all C in ai (i = 1, 2), if u = 〈ai, aj , , C, 〉 is in δ then T ui +Wχi >
0;
• for all C not in ai (i = 1, 2), if u = 〈ai, aj , , C, 〉 is in δ then T ui +
Wχi < 0;
2. for all C1 in U1δ and C2 in U2δ , C1 6= C2.
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Proof. Let σ1, σ2 be actions given by sδ. To show that sδ is dominant is to
show that there is no other strategy which gives actions σ′1 and σ′2 such that
ui(g(σ
′
1, σ
′
2), θi) > ui(g(σ1, σ2), θi), i ∈ {1, 2}. We show this by examining
properties of φp and φo.
From the definition of φp, we know that an agent who uses this strategy (the
proponent):
• makes utterances from its knowledge base;
• only makes utterances that support the claim; and
• hides no utterance that supports the claim.
Similarly, from the definition of φo, we know that an agent who uses this strategy
(the opponent):
• makes utterances from its knowledge base;
• only makes utterances that attacks the claim; and
• hides no utterance that attacks the claim.
In cases, we show strategies that define any other behaviours give no higher
utilities for the proponent and the opponent using φp and φo, respectively.
Firstly, we show that truthfulness yields better utility than introducing lies in a
dialogue. Since a1 uses φp and a2 uses φo, σi v ai. Hence, by condition (1), ui ≥
0. Also by condition (1), for any σ′i with content not in ai, ui(gp(σ
′
1, σ
′
2), θi) ≤ 0.
Hence, any strategy that gives σi with contents not in ai is no better than sδ.
Secondly, we show that disclosing information that is in ai but not in σi produces
no higher utility, as a1 utters odd utterances and a2 utters even utterances that form
σ1 and σ2, respectively. Since the contents of odd utterances are in arguments that
support/defend the claim, whereas the content of even utterances are in arguments
that attack the claim/its defences, neither agent gains higher utility by uttering
utterances of the opposite type.
Thirdly, we show that disclosing less information allowed by φp and φo pro-
duces no higher utility for a1 and a2, respectively. By condition (2), there is no
utterance by ai with content that can be used in arguments uttered by aj . Hence,
disclosing less information than allowed by φp and φo yields no higher utility.
We define the social choice function for persuasion as follows:
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Definition 60. Given a topic χ, The persuasion social choice function is: fp(θ1, θ2) =
F defined inductively by:
• F0 is the framework in AF(L) with empty sets of rules and assumptions;
• F1 = FP1 unionmulti FO1 , where FP1 = 〈L,RP1 ,AP1 , CP1 〉 (the proponent sub-
framework ofF) andFO1 = 〈L,RO1 ,AO1 , CO1 〉 (the opponent sub-framework
of F), such that:
– RP1 = {X|X ∈ R1, X is directly related to χ},
– AP1 = {X|X ∈ A1, X is directly related to χ},
– CP1 is such that, for any α ∈ AP1 , CP1 (α) = {};
– RO1 = {}, AO1 = {}, CO1 is such that, for any α ∈ AO1 , CO1 (α) = {};
• GivenFi = FPi unionmultiFOi ,Fi+1 = FPi+1unionmultiFOi+1, whereFPi+1 = 〈L,RPi+1,APi+1,
CPi+1〉 and FOi+1 = 〈L,ROi+1,AOi+1, COi+1〉, such that:
– RPi+1 = {X|X ∈ R1, X is directly related toRPi ∪ CPi }2,
– APi+1 = {X|X ∈ A1, X is directly related toRPi ∪ CPi },
– CPi+1 is such that, for any α ∈ APi+1, CPi+1(α) = {β|α ∈ AOi and
β ∈ C1(α)},
– ROi+1 = {X|X ∈ R2, X is directly related toROi ∪ COi },
– AOi+1 = {X|X ∈ A2, X is directly related toROi ∪ COi },
– COi+1 is such that, for any α ∈ AOi+1, COi+1(α) = {β|α ∈ APi and
β ∈ C2(α)}.
The persuasion social choice function fp constructs F . Roughly speaking, F is
defined so that it contains rules, assumptions, and contraries that support the claim
in the persuader and rules, assumptions, and contraries that attack the claim in the
persuadee. Given the construction of such F , the following theorem holds.
Theorem 8. Under conditions (1) and (2) specified in theorem 7, the mechanism
M = (Σ, sδ) implements the persuasion social choice function fp.
2With an abuse of notation, we say thatX is directly related to S whereX is a rule, an assumption,
or a contrary and S is a set of rules, assumptions and contraries, if and only if X is directly
related to some s such that s ∈ S.
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Mechanism Design Concepts (i ∈ {1, . . . , I}) Persuasion (I = 2)
Type space (of agent i) Θi 〈L,Ri,Ai, Ci〉
Outcomes O Definition 52
Utility function (for agent i) ui : O × θi → R Definition 58
Action space Σ = Σ1 × . . .× ΣI AF(L) (Definition 54)
Strategy (of agent i) si : Θi × Σ→ Σi sδ (Definition 55)
Social choice function f : Θ1 × . . .×ΘI → O fp (Definition 60)
Table 6.6: Dialogue as mechanism
Proof. Since sδ is a dominant strategy (under conditions (1) and (2)), to show that
M implements fp is to show gp(σ1, σ2) = fp(θ1, θ2), i.e., F = fp(θ1, θ2) =
σ1 unionmulti σ2, namely rule, assumption and contrary in F is also in σ1 unionmulti σ2 and vice
versa. This is the case as, by the definitions of φp and φo, the set of utterances made
by a1 constitutes the proponent sub-framework ofF and the set of utterances made
by a2 constitutes the opponent sub-framework of F . Hence, F = σ1 unionmulti σ2.
We summarise the connection between mechanism design and dialogues in ta-
ble 6.6.
We illustrate our results in the following example.
Example 40. In this example, we let a1 and a2 be as follows:
• R1 = {χ← q1;χ← q2; q1 ← a1; q2 ← a2; c2 ←; c3 ←},
• A1 = {a1; a2},
• C1 is: C1(a1) = {c1}; C1(a2) = {c2},
• R2 = {},
• A2 = {a1, a2, a3},
• C2 is: C2(a1) = {a3}; C2(a2) = {c2}; C2(a3) = {c3}.
The dialogue proceeds as shown in Table 6.7. The ABA framework drawn from
the dialogue, Fδ, is the following.
• Rδ = {χ← q1; q1 ← a1;χ← q2; q2 ← a2}
• Aδ = {a1, a2, a3}
• Cδ is: Cδ(a1) = {a3}; Cδ(a2) = {c2}.
120
Table 6.7: A persuasion dialogue example.
a1: a2:
〈a1, a2, 0, claim(χ), 1〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(χ← q1), 3〉
〈a1, a2, 3, rl(q1 ← a1), 5〉
〈a1, a2, 5, asm(a1), 7〉 〈a2, a1, 7, ctr(a1, a3), 8〉
〈a2, a1, 8, asm(a3), 10〉
〈a1, a2, 1, rl(χ← q2), 11〉
〈a1, a2, 11, rl(q2 ← a2), 13〉
〈a1, a2, 13, asm(a2), 15〉 〈a2, a1, 15, ctr(a2, c2), 16〉
〈a2, a1, 0, pi, 18〉
〈a1, a2, 0, pi, 19〉
Clearly, Fδ v a1 unionmulti a2 so both a1 and a2 have uttered information from their ABA
frameworks. Since they have also hidden certain part of their knowledge base, so
Fδ 6= a1 unionmulti a2.
In a more realistic example, we can have a dialogue as follows.
Example 41. In this example, we have two agents, Jenny (J) and Amy (A), plan-
ning a film night together. Jenny would like to persuade Amy to watch the movie
Terminator (Ter for short). The dialogue is as follows.
〈J,A, 0, claim(watchMovie(Ter)), 1〉
〈J,A, 1, rl(watchMovie(Ter)← fun(Ter), goodScreenTime(Ter)), 2〉
〈J,A, 2, rl(fun(Ter)← actionMovie(Ter)), 3〉
〈J,A, 3, rl(actionMovie(Ter)←), 4〉
〈J,A, 2, asm(goodScreenTime(Ter)), 5〉
〈A, J, 5, ctr(goodScreenTime(Ter), late(Ter)), 6〉
〈A, J, 6, asm(late(Ter)), 7〉
〈J,A, 7, ctr(late(Ter),finishByTen(Ter)), 8〉
〈J,A, 8, rl(finishByTen(Ter)), 9〉
〈J,A, 0, pi, 10〉
〈A, J, 0, pi, 11〉
A natural language reading of this dialogue is shown below.
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Jenny: Let’s watch Terminator.
Jenny: We can watch Terminator, if it is fun and has the right screening time.
Jenny: I think action movies are pretty fun.
Jenny: Moreover, I know Terminator is an action movie.
Jenny: I also think Terminator starts at the right time.
Amy: Are you sure it won’t be too late?
Amy: I am just afraid Terminator starts late.
Jenny: It won’t be too late if it finishes by 10 o’clock.
Jenny: And, indeed Terminator finishes by 10 o’clock.
Jenny: OK, we can watch Terminator.
Amy: OK.
As we can see from this example, the proponent agent, Jenny, starts the dialogue
and puts forward utterances that support the claim, watchMovie(Ter), whereas the
opponent agent, Amy, attacks this proposal by questioning if it has the right screen-
ing time. At the end, Amy is persuaded as the claim of the dialogue is acceptable
(with respect to an admissible, grounded or ideal) in the ABA framework drawn
from the dialogue.
6.3.5 Related Work
Amgoud and Maudet [AM02] present an early work on studying agent strategies in
persuasion dialogues. Their approach derives dialogue strategies from pre-defined
agent profiles, e.g., agreeable agent that accepts everything, argumentative agent
that challenge everything, etc. They have not linked dialogue results with agents’
internal beliefs.
Kakas et al. [KMM04] present a study on strategies used in agent interactions.
However, the strategies in [KMM04] are more like rules than describing agent
profiles. Also, the proposal of [KMM04] is not concerned with dialogues, and
hence is orthogonal to our work.
Black and Katie [BA11] present a study on dialogue systems that support delib-
eration dialogues. Their underlying argumentation framework is the instantiated
value-based argumentation framework, hence their dialogue model and results are
concerned with agents with preferences. Their system relies upon agents estimat-
ing their counterparts’ preferences and does not study strategies using mechanism
design.
Introducing mechanism design approach in argumentation research is a rela-
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tively new phenomenon. Rahwan and Larson [RL11] present a few examples in
logical mechanism design. However, the main point of this work is to demonstrate
the the feasibility of introducing mechanism design as a tool in the design of logical
inference procedures, whereas our paper focuses on directly applying mechanism
design in a particular type of argumentation based dialogue, for persuasion.
Rahwan et al. [RLT09] and Pan et al. [PLR10] have introduced the Argumen-
tation Mechanism Design as a paradigm for studying argumentation using game-
theoretic techniques. Those two papers have shown results that: for the purpose of
having more arguments accepted with respect to various semantics, agents would
disclose all their arguments if and only if no argument in one agent’s argumentation
framework attacks any other argument in this agent’s argumentation framework,
directly or indirectly. Unlike those works, our work has focused on argumentation
dialogues. Furthermore, [RLT09] and [PLR10] used the abstract argumentation
(AA) framework defined in [Dun95] whereas our work is based on ABA.
Caminada [Cam09] presents a study of three different types of dishonesty: lie,
BS, and deception, where lie is uttering information that is directly inconsistent
with one agent’s knowledge base; BS is uttering information that are made up,
i.e., not necessarily inconsistent with the agent’s knowledge base, but does not
exist in the agent’s knowledge base; and deception is hiding information. Our
definition of lying captures the first two types of dishonesty. It can be viewed that
our truthful strategy-move function rules out lie and BS. We view that deception
can be purposefully allowed in persuasion.
Kraus and Schechter [KS03] present a study on collaborative agent behaviours
for resource sharing. Though this study involves game theoretic aspects, it is
not linked to argumentation nor formal argumentation based dialogues. Rather,
it presents a study of the resource sharing problem with a game theory based ap-
proach with specific constraints.
6.3.6 Summary
In this section, we have studied strategies that agents may use in persuasion dia-
logues. Building upon our dialogue and model, we define strategy-move functions
that describe suitable utterances for agents in persuasion. We have brought mech-
anism design techniques into argumentation based dialogues by mapping dialogue
components into various mechanism design results. We have proved that under
specified conditions, neither the persuader agent nor the persuadee agent will lie
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in dialogues. We have also defined a persuasion social choice function and proved
that the dialogue strategy implements such social choice function.
As an early work in introducing mechanism design in argumentation based di-
alogues, the two main contribution of this work are: (1) mapping various mecha-
nism design concepts into argumentation and argumentation based dialogues; and
(2) showing that the dialogue mechanism for persuasion have desired properties
under specific conditions.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we instantiated our dialogue model in previous chapters for three
different dialogue types: information-seeking, inquiry, and persuasion. We have
demonstrated how various strategy-move functions can be deployed to represent
agent behaviours in these dialogues and how techniques in mechanism design can
be used in persuasion dialogues.
In the next chapter we will further illustrate how our dialogue models can be
extended and applied in two other types of dialogues.
124
7 Dialogue Instantiations (II)
7.1 Introduction
After information-seeking, inquiry and persuasion, we study another set of dia-
logues, dialogues with goals that are represented in terms of predicates. In par-
ticular, we focus on conflict resolution and discovery dialogues. We show how a
modified version of our dialogue framework can be applied to support these two
types of dialogues.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 formally defines the notion
of dialogue goal. Section 7.3 presents our formalisation of conflict resolution
dialogues and conflict resolution dialogue sequences. Section 7.4 presents our
formalisation of discovery dialogues. Section 7.5 concludes.
7.2 Preliminaries
In both conflict resolution and discovery dialogues, we define a notion of goal, that
could represent a belief, desire or intention agents may want to share. Thus, we
define a goal in the context of the shared language L.
Definition 61. A goal (with respect to L) is of the form ∃ X G such that
• X is a tuple of variables;
• there exists β = {X/t} for t a tuple of terms such that Gβ ∈ L 1.
A (goal) realisation is Gβ∈ L such that β = {X/t}.
We will leave the existential quantifier of goals implicit.
Similarly to the rest of this thesis, here we consider two agents a1 and a2, both
are capable of representing their knowledge base in ABA. We will use a1, a2 to
1Gβ stands for G with all occurrences of (elements in) X replaced by (corresponding elements in)
t. (Namely Gβ is a substitution).
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stand for the agents and their ABA frameworks. Moreover, given ai ∈ {a1, a2},
ai = a1 if ai = a2, and ai = a2 if ai = a1.
Note that agents will typically hold different views (and so have different rules,
assumptions, and contraries in their ABA frameworks), but share the same underly-
ing language. Until section 7.3.4, we assume that if a sentence β in the underlying
language is deemed to be an assumption by both agents (namely β ∈ A1 ∩ A2),
then the agents agree on what the contrary is (namely C1(β) = C2(β)).
To simplify our presentation, in this chapter, the ABA framework agents use is in
the form presented in [BDKT97], such that given an ABA framework 〈L,R,A, C〉,
C is a total mapping from A into L (rather than a total mapping from A into 2L).
7.3 Conflict Resolution Dialogues
In this section, we consider conflicts arising when the agents share a goal, disagree
on how to realize it, and would benefit from identifying a joint realisation. The
disagreement may occur for two reasons. Firstly, agents have incomplete infor-
mation, and may reason with different assumptions to fill gaps in the information
available to them. Since some assumptions may be incorrect, agents may be mis-
informed and decide on incompatible realisations that lead to conflict. Secondly,
agents may have different views of what makes a suitable realisation of the goal.
In this setting, to resolve conflicts between the agents is to build a shared ABA
framework where both agents’ views are taken into account and misunderstandings
eliminated. We show how this can be achieved by deploying, in a tailored manner,
our dialogue frameworks.
We prove formally that (a specific form of) conflict resolution results from iden-
tifying, by means of argumentation dialogues, an admissible set of arguments.
Thus, our dialogues provide a fully distributed solution to the conflict resolution
problem while at the same time linking to a well-known argumentation semantics.
7.3.1 Motivating Example
We reuse the two agents watching moving scenario shown in Example 41 with a
few changes in the setting. In this example, we have two movies: Lord of the Rings
(LoR) and Terminator (Ter) that are both screening.
Jenny wants to pick a fun movie, and finds action movies fun. She does not want
to watch a movie she has already seen. Jenny believes Ter is an action movie and,
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since she has not seen it before, wants to watch it.
Amy also wants to watch a fun movie and does not want to watch a movie she
has already seen, but she finds fantasy, rather than action, movies fun. Amy has
watched the trailer of LoR and believes it is both an action and a fantasy movie.
Given that she has never seen it before, Amy concludes she wants to watch LoR.
After exchanging information and finding out that LoR is an action movie, Jenny
agrees to watch it. Thus, LoR is a conflict resolution.
We will model conflict resolution using a sequence of (pairs of) dialogues. We
give here an informal presentation of the first dialogue in the sequence for this
example. For illustration purposes, we present this dialogue in natural language.
J: Let’s see if Terminator is a good movie to watch.
J: I will watch Terminator if it is fun and there is no objection to it.
J: Terminator would be fun if it is an action movie.
A: Yes, Terminator is an action movie.
J: I propose we watch Terminator then.
A: We can watch it unless we have watched it before.
J: OK, I have not.
A: OK. I have not either.
Since Terminator satisfies Jenny, we move to the second dialogue, in which
Terminator’s satisfiability for Amy is examined. Now, Amy starts the dialogue and
the two agents proceed similarly as in the previous dialogue, except this time Amy
believes fantasy movies are fun and Terminator is not a fantasy movie. Hence the
dialogue fails. Since Terminator is rejected by Amy, Amy starts the next dialogue,
proposing Lord of the Rings. Using this and another dialogue, the agents identify
Lord of the Rings as mutually agreeable.
7.3.2 Conflict and Conflict Resolution Agents
We have defined goal and goal realisation in Section 7.2, in our motivating exam-
ple, the goal is watchMovie(X), and goal realisations may be watchMovie(Ter)
(for {X/Ter}) and watchMovie(LoR) (for {X/LoR})2.
We assume that agents are rational, in the sense that they adopt a goal realisation
only if they have reasons to do so, in terms of their internal views. As discussed
earlier, we abstract the internal representation of agents’ views in terms of ABA
2In this section, X, Y etc. are (tuples of) variables; rule/assumptions/contrary schemata (with
variables) are used to stand for the set of all their instances with respect to constants.
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frameworks.
Rational (ABA) agents would adopt or propose a goal realisation if this is ad-
missible to them:
Definition 62. A rational (goal) realisation for agent ai is a goal realisation that
is admissible in ai.
Note that our notion of rationality is rather weak, in that it solely requires for a
realisation to stand against (internal) criticism, in the dialectical sense given by the
admissibility semantics for argumentation. In our motivating example, the goal
realisations watchMovie(Ter) and watchMovie(LoR) are rational for Jenny and
Amy, respectively.
Agents conflict when they adopt different rational goal realisations:
Definition 63. A conflict (between a1 and a2) with respect to a goal G is a pair
(Gβ1,Gβ2) such that Gβ1 6= Gβ2 and, for i = 1, 2, Gβi is a rational realisation
with respect to ai.
In order for agents to come to an agreement and resolve conflicts, we assume
that they are cooperative and willing to concede on some of their views. This
amounts to the agents envisaging that their views may be imperfect and incom-
plete. However, agents may still want to be committed to some of their views,
especially if they reflect their desires. We thus assume that the rules in our agents’
ABA frameworks are of two types: concession rules and non-concession rules.
Definition 64. A conflict resolution agent is equipped with an ABA framework
AF = 〈L,R,A, C〉 such that
• R = RC ∪RNC and
• RC ∩RNC = {}.
We refer toRC as concession rules and toRNC as non-concession rules.
Note that concession and non-concession rules are syntactically indistinguish-
able, but in principle we could allow different syntactical formats for them, rather
than separating them out in different subsets of the rule set.
In our example, a split of Jenny’s and Amy’s rules is in Table 7.1. This split
reflects that agents are not willing to compromise in what they deem to be fun or
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Non-Concession Rules:
watchMovie(X)← fun(X), selectMovie(X) (for J, A)
fun(X)← actionMovie(X) (for J)
fun(X)← fantasyMovie(X) (for A)
Concession Rules:
actionMovie(Ter←) (for J, A)
fantasyMovie(LoR)← (for A)
actionMovie(LoR)← (for A)
Table 7.1: Jenny’s and Amy’s Concession and Non-Concession Rules
the fact that they want to watch a fun movie, but they are willing to change their
mind as to which movies are available options and what types they are.
A conflict resolution needs to satisfy all non-concession rules of agents, under
the condition that both agents are aware of the other agent’s relevant concession
rules. Thus, non-concession rules express more preferred views.
Definition 65. A conflict resolution Gβ for a conflict (Gβ1,Gβ2) with respect to
G is a rational realisation with respect to a′1 = 〈L,R1 ∪ RC2 ,A, C〉 and a′2 =
〈L,R2 ∪RC1 ,A, C〉 where:
• A = A1 ∪ A2;
• C(α) =

c if α ∈ A1 ∩ A2, where C1(α) = C2(α) = c,
C1(α) if α ∈ A1 \ A2,
C2(α) if α ∈ A2 \ A1.
Note the second bullet is needed as agents have different assumptions. In our
motivating example, where the conflict is:
(watchMovie(Ter), watchMovie(LoR)),
the conflict resolution is: watchMovie(LoR).
Basically, a conflict resolution amounts to each agent taking into account all
their individual rules as well as the concession rules of the other agent. This cor-
responds to agents being prepared to concede what they can, but not what they are
absolutely inflexible about. As an extreme case, if both agents have an empty set
of concession rules (namely agents are not prepared to compromise at all), then
a conflict resolution is a realisation that is individually rational for each agent,
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without taking any of the other agent’s views into account. At the other end of
the spectrum, if both agents have all their rules down as concession rules (namely
agents are prepared to compromise on everything), then a conflict resolution is a
realisation that is rational in the union of the agents’ views.
Note that, in the definition of conflict resolution, the agents’ assumptions are
joined. In general, since agents may not agree on what can be assumed and what
can be argued for, this may cause that one or both of the a′i is not flat. For simplic-
ity, until section 7.3.4, we assume that a′i, for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, is flat.
Note that our notion of conflict resolution is in some sense “centralised”, as
it assumes that agents are prepared to share their concession rules, assumptions,
and contraries. By means of our specialised conflict resolution dialogues, we will
provide an equivalent, distributed solution.
7.3.3 Conflict Resolution Dialogues and Sequences
As seen in Chapter 6, we define strategy-move functions to specify agent be-
haviours that advance the dialogue goal.
Definition 66. A conflict resolution strategy-move function, φ ∈ Φ for agent ak
(k ∈ {1, 2}) is a truthful strategy-move function such that, given a dialogue δ
= Daiaj (χ) and a legal-move function λ ∈ Λ, for all u ∈ φ(δ, λ) made by ak,
• for ak = ai, φ(δ, λ) = φh(δ, λ) where φh is a thorough strategy-move
function;
• for ak = aj , for all u ∈ φ(δ, λ) made by ak, if u is a pass-utterance then
there exists no regular utterance u′ = 〈aj , ak, , C, 〉 ∈ λ(δ) ∩ Uk, where
C is either asm( ), rl(ρ) where ρ ∈ RCj , or ctr( , ) such that δ ◦ u is
constructed with a truthful strategy-move function.
We use φcr to denote a generic conflict resolution strategy-move function.
The conflict resolution strategy-move defined above is based on the thorough
strategy-move function given in Definition 46. Conceptually, a φcr is a φh with
limited utterances in rules. Hence, for the two agents use φcr in a dialogue, the
agent who starts the dialogue is bound to utter all topic-relevant utterances from
its knowledge base; whereas the other agent is bound to make all topic-relevant
utterance from its assumptions, contraries, and concession rules.
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We also specialise the notion of dialogues given in Chapter 3 to conflict resolu-
tion dialogues. We require a conflict resolution dialogue to start with a realisation
of the agents’ goal. We also let both agents using φcr in a conflict resolution dia-
logue.
Definition 67. A conflict resolution dialogue is a dialogue Daiaj (Gβ) = δ such that
both ai and aj use φcr in δ. We refer to such a dialogue as cDaiaj (Gβ).
We also refer to ai and aj in cDaiaj (Gβ) as the nominator and challenger, re-
spectively.
Basically, in a conflict resolution dialogue, the challenger can only utter its con-
cession rules, whereas the nominator can utter rules of either types.
In order to resolve conflicts, several conflict resolution dialogues may be needed
in sequence:
Definition 68. A successful conflict resolution dialogue sequence (successful se-
quence in short) between ai and aj with respect to a goal G is a sequence
δ1 = cD
ai
aj (Gβ1), δ2 = cD
aj
ai (Gβ1),
. . . ,
δ2n−1 = cDaiaj (Gβn), δ2n = cD
aj
ai (Gβn),
such that n > 0, ωscc(δ2n−1, λADM ) = ωscc(δ2n, λADM ) = true and, for every
k < n, ωscc(δ2k−1, λADM ) 6= true or ωscc(δ2k, λADM ) 6= true.
Gβn is the result of the conflict resolution dialogue sequence.
Theorem 9. Given a conflict (Gβ1,Gβ2) between a1 and a2 with respect to some
goal G, a conflict resolution Gβ exists if there is a successful conflict resolution
dialogue sequence between a1 and a2 with respect to G.
Proof. Let the successful conflict resolution dialogue sequence be δ1, δ2, . . . ,
δ2n−1, δ2n. Given ωscc(δ2n−1, λADM ) = ωscc(δ2n, λADM ) = true, we know
Gβn is admissible in both the ABA framework Fδ2n−1 drawn from δ2n−1 and the
ABA framework Fδ2n drawn from δ2n by Theorem 1.
Given both δ2n−1 and δ2n are constructed with φcr, and φcr is a thorough
strategy-move with a limited utterance in rules, Fδ2n−1 is a Gβn-related frame-
work of a′1 and Fδ2n is a Gβn-related framework of a′2. Hence, by Theorem 6,
Gβn is admissible in a′1 and a′2. Hence this theorem holds.
The successful sequence in our motivating example is composed of four conflict
resolution dialogues:
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〈J,A, 0, claim(watchMovie(Ter)), 1〉
〈J,A, 1, rl(watchMovie(Ter)← fun(Ter), selectMovie(Ter)), 2〉
〈J,A, 2, rl(fun(Ter)← actionMovie(Ter)), 3〉
〈A,J, 3, rl(actionMovie(Ter)←), 4〉
〈J,A, 2, asm(selectMovie(Ter)), 5〉
〈A,J, 5, ctr(selectMovie(Ter), seen(Ter)), 6〉
〈J,A, 0, pi, 7〉
〈A,J, 0, pi, 8〉
Table 7.2: A conflict resolution dialogue example (part 1).
〈A,J, 0, claim(watchMovie(Ter)), 1〉
〈A,J, 1, rl(watchMovie(Ter)← fun(Ter), selectMovie(Ter)), 2〉
〈J,A, 2, asm(selectMovie(Ter)), 3〉
〈A,J, 2, rl(fun(Ter)← fantasyMovie(Ter)), 4〉
〈J,A, 0, pi, 5〉
〈A,J, 0, pi, 6〉
Table 7.3: A conflict resolution dialogue example (part 2).
cDJA(watchMovie(Ter)) = δ1, cD
A
J (watchMovie(Ter)) = δ2,
cDJA(watchMovie(LoR)) = δ3, cD
A
J (watchMovie(LoR)) = δ4.
Among them, δ2 is not a successful dialogue, whereas the others are successful. δ1
is in Table 7.2. δ2 is similar to δ1, except that the role of nominator and challenger
are swapped. The dialogue terminates unsuccessfully after Amy states that Ter
would be fun for her if it is a fantasy movie (as shown in Table 7.3). δ3 is similar
to δ1, except that Amy states that LoR is an action move (Table 7.4). δ4 is similar
to δ3 with the roles of nominator and challenger swapped (Table 7.5).
7.3.4 An Extension
We have assumed, from section 7.3.2, that agents agree on the contraries of as-
sumptions they share. This is the case in our motivating example, where Jenny and
Amy agree that the contrary of selectMovie(X) is seen(X). However, this may not
always be the case and agents may have different views as to what the contrary of
an assumption is. For example, some agent may believe that violent(X) is the con-
trary of selectMovie(X), to express that it does not want to watch violent movies.
The notion of conflict resolution can be generalised to take this into account, as
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〈J,A, 0, claim(watchMovie(LoR)), 1〉
〈J,A, 1, rl(watchMovie(LoR)← fun(LoR), selectMovie(LoR)), 2〉
〈J,A, 2, rl(fun(LoR)← actionMovie(LoR)), 3〉
〈A,J, 3, rl(actionMovie(LoR)←), 4〉
〈J,A, 2, asm(selectMovie(LoR)), 5〉
〈A,J, 5, ctr(selectMovie(LoR), seen(LoR)), 6〉
〈J,A, 0, pi, 7〉
〈A,J, 0, pi, 8〉
Table 7.4: A conflict resolution dialogue example (part 3).
〈A,J, 0, claim(watchMovie(LoR)), 1〉
〈A,J, 1, rl(watchMovie(LoR)← fun(LoR), selectMovie(LoR)), 2〉
〈A,J, 2, rl(fun(LoR)← fantasyMovie(LoR)), 3〉
〈A,J, 3, rl(fantasyMovie(LoR)←), 4〉
〈J,A, 2, asm(selectMovie(LoR)), 5〉
〈A,J, 5, ctr(selectMovie(LoR), seen(LoR)), 6〉
〈J,A, 0, pi, 7〉
〈A,J, 0, pi, 8〉
Table 7.5: A conflict resolution dialogue example (part 4).
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follows.
Definition 69. A (generalised) conflict resolution Gβ for a conflict (Gβ1,Gβ2)
with respect to G is a rational realisation with respect to a′1 = 〈L′,R1 ∪ RC2 ∪
R′,A, C〉 and a′2 = 〈L′,R2 ∪RC1 ∪R′,A, C〉 where:
• A = A1 ∪ A2;
• C is defined as follows:
1. let C′ be such that C′(α) = {C1(α), C2(α)} (α ∈ A);
2. C(α) =
c if C′(α) = {c}c′ if C′(α) = {c1, c2}
where c′ 6∈ L and such that C(α) 6= C(β) if α 6= β;
• L′ = L ∪⋃α∈A{c′|C′(α) = {c1, c2} and C(α) = c′};
• R′ = R∪⋃α∈A{c′ ← c1, c′ ← c2|C′(α) = {c1, c2} and C(α) = c′}.
Here, the L′ and R′ components of the a′is are introduced to guarantee that
assumptions in the a′is have a single contrary. Trivially, if different agents agree on
the contrary of assumptions to start with, as we have assumed in section 7.3.2, L′
and R′ are empty and the notion of generalised conflict resolution amounts to the
earlier notion.
Theorem 9 still holds under this generalisation.
7.3.5 Related Work
Tessier et. al [TCM01] present a collection of papers that study various aspects
of conflicts between agents, such as the definition and categorisation of conflicts
[TLFC01] and conflicts among collaborative agents [Cha01]. According to their
classification, our work is about resolving knowledge conflicts. Our work thus
differ from work, such as [RPSD07], where agents have conflicts of interest.
Several authors have demonstrated the versatility of various argumentation frame-
works for conflict resolution, e.g. [AK07, BH08, RS09]. Instead of representing
conflicts with a single argumentation framework, our approach resolves conflicts
through a series of dialogues, where each dialogue is constructed from two ar-
gumentation frameworks. Moreover, differently from others, we show how argu-
ments can be constructed and debated, for resolving conflicts, putting together in-
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formation held by different agents, rather than simply exchanging fully constructed
arguments (e.g. if using abstract argumentation).
Amgoud et al [ABP05] present a work on consensus forming. This follows the
classical view of decision making under uncertainty while we see decision making
as inference in which the different decisions are considered as assumptions.
In [FT12b], we have presented an earlier version of this conflict resolution di-
alogue work giving similar results, e.g., a version of Theorem 9 has been pre-
sented in [FT12b]. However, there, we have based our results purely on legal-move
functions, e.g., we have defined truthful legal-move function and conflict resolu-
tion legal-move function in [FT12b] in place for truthful strategy-move function
and conflict resolution strategy-move function given in this thesis, respectively.
Clearly, the new setting presented in this thesis shows an improvement as these
concepts should be modelled as agent behaviours rather than dialogue protocols.
7.3.6 Summary
We have presented a two-agent conflict resolution mechanism supported by dia-
logues. Agents are in conflict because they propose different realisations of the
same goal. Through dialogues, information is shared during the dialogue and the
resulting realisation satisfy both agents. We use our dialogue model defined in
Chapter 3 but tailored to the needs of conflict resolution agents. In particular, the
agents exchange, during dialogues, only information they are prepared to concede.
Moreover, they need to engage in sequences of an even number of dialogues, tak-
ing turns in playing roles of nominator and challenger. Finally, agents need to be
truthful, in contributing only views they actually hold, but only insofar as bringing
into dialogues everything they are aware of that is relevant to the conflict.
We have defined a form of rational conflict resolution based on the admissibility
semantics for argumentation, and made use of results in Chapters 4 and 5 to prove
that successful sequences of dialogues resolve conflicts.
7.4 Discovery Dialogues
In addition to the six dialogue types described in Chapter 2, McBurney and Parsons
[MP01] introduce discovery as an additional type of dialogue, different from other
types in that:
“[discovery dialogues] discover something not previously known; the
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question whose truth is to be ascertained may only emerge in the
course of the dialogue.”
In this section, we show how our dialogue framework can be instantiated to support
a special type of discovery dialogues.
Unlike information-seeking and inquiry dialogues, where dialogues starting from
a known proposition, in discovery dialogues, there may be no such known propo-
sition to start with. Instead, the dialogue participants face an open problem; they
must decide on an abstract description of the goal of the dialogue and proceed by
putting forward information that may contribute to identify the proposition and
determine its acceptability.
In this section, we focus on a particular type of discovery dialogue, in which the
two participating agents start from the same abstract description of the proposition.
We call this abstract description the goal. None of the two agents have sufficient
information to produce an acceptable concrete realisation of this goal. The agents’
task is then to discover an acceptable goal realisation.
In order to perform the joint discovery, the dialogue starts by one agent putting
forward a sentence. Then the two agents can either expand this sentence in a top-
down manner to explore its supports and attacks or bottom-up inference to identify
any “higher level” arguments that are supported by it.
7.4.1 Another Movie Example
We again alter the two agents watching a movie example shown in Section 7.3.1
to illustrate our concept of discovery.
Example 42. Two agents, Jenny and Amy, are planning a film night. They would
like to jointly decide on a movie. Jenny wants to pick a fun movie. She finds action
movies fun. Jenny also worries about going home late so she prefers a movie that
finishes by 10 o’clock. Amy knows that Terminator is screening and is an action
movie. She also knows that Terminator finishes by 10 o’clock. Amy does not have
any preference in selecting a movie. In order to reach agreement, the two agents
may conduct a dialogue as follows.
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Jenny: Let’s find a movie to watch.
Amy: Sure, I know Terminator is an action movie.
Jenny: That’s interesting. I think action movies are pretty fun.
Amy: We can watch Terminator, if it is fun and has the right screening time.
Jenny: Agreed. I think Terminator starts at the right time.
Amy: Are you sure it won’t be too late?
Jenny: Why?
Amy: I don’t know. I am just afraid so.
Jenny: It won’t be too late if it finishes by 10 o’clock.
Amy: I see. Indeed Terminator finishes by 10 o’clock.
Jenny: OK.
Amy: OK.
Jenny starts the dialogue by putting forward the goal of determining some movie
to watch. Then Amy supplies one possibly relevant fact, that Terminator is an
action movie. This is just a guess, in the sense that the agent does not know whether
a goal realisation can be found by exploring information related to Terminator.
From this utterance, agents reason bottom-up until Amy’s second utterance. Then
they start top-down. From the initial guess, the dialogue constructs arguments both
for and against watching Terminator. After examining the arguments, the agents
decide that Terminator is a good movie to watch.
7.4.2 Discovery Dialogue Formulation
To implement discovery, we specialise the definition of utterance (Definition 1) so
it accommodates a modified content field and a richer ID, as follows.
Definition 70. An utterance from agent ai to agent aj (i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j) with
respect to L is a tuple 〈ai, aj , Target, C, ID〉, where:
• C (the content) is of one of the following forms:
1. goal(G) for some G such that ∃XG is a goal;
2. rl(s0 ← s1, . . . , sm) for some s0, . . . , sm ∈ L (a rule);
3. asm(a) for some a ∈ L (an assumption);
4. ctr(a, s) for some a, s ∈ L (a contrary);
5. a pass sentence pi, such that pi /∈ L.
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• ID is a pair [N,R], whereN ∈ N andR is either td (top-down), bu (bottom-
up) or nr (not-related) (the identifier).
• Target ∈ N (the target); Target ≤ ID.
In the above definition, we overload “<” and “=” when comparing a target and
an ID such that given a target t and an ID id = [n, r], t < id if and only if t < n
and t = id if and only if t = n. This definition is based on Definition 1, but (1)
this definition adds the new related field (R) in an identifier to indicate different
utterance relations (td, bu or nr); (2) there is no “claim” used in this definition;
and (3) it allows goal( ) as the content of an utterance.
Similarly to previous chapters, we refer to an utterance with content other than
pi and goal( ) as regular-utterance.
We then redefine the notion of top-down related (Definition 11) as follows:
Definition 71. For two utterances ui 6= uj , uj is top-down related to ui if and
only if ui = 〈 , , , Ci, [id, ]〉, uj = 〈 , , id, Cj , [ , td]〉, and one of the following
holds:
1. Cj = rl(ρj), Head(ρj) = h and either Ci = rl(ρi) with h ∈ Body(ρi), or
Ci = ctr( , h);
2. Cj = asm(a) and either Ci = rl(ρ) with a ∈ Body(ρ), or Ci = ctr( , a);
3. Cj = ctr(a, ) and Ci = asm(a).
This modification does not consider claim utterances (as these are not allowed
here). Intuitively, an utterance is top-down related to another if its target is the iden-
tifier of the latter and it contributes to expanding an argument (cases 1), identifies
an assumption in the support of an argument (cases 2) or starts the construction of
a counter-argument (case 3).
Similarly, we define the notion of bottom-up related as follows.
Definition 72. For two utterances ui 6= uj , uj is bottom-up related to ui if and only
if ui = 〈 , , , Ci, [id, ]〉 and uj = 〈 , , id, Cj , [ , bu]〉, and one of the following
holds:
1. Ci = rl(ρi), Cj = rl(ρj), and Head(ρi) ∈ Body(ρj);
2. Ci = asm(a), Cj = rl(ρ), and a ∈ Body(ρ).
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Intuitively, an utterance is bottom-up related to another if its target is the iden-
tifier of the latter and it forms a “higher level” argument supported by its target.
In this section, we say that an utterance uj is related to ui if uj is either top-down
or bottom-up related to ui. Also, no pass-utterance can be related to a regular-
utterance and no utterance can be related to a pass-utterance.
After defining utterances, we alter Definition 2 to define discovery dialogues, as
follows.
Definition 73. A discovery dialogue dDaiaj (G) (between ai and aj , for goal G with
respect to L), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, is a finite sequence 〈u1, . . . , un〉, n ≥ 0, where
each ul, l = 1, . . . , n, is an utterance from ai or aj (with respect to L), u1 is an
utterance from ai, and:
1. the content of ul is goal(G) if and only if l = 1;
2. the content of u2 is either rl( ) or asm( );
3. u1 and u2 are of the form 〈 , , 0, , [ , nr]〉;
4. the target of pass-utterances is 0;
5. each regular-utterance ul, l > 2, is related to its target utterance;
6. no two consecutive utterances are pass-utterances, other than possibly the
last two utterances, un−1 and un;
7. the identifier of ui is [i, ].
This definition requires dialogues to start with a goal (the first utterance). The
second utterance must be a rule or an assumption. Agents make this utterance
with a “wild guess” in the hope that a goal realisation can be found by exploring
around this guess. All subsequent regular-utterance must be related to some earlier
utterance in the dialogue. This definition is a variant of Definition 2 with dialogues
starting with a goal rather than a claim and the second utterance being not related
to the first. An example dialogue is given below.
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〈J,A, 0, goal(watchMovie(X)), [1, nr]〉
〈A, J, 0, rl(actionMovie(Ter)←), [2, nr]〉
〈J,A, 2, rl(fun(Ter)← actionMovie(Ter)), [3, bu]〉
〈A, J, 3, rl(watchMovie(Ter)← fun(Ter), goodScreenTime(Ter)), [4, bu]〉
〈J,A, 4, asm(goodScreenTime(Ter)), [5, td]〉
〈A, J, 5, ctr(goodScreenTime(Ter), late(Ter)), [6, td]〉
〈J,A, 0, pi, [7, nr]〉
〈A, J, 6, asm(late(Ter)), [8, td]〉
〈J,A, 8, ctr(late(Ter),finishByTen(Ter)), [9, td]〉
〈A, J, 9, rl(finishByTen(Ter)←), [10, td]〉
〈J,A, 0, pi, [11, nr]〉
〈A, J, 0, pi, [12, nr]〉
An informal reading of this dialogue is given in Section 7.4.1. In this section, U
and D stand for the sets, respectively, of all utterances as in Definition 70 and of
all dialogues as in Definition 73.
Since discovery dialogues (Definition 73) are specialised dialogues (Defini-
tion 2), we will not redefine concepts such as the ABA framework drawn from
a dialogue (Definition 5), legal-move functions (Definition 6), and outcome func-
tions (Definition 8). Rather, we will reuse these concepts as they are defined for
discovery dialogues. Moreover, for simplicity, we will also assume that all (discov-
ery) dialogues in discussion are compatible with a one-way expansion legal-move
function (Definition 30). Moreover, as we illustrated in the above example, we
support one and only one “wild guess” in a discovery dialogue.
7.4.3 Debate Trees Revisited
To ensure our discovery dialogue computes admissible results for a given goal, we
again use debate trees as the commitment store to keep track of information that
has been disclosed in dialogues.
When constructing a debate tree from a discovery dialogue, we use a subset
of utterances presented in the dialogue. Similar to Example 11, this extraction
ignores the goal- and pass-utterances, i.e. a debate tree is extracted from the goal-
/pi-pruned sequence obtained from a dialogue, consisting of all regular-utterances.
Furthermore, by Definition 73, for all utterances u = 〈 , , , , [i, R]〉 in a goal-/pi-
pruned sequence, if i > 1, then R is either td or bu.
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We show the following process constructs a debate-tree from a discovery dia-
logue.
Lemma 14. Given a discovery dialogue dDaiaj (χ) = δ, the goal-/pi-pruned se-
quence δ′ = 〈u′1 . . . , u′m〉 obtained from δ, let T 0(δ), T 1(δ), . . . , T m(δ) con-
structed from δ′ as defined below constructs a tree, then T m(δ) is a debate tree
(L,L′ ∈ {P, O}, L 6= L′) if and only if T 0(δ), T 1(δ), . . . , T m(δ) are constructed
as follows.
1. T 0(δ) is empty;
2. T 1(δ) is constructed as follows,
a) if the content of u′1 is asm(α), then T 1(δ) consists only of (α,ma :
P[2]);
b) if the content of u′1 is rl(h← b1, . . . , bl), then T 1(δ) consists of l + 1
nodes, where (h,mr : P[2]) is a new node and
(b1, um : P[2]), . . . , (bl, um : P[2])
are children of (h,mr : P[2]).
3. Let T i(δ) be the i-th tree, for 0 < i < m, let u′i+1 = 〈 , , t, C, [id,R]〉,
and let u′t = 〈 , , , Ct, [t, ]〉 be the target utterance of u′i+1; then T i+1(δ)
is obtained according to one of the following cases:
a) If R = td, then
• if C = rl(h← b1, . . . , bl) then T i+1(δ) is T i(δ) with additional
l nodes:
(b1, um : L[id]), . . . , (bl, um : L[id])
as children of the node (h, um : L[t]), and this node is replaced
by (h,mr : L[id]).
• if C = asm(α) then T i+1(δ) is T i(δ) with the node
(α, um : L[t]) replaced by (α,ma : L[id]).
• if C = ctr(α, c) then T i+1(δ) is T i(δ) with an additional node:
(c, um : L[id]) child of (α,ma : L′[t]),whereL,L′ ∈ {P,O}, L 6=
L′.
b) If R = bu, then
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• C = rl(h← b1, . . . , bl), T i+1(δ) is T i(δ) with l additional nodes,
in which there is a node (h,mr : L[id]), parent of (bt, F : L[t]),
such that
– if Ct = rl(h′ ← b′1, . . . , b′k), then bt = h′, F = mr;
– if Ct = asm(α), then bt = α, F = ma;
and the remaining l − 1 nodes are
(b′′1, um : L[id]), . . . , (b
′′
l−1, um : L[id]),
children of (h,mr : L[id]), where {b′′1, . . . , b′′l−1}= {b1, . . . , bl}\
{bt}.
Proof. Similar to the proof for Lemma 2, we show that all conditions in Defini-
tion 15 are met in the process. Condition 1(a-c) are met for the same reason that
they met in Lemma 2 that all nodes in T m(δ) correspond to utterances in δ. Con-
ditions 2(a) through 2(f) in Definition 15 are met by the process given in 3(a) and
3(b) in this lemma.
Since the above inductive process yields a debate tree under the condition that
T m(δ) is a tree, we will refer to T m(δ) as a debate in general. Figure 7.1 gives
the construction of the debate drawn from the dialogue in our example3. Note that
this is a tree but in general it may not be.
To ensure a debate as a tree, we give the following definition.
Definition 74. A debate T (δ) is properly-structured if and only if it is a tree.
This definition is needed as we need to rule out the case of related utterances
with contents of the form p ← q, q ← r and p′ ← q, where the second utterance
is top-down related to the first and the third is bottom-up related to the second.
Clearly, such situation prevents a properly-structured debate tree being built.
We ensure debate trees drawn from our dialogues are properly-structured with a
legal-move function, as follows.
Definition 75. A (one-way expansion) legal-move function λ : D 7→ U is a
properly-structured legal-move function if and only if for every dialogue δ ∈ D
such that T (δ) is properly-structured, then T (δ ◦λ(δ)) is also properly-structured.
3↑ represents expanding a rule within an argument. ⇑ represents the attack relation between argu-
ments. Here, wM, aM, gST, fBT, and T are a shorthand for watchMovie, actionMovie, good-
ScreenTime, finishByTen, and Terminator, respectively.
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utterance1 utterance2 utterance3
(wM(T ),mr : P[4])
(fun(T ),mr : P[3]) (fun(T ),mr : P[3])
OO
(gST(T ), um : P[4])
ll
(aM(T ),mr : P[2]) (aM(T ),mr : P[2])
OO
(aM(T ),mr : P[2])
OO
utterance4 utterance5
(wM(T ),mr : P[4]) (wM(T ),mr : P[4])
(fun(T ),mr : P[3])
OO
(gST(T ),ma : P[5])
ll
(fun(T ),mr : P[3])
OO
(gST(T ),ma : P[5])
ll
(aM(T ),mr : P[2])
OO
(aM(T ),mr : P[2])
OO
(late(T ), um : O[6])
KS
utterance7 utterance8
(wM(T ),mr : P[4]) (wM(T ),mr : P[4])
(fun(T ),mr : P[3])
OO
(gST(T ),ma : P[5])
ll
(fun(T ),mr : P[3])
OO
(gST(T ),ma : P[5])
ll
(aM(T ),mr : P[2])
OO
(late(T ),ma : O[8])
KS
(aM(T ),mr : P[2])
OO
(late(T ),ma : O[8])
KS
utterance9 (fBT(T ), um : P[9])
KS
(wM(T ),mr : P[4])
(fun(T ),mr : P[3])
OO
(gST(T ),ma : P[5])
ll
(aM(T ),mr : P[2])
OO
(late(T ),ma : O[8])
KS
(fBT(T ),mr : P[10])
KS
Figure 7.1: The construction of the debate tree drawn from the discovery dialogue
in Example 42.
We use λps to denote a generic properly-structured legal-move function.
Given that Lemma 14 has shown that debate trees can be constructed from dis-
covery dialogue that are compatible with λps. We can obtain the following admis-
sibility result of the goal of a discovery dialogue.
Theorem 10. Given a successful discovery dialogue δ = dDaiaj (G), let (Gβ, :
P[ ]) be the root node of a properly structured debate tree T (δ), where σ = {X/t}.
Then Gβ is a goal realisation for G with respect to to the ABA framework drawn
from δ.
Proof. If Gβ is the sentence in the root node of T (δ) and δ is successful, then Gβ is
admissible with respect toAFδ, the ABA framework drawn from δ, by Corollary 1.
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Hence Gβ is a goal realisation with respect to AFδ.
7.4.4 Related Work
McBurney and Parsons [MP01] present a modelling for chance discovery dialogue.
The formal system in that work is defined with locutions and rules without linking
to any argumentation framework, whereas our work is based on ABA. There is no
argumentation semantics used in examining the result of their dialogues, whereas
our work makes the connection to the admissibility semantics. Moreover, [MP01]
focuses on chance discovery, whereas our work is applicable to any discoveries as
long as the desired outcome can be qualified, essentially, by a predicate.
Rybakov [Ryb09] presents a logic modelling of chance discovery. Our work
differs from that as is focuses on a dialogue system for discovery whereas his is
mainly concerned with constructing a modal/temporal modelling for chance dis-
covery.
Fisher [Fis97] presents a mechanism for concurrent theorem-proving. In his
setting, the knowledge base (a set of formulae) is distributed at different objects
and each object continuously broadcasts messages about its formulae. Upon re-
ceiving messages, an object makes inferences, transforms its formulae and sends
out further messages. Even though similarity exists, this work is vastly different
from ours as (1) it does not focus on discovering any particular information; (2)
it is not concerned with either agents or dialogues; (3) it requires formulae to be
represented in Horn Clauses. No formal results have been shown in [Fis97].
7.4.5 Summary
In this section, we introduce a formal modelling for a form of discovery dialogue
for two agents, in which the desired outcomes are only partially known when di-
alogues start. In our setting, the two agents share the same discovery goal but
neither of the two agents is capable of discovering a justified goal realisation that
fulfils the shared goal. A discovery dialogue is successful if a goal realisation is
found through the dialogue.
In our model, the dialogue effectively starts by one agent putting forward a piece
of information that might be related to the goal realisation. Through dialogues,
more information that is related to the initial utterance is gathered and examined.
This process is defined with legal-move functions with the help of constructing a
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debate tree. We examine the acceptability of the goal realisation with the admissi-
bility semantics.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented our formal modelling of conflict resolution and
discovery dialogues. Our conflict resolution is realised through a sequence of di-
alogues. Our discovery dialogue is realised by recognising the “bottom-up” rela-
tion between utterances. They both demonstrate how our dialogue model can be
applied to various settings.
145
8 Conclusion
This thesis is about argumentation based multi-agent dialogues. As we state in
Chapter 1, this thesis is set to show that:
Argumentation dialogues are a viable means for agents to exchange
information and deliberate.
We achieve this goal by firstly constructing a dialogue model (Chapter 3, 4 and
5) and then demonstrate how this model can be instantiated in various types of
dialogue (Chapter 6 and 7). The model is sound in that if the two agents follow
our protocol to construct a dialogue and our model states that the dialogue is suc-
cessful, then the claim of the dialogue is acceptable with respect to the information
disclosed in the dialogue.
We have given a fair amount of definitions in this thesis, though we have shown a
relatively small amount of propositions, lemmas, and theorems. This is not unusual
given the theoretical aspects of this thesis and high level of formality we achieve.
We claim that our dialogue model has two main advantages:
1. our dialogues output results that meet certain soundness criteria as our dia-
logue model is built upon a general-purpose, widely applicable argumenta-
tion framework, ABA, with established connection with argumentation se-
mantics;
2. our dialogue model is generic and flexible as it is composed of many loosely
coupled components (i.e., legal-move, outcome, and strategy-move func-
tions) that enjoy the freedom in swapping between them to construct dia-
logues with different goals.
Over the course of the thesis, in addition to constructing our dialogue model, we
have made some other contributions as well, such as:
1. formalising a few types of dialogues, namely information-seeking, inquiry,
persuasion, conflict-resolution, and discovery (Chapter 6 and 7); and
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2. using mechanism design techniques to analyse agent behaviours in persua-
sion dialogues (Chapter 6).
These results open up many possibilities for future investigation, as discussed be-
low.
In a broader scope, this thesis has made a few contributions in argumentation,
multi-agent systems, and the field of artificial intelligence as follows.
• In the field of argumentation, a dialogic model, as the one we presented in
this thesis, brings dynamics into argumentation system. Argumentation is
meant to be an interactive process where information is exchanged. How-
ever, much research on argumentation treats it as a static process in which
the main concern is to reason “correctly” from a fixed set of postulates. A
dialogic approach brings interaction and dynamics to the reasoning process
and provides a more applicable modelling of argumentation.
• In the field of multi-agent system, as we stated in Chapter 1, agents need to
communicate and interact with each other. This thesis contributes to formal-
ising high level agents communication. As presented throughout this thesis
and discussed earlier, our approach is sound and flexible.
• In the field of artificial intelligence in general, where, as Russell and Norvig
[RN03] point out, AI is about understanding as well as building intelligent
entities, our work should be understood in the context of enabling more ca-
pable software or hardware agents. Moreover, our work can be viewed as an
attempt to bring formalism to some areas, e.g., dialogue taxonomy, which
are predominantly presented informally. Such effort is worthwhile as it en-
ables us in understanding these areas more concretely and systematically.
This thesis has touched upon a variety of topics. Some of them have been in-
vestigated more thoroughly than others. Nevertheless, a large amount of new work
can continue the research presented in this thesis. We divide our discussion on
future work into two groups: refinement and extensions.
We first talk about refinement. For conflict resolution and discovery dialogues,
we have only shown admissibility results. Moreover, we have forced conflict res-
olution dialogues to be focused and discovery dialogues to be compatible with a
one-way expansion legal-move function. Both constraints can be lifted by using
results based on debate forests rather than debate trees. In this way, more generic
dialogues can be modelled.
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The work on persuasion dialogues with mechanism design can also be enhanced.
In that work, we have defined the “damage” of a (potentially lying) utterance and
the possibility of an utterance being considered as a lie to be some constants given
to agents. Clearly, both values are not easily quantifiable. Hence, it would be
interesting to see algorithms that estimate these values.
As for extensions, it would be interesting to see our dialogue model being used
in other types of dialogues, namely, negotiation and deliberation. Both types of
dialogues may require a new modelling of agent utility and/or action utility.
Secondly, it would be useful to experiment our dialogue model with other argu-
mentation semantics, e.g., prefered. Since we obtain soundness results by mapping
debate trees to dispute trees, it is easy to extend our results to any new semantics
if it is computed with some dispute trees.
Thirdly, as discussed in [WK95], many real dialogues are sequences of sub-
dialogues of different types. Our current dialogue model supports single dialogues.
It would be interesting to see how our model can be extended to support generic
dialogue sequences.
Lastly, if we consider that the study of agent dialogues should contribute to
agent understanding of human dialogues, then it would be interesting to study
how human dialogues represented in natural language can be translated into some
machine readable formal models. Moreover, if such translation is robust, then pos-
sibly many interesting inferencing can be performed over the constructed model
and then useful feedbacks can be generated and sent to human users in natural lan-
guage. Such achievement would advance many studies in dialogue systems and
artificial intelligence as a whole.
To conclude, by designing a generic argumentation based dialogue model, prov-
ing its soundness, applying it to several types of dialogues, we have shown that:
argumentation dialogues is a viable means for agents to exchange information and
deliberate, as we originally aimed.
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